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Drawing an arc from Narcissus’ encounter with his own reflection, tracking through 
varieties and modalities of glassy surfaces and technologies through history, from the 
mirror to the lens, microscope and telescope, camera obscura and panopticon, to 
contemporary techno-cultural phenomena of the ‘digital age’ the concern of this work is 
to determine how mirrors, lenses, screens and monitors have shaped our social and 
conceptual modes of existence. The four parts of this dissertation all illustrate how glass 
technology modalities of vitreous optic has contributed to the development of the various 
spheres of our life, and vice versa. The general hypothesis shows how intertwined we are 
with our material production beyond the reductive perspectives of technological 
determinism and social constructivism; and, more specifically, the thesis argues that the 
vitreous optics of the contemporary age –the computer game, the smartphone, social 
media platforms and networks- have profound ramifications that are redefining 



















The purpose of this project is mostly inspired by Jean Baudrillard whose work, ‘The 
Transparency of Evil’, states explicitly: 
"We lived once in a world where the realm of the imaginary was governed by the 
mirror, by dividing one into two, by theatre, by otherness and alienation. Today 
that realm is the realm of screen, of interfaces and duplication, of contiguity and 
networks. All our machines are screens, and the inter-activity of humans has been 
replaced by the interactivity of screens" (Baudrillard, 1993, 61). 
Hence, my project aims: 
- To specifically outline the metaphysical, symbolic characteristics of glass. 
- To outline how peoples’ thinking and social environments are greatly influenced 
by technical devices, materials, and technology, and to explore the attachments 
which can develop, often beyond the realm of the device’s objective use. 
 
Composed of various research attitudes, the project will include historical analysis of 
concepts, essentially focusing on those of Plato, Galileo, and Galilei.  With inspiration 
drawn primarily from Martin Jay’s work. Other important sources include social analysis 
(Baudrillard and Azuma), deconstructive method (Baudrillard), and theoretical 
approaches (Bergson and Deleuze). 
 
The basis of my studies is found in selected works by Baudrillard (The Transparency of 
Evil, 1990, Simulacra and Simulation, 1981 and The System of Objects, 1968), Hiroki 
Azuma (Otaku: Japan’s Database Animals, 2009) and Martin Jay (Downcast Eyes, 
1993). These theorists, although belonging to the same historical period, come from 
various countries and therefore have different cultural contexts. I am going to examine 
their thoughts in my project as they directly approach many points of my proposal. The 
research of Baudrillard and Azuma individualize the characteristics of the screen both as 
symbol and instrument. Baudrillard also hints at differences and similarities, even more 
importantly, between the screen and his predecessor, the mirror. Martin Jay illustrates the 
history of ocularcentrism, the domination of sight within both society and philosophy 
since ancient history, and the underlying implications that technical enhancement had on 




However, Baudrillard’s works concerning the passage ‘from the mirror phase to the 
screen phase’ do not address a specific argument on the metaphysical symbolic 
characteristics of glass, the vitreous optic, but they can be considered, as the essay of 
Azuma, a part of a more ample research studying the link between contemporary society 
and technology. 
 
My scope comprises of two areas of study, which examine from multiple angles the 
prominence of glass, both symbolically and concretely, to underline how the specific 
development of intelligence and society since Ancient history has been strictly entwined 
with this actual item/material. The second objective is to briefly illustrate how glass has 
historically been the most representative instantiation of the strict connection between 
intelligence, technology, materials and objects but nonetheless contingent. I will also 
consider how different materials can instantiate such a connection with different 
outcomes, so as to leave a door open for future possibilities in human development. 
 
Each part will correspond to a different phase, and a different method, in view of passing 
gradually from the introduction to the vitreous optic and its eventual deconstruction 
through a general redefinition of technology. This approach will be necessary to 
demonstrate the existence of a metaphysics of glass behind the concrete development of 
thought, intelligence and human action. Furthermore, it will comprehend, and ultimately 
address the arbitrariness of its course. 
 
The first part of this project will expose the origin of the mirror phase in ancient history 
and the middle ages. By Plato’s dialogue Alcibiades and the myth of Narcissus, I will 
demonstrate the first use of the mirror metaphor in philosophy and how the Greek thinkers 
afterwards conceived the functioning/thinking of the mind as a reflective mirror. In this 
regard, I will identify the connection between the first and basic philosophical ideas of 
conscience, the double, reflection and speculation, and the first form of the hidden glass 
metaphysics. For instance, I will outline how the mind (thus intelligence) has emerged 
and developed from the mirror metaphor. The latter has in fact posed criticisms of the 





The second part will focus on the lens phase. This part will be presented from stages of 
the journey and execution of imaginary evolution and human technology concerning the 
use of glass from the mirror to the screen. The gradualness of this transformation and the 
co-existence of the various metaphors in human history will, therefore, be highlighted. 
The lens will be considered as an exhaustive symbol, and instrument of modern age 
society and philosophy. With particular attention to the interest of Spinoza, Descartes, 
Leibniz and other modern philosophers for practical applications of the lens, I will 
identify the characteristics of this new metaphor, related to modern thinking and will 
compare this phase with the previous one, the mirror. We will also demonstrate how the 
new instrument altered the technical performance of human intelligence, by indirectly 
changing the consideration of the body (as object) and the mind (as subject). Finally, I 
will detect the gradual passage from this phase to the next: the screen. 
 
The third part will focus on the screen phase. I will refer to Deleuze, considering his 
philosophical interest in cinema (specifically Cinema1: The movement image and Cinema 
2: The Time-Image), emphasizing a first manifestation of the screen: stage in which 
integration of man with the machine (adopting the expression of Baudrillard) had not been 
manifested yet: in which, however, the first great transformations and characteristics of 
this new technical instrument already appear. I will then analyze television (the second 
stage of this phase) and the post-World War II society which it contributed to shaping- 
referring to Baudrillard’s insights on this matter. 
 
The fourth part will focus on the contemporary phase of the vitreous optic: the monitor 
phase. In this regard, I will address Baudrillard when analyzing the increased integration 
operated by video games, computers and smartphones, due to their new haptic and 
interactive characteristics. Furthermore, I will demonstrate the aspects of this new phase, 
both in symbolic and concrete terms, by also referring to authors from game studies. 
Moreover, the analysis by the Japanese philosopher, Hiroki Azuma in Otaku: Japan’s 
Database Animals, with references to Baudrillard (particularly in the discussion 
pertaining to the use of simulacrum by the Otaku online community) will help me with 
the part concerning the characteristics of the use of the computer in the Otaku culture, 
with, reference to the same physical characteristics of the monitor and how it is 





The Conclusions will reflect on what is revealed by this work and will be divided into 
two chapters. 
The first chapter will detect and summarize the common characteristics of the entire 
vitreous optic, which are also some of the main features shared by all cultures since 
ancient Greece. 
The second chapter will examine how technical manipulation is an essential characteristic 
of intelligence. In order to address this issue, we will refer to Henri Bergson's thesis 
concerning the genealogy of intelligence, that of Creative Evolution, and Bruno Latour’s 
innovative view on things, materials, and technology, expressed in his texts An Inquiry 
into Modes of Existence, Reassembling the Social and in his short essay Why Has Critique 
Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern. 
By referring to the work of Latour and by addressing, through a specific study case (i.e. 
the history of the crafting of glass), the more general entanglement of practical 
interactions with materiality (e.g. production, crafting, use of objects), thought, 
perception, experience and collectives within history, this project is at the intersection of 
sociology, social studies of science and technology, and actor--‐network theory. 
  
Moreover, this project offers a grand narrative, which is nevertheless displayed as an 
active, engaged, selective reconstruction of specific historical processes, expressed by the 
choice of focusing on a specific material. In other words, this research does not aim 
toward a completely exhaustive analysis of historical relationship between technology 
and ‘human beings’. This thesis leaves open future possible studies concerning other 
materials, which had been relevant in the development of history, such as metal. 
 
Finally, this thesis follows the return to materiality in the study of technology supported 
and somehow inaugurated by Friedrich Kittler (1943-2011), but it also avoids 
technological determinism and focusing merely on modernity. In this regard, the use of a 
non-reductionist and multidimensional methodology inspired to Latour’s ANT (Actor-





I   MIRROR PHASE (FROM ANCIENT GREECE TO THE 
MIDDLE AGES) 
 
A. MIRROR OF DECEPTIVENESS 
1. The Deceived Narcissus 
The mirror phase takes its first form mostly through Greek mythology, and philosophy, 
only later, enhances it. Greek myths feature the mirror as a powerful magical object, both 
deceptive and truthful, dangerous and helpful; it was in fact ‘for centuries a rare object 
endowed with magical and often disturbing powers' (Bonnet, 2014, 9). For instance, there 
are three central myths that both denote and code the rise of the mirror symbolically and 
concretely: the myth of Narcissus, the tale of Perseus and Medusa, and the myth of 
Dionysus and the Titans. This chapter focuses specifically on these two tales mostly 
concerning the deceptiveness of the mirror. The latter tale will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
 
The story of Narcissus ‘plays only a tangential role in Greek mythology' (Galinsky, 1975, 
529). It was Ovid who rescued it ‘from lapsing totally into an inane fairy tale’ (Ibid, 1975, 
52) by providing ‘some motivation for Narcissus which would compensate for the 
improbability of the paradox. The motivation he provides is Narcissus’ inability to go 
beyond himself. Because of this deficiency he destroys others and ultimately himself’ 
(Ibid., 52). Summing up the notorious Ovid’s version, ‘Narcissus falls in love with his 
own shadow [reflection], which he sees in a fountain [well]; and, pining to death, the 
Gods change him into a flower, which still bears his name’ (Ovid, 1876, 103). As 
recounted in the Metamorphoses: ‘While he is drinking, being attracted with the reflection 
of his own form, seen in the water, he falls in love with a thing that has no substance; and 
he thinks that to be a body, which is but a shadow’ (Ibid., III. 413-445). Narcissus later 
states: ‘I wish that he who is beloved could enjoy a longer life. Now we two, of one mind, 
shall die in the extinction of one life’ (Ibid., III. 445-480). ‘In his grief Narcissus beats his 
breast with such force that it turns red and when he sees the effect of his flagellation in 
his reflected image, he collapses in an autoerotic paroxysm (480-7)’ (Galinsky, 1975, 59). 
 
‘The misfortune of Narcissus, whose story has been retold so often since Ovid, was to 
have chosen the lowest degree of knowledge, that of his reflection. He was punished by 
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Nemesis for having scorned Echo’s love, for having refused the mediation of the other in 
the construction of the self. There was certainly not yet a psychological implication to the 
fable in antiquity, but only the passing of a moral judgement on a young man overtaken 
by madness and excess, confusing illusion with reality and making himself his own aim 
rather than investing himself in the polis’ (Bonnet, 2014, 106). The reason for Narcissus’s 
own tragic demise is his hybris, that pride, arrogance, excessive self-confidence the entire 
Greek tradition has always judged as the worst possible vice, or rather the reason behind 
every excess and vice. Acting according to hybris meant defying the norms established 
by the gods and bringing about one's own downfall. Such conception is the religious and 
mythological counterpart of a social sphere still constituted as a community, by a strict 
sense of belonging toward the place of birth. The norms of the community, like the norms 
of the gods, constituted the basic perimeter of meaning for one's own existence. Breaking 
them for mere self-gain corresponded to suicidal behavior. The unencumbered self (as 
conceived by modernity) was inconceivable for both the Ancient History and the Middle 
Ages. The single individual was strictly determined and defined by his/her culture and 
tradition. There was not an abstract, universal and general concept for defining 
‘individuals'. A single individual could not exist without the community he belongs to, 
where he was born and where he had to be brought back once dead. In old heroic societies, 
as such as the Homeric one or in Celtic Ireland: 
‘The individual has a given role and status within a well-defined and highly 
determinate system of roles and statuses. The key structures are those of kinship 
and the household. In such a society a man knows who he is by knowing his role 
in these structures; and in knowing this he knows also what he owes and what is 
owed to him by the occupant of every other role and status' (McIntyre, 2007, 122). 
 
It is true that Greek ethics, culminating in Aristotle's both ethical and political discourse, 
was teleological ethics based on the concept of selfhood, whereby the goal of each free 
adult male citizen of the polis was achieving happiness (eudemonia), conceived as self-
flourishing. Aristotle defines it explicitly in his Nicomachean Ethics as ‘a certain kind of 
exercise of the vital faculties in accordance with excellence or virtue’ (Aristotle, 1893, 
23). 
However, the cultural context of the polis always determines the virtue (arête) necessary 
to achieve self-flourishing. In other words, the virtues that the Greeks take into account 




Moreover, the fact that eudemonia refers to excellence makes it an objective judgment 
independent from one's feeling and knowledge. The excellence of man is also the 
‘excellence, not of body, but of soul; for happiness we take to be an activity of the soul' 
(Ibid., 30), whereby virtues correspond to the wellbeing of the soul. 
 
Finally, Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics always refers to himself and his point of 
view by using the first person plural subjective pronoun ‘we' instead of the singular ‘I'. 
That ‘we' corresponds to a common ethical tradition, a specific form of social agency 
instead of the ‘I' of personal thought on ethics. In fact, "‘What do we say on such and 
such a topic?' is a question that he continuously asks, not, 'What do I say?' Who is this 
'we' in whose name he writes? Aristotle takes himself not to be inventing an account of 
the virtues, but to be articulating an account that is implicit in the thought, utterance and 
action of an educated Athenian" (McIntyre, 2007, 147-148). Aristotle unwarily viewed 
himself just as a portion of Athens, without which the existence his self and soul would 
have been utterly impossible. 
 
In both Homeric and classical Greek traditions, the word ‘soul' was a synonym for 
selfhood, describing mind, consciousness, and spirit altogether. Moreover, the soul was 
not conceived in mere individualistic terms: ‘soul' and ‘self' correspond to a unique 
concept and always refer to a community. 
It is within this classicist cultural context and the older heroic social context of the 
Homeric world that the tale of Narcissus assumes the function of a warning and the mirror 
an instrument of temptation. 
 
2. The Deceiving Perseus 
The goddess Athena accompanied the hero and demigod Perseus in his quest to decapitate 
the Gorgon Medusa and retrieve her head. ‘Now, the Gorgon Medusa had serpents for 
hair, huge teeth, protruding tongue, and altogether so ugly a face that all who gazed at it 
were petrified with fright’ (Graves, 1960, 238-239). To help him succeed, Athena warned 
Perseus ‘never to look at Medusa directly, but only at her reflection, and presented him 
with a brightly-polished shield’ (Ibid., 239). Once in front of the Gorgon, the hero ‘fixed 
his eyes on the reflection in the shield […] and he cut off [her] head with one stroke’ 




This story corresponds to ‘the contest for power between the Medusan gaze and its 
apotropaic antidote’ (Jay, 1994, 33), which corresponds to ‘the brightly-polished shield’ 
wielded by the hero. 
This myth dates to a time before Homer, and it thus embodies the dawn of Greek Heroic 
society, when the first triumph of a purported male rationality against female irrationality 
occurs. However, the first form of rationality expressed by pre-Homeric mythology 
differs quite notably from the Homeric one, and the later development of philosophy. 
 
Various myths along the tale of Perseus exemplify the passage from a pseudo-matriarchal 
society to a pre-agricultural society, based mostly on hunting. All these tales share the 
same image: a beautiful male god, demigod or hero incorporates faculties and 
characteristics that are supposed to qualify untamed women. To accomplish this deed he 
must kill, eat or subdue a goddess or a female monster. The most evocative amongst these 
female skills was cunning, as archetypically illustrated by the myth of Zeus and Metis – 
the Greek word originally meaning ‘magical cunning' and after that ‘craft' or ‘wisdom' as 
practical wisdom. 
“Zeus lusted after Metis the Titaness, who turned into many shapes to escape him 
until she was caught at last and got ‘with child’. An oracle of Mother Earth then 
declared that this would be a girl-child and that, if Metis conceived again, she 
would bear a son who was fated to depose Zeus […]. Therefore, having coaxed 
Metis to a couch with honeyed words, Zeus suddenly opened his mouth and 
swallowed her, […] he claimed afterward that she gave him counsel from inside 
his belly. In due process, he was seized by a raging headache […] so that his skull 
seemed about to burst […]. [Zeus] persuaded Hephaestus to […] make a breach 
in [his] […] skull, form which Athene sprang, fully armed, with a mighty shout” 
(Graves, 1960, 46). 
 
This tale symbolizes the domination of Greek patriarchal society over matriarchal society, 
and thus the appropriation of female skills in what was the primary source of livelihood 
at that time: hunting. To be applied to this activity, rationality - exclusively attributed to 
men – required in fact the incorporation of cunning, an instinctual quality usually 
associated to women and corresponding to Metis' ability of camouflage. 
 
The very ancient myth of Perseus belongs to this young age of Greek patriarchy, before 
the age of war heroes symbolized by the Iliad, lately the age of trading and colonization 
of the Odyssey and lastly the classical age of tragedy and philosophy. Perseus is still a 
hero of pre-Homeric mythology, whereby the narrative revolves around action more than 
characters' motivation and emotions. It is within this context that the truncated head of 
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Medusa turns into a weapon in the hands of the rational male hero: despite the Gorgon's 
demise, her sight can still petrify whatever living creature meets her eyes. Therefore, male 
rationality has once again subdued the female irrational and monstrous power to man's 
own will. A heroic feat achieved in this instance through the juxtaposition of mirror and 
shield: both a mirror used as a protection against and a shield employed as a mirror to 
reflect the sight of Medusa. 
 
Throughout the story of Perseus and Medusa, the mirror appears as the model of a first 
metaphorical (and practical) conception of exclusively masculine rationality. A mirror 
that is not used to reflect one's image (Narcissus), and thus to construct selfhood, but to 
inhibit and then take possession of the objectifying and terrifying gaze of radical 
otherness, which corresponds from a patriarchal perspective to an aggressive, castrating 
and untamed femininity. The mirror thus becomes a means of, and a symbol for 
rationality, protection, and reflection, whereby rationality commutes man into a mere 
image, so as to protect him from an adverse world. In a purely Greek context, mythology 
already anticipates an idea mastered a few centuries later by philosophy: mind (intellect) 
is the mirror of nature, the antidote against that primeval thauma addressed by both Plato 
and Aristotle. 
 
‘Wonder’ is the usual translation for this Greek word, and hence wrongly confused with 
intellectual wonder. However, a more suited translation for thauma is ‘a mixed feeling of 
terror and wonder’, a paralyzing state of shock that makes who is affected by it dizzy and 
speechless. It refers to the initial anguish felt once facing nature, which is conceived by 
the Greek as physis, the mutable reality that surrounds us. It also corresponds to the fear 
of the death and of the unknown. Both mythology and philosophy begin in wonder (as 
thauma), as confirmed by Aristotle in his Metaphysics: 
‘For from wonder men, both now and at the first, began to philosophize, having 
felt astonishment originally at the things which were more obvious, indeed, 
amongst those that were doubtful; then, by degrees, in this way having advanced 
onwards, and, in process of time, having started difficulties about more important 
subjects […]. But he that labors under perplexity and wonder thinks that he is 
involved in ignorance. Therefore, also, the philosopher […] is somehow a lover 
of fables, for the fable is made up of the things that are marvelous’ (Aristotle, 
1991, 928b). 
 
It follows that both fables (mythology) and philosophy try to sooth this strong wonder-
fear (thauma). In other words, they are both a remedy for it, even though not of equal 
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measure. Philosophy, in fact, replaces the older mythology as a more efficient, rational 
and radical remedy. 
In the Theatetus, Plato also describes thauma as a state of dizziness and perplexity that 
introduces men to philosophy: 
‘THEAET. […] I often wonder like mad what these things mean; sometimes when 
I’m looking at them I begin to feel quite giddy. 
SOC. […] this wondering: this is where philosophy begins and nowhere else’ 
(Plato, 1990, 156d). 
 
Despite its disturbing aspect, the attitude of wonder was to let things be, especially from 
the perspective of pre-Socratic philosophy. Even the famous statement ‘man as the 
measure of all things' of the sophist Protagoras belongs to this tradition. Protagoras still 
operated in fact ‘with a concept of truth that was not yet representational, not yet based 
on the correspondence of object and mental image' (Jay, 1994, 272). It was the respectful 
and resigned passivity of wonder to have brought to the apprehensive and reverential 
immersion into nature (as flowing physis) still embodied by the Greek, even after Socrates 
and Plato. In this context, where no detachment from the world had reduced it yet to 
object, the term theoria was coined. This term means to contemplate, to behold, to view, 
and it is the same root shared by the words theory, theatre and theorem. This term shares 
the same ambiguity of the mirror as sight shares in all Greek tradition. Despite its 
etymology, theoria is not merely spectactorial and detached. Instead, as argued by the 
contemporary German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘Theoria is a true participation, 
not something active, but something passive (pathos), namely being totally involved in 
and carried away by what one sees’ (Gadamer, 1989, 124-5). In other words, viewer and 
viewed are intertwined. 
 
The disregard of this ‘sacral communion’ in a pure act of hybris causes Narcissus’ own 
demise. As already mentioned, he focuses so much on his individual reflected image that 
he forgets the mediation of any other being around him. On the contrary, the figure of 
Perseus anticipates the theoria of Greek philosophy by managing through visual 
reflection the petrifying sight of physis. 
Furthermore, by turning the mirror outward instead of inward, the myth of Perseus thus 
reverses the deceptiveness of reflection displayed by the myth of Narcissus. By doing so, 
Perseus makes good use out of the mirror, whereas Narcissus's life ends catastrophically 
under its temptation. The good or bad use made of the deceptive character of the mirror 
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thoroughly explains its own ambiguity. These two myths together precisely point out how 
such ambivalence moved the first manufacturers of polished mirrors. 
 
B. THE CONCRETE MIRRORS OF OPTICS 
The employment of lateral vision by Perseus to evade being petrified illustrated by the 
myth, indicates the degree of knowledge already achieved in the study of reflection. 
During classical antiquity, this interest will be furthered by catoptrics (the science of 
reflection) and dioptrics (the study of reflection), the two main branches of optics, the 
most fundamental ‘scientific discipline’ to Classical Greece. 
 
The big concern for Optics proves to be how Greek philosophy was not just 
metaphorically but also technically interested in mirrors and in the study of reflection. 
Aristotle also demonstrated a particular interest in mirrors in both his On Dreams and 
Metereology. 
In On Dreams, he states: 
‘An example of the rapidity with which the sense organs perceive even a slight 
difference is found in the behaviour of mirrors […] [It] is quite clear from this 
instance that the organ of sight not only is acted upon by its object, but acts 
reciprocally upon it. If a woman looks into a highly polished mirror during the 
menstrual period, the surface of the mirror becomes clouded with a blood-red 
colour’ (Aristotle, 1957, 357). 
 
In the same text, he also utters: 
‘[The] eyes set up a movement in the air. This imparts a certain quality to the layer 
of air extending over the mirror, and assimilates it to itself; and this layer affects 
the surface of the mirror’ (Ibid.) 
 
Both these views emphasize once again how the Aristotelian theory of knowledge 
configures images and how this configuration draws from the more general frame of 
Greek tradition. ‘For the Greeks, the world of images had a tangible existence by 
reproducing and resembling the real; this realm was a precise imitation of the actual one, 
although of an inferior and altogether different nature' (Bonnet, 2014, 103). 
In Meteorology, Aristotle affirms: 
‘Our vision […] is reflected from all smooth surfaces, among them air and water. 
Air reflects when it is condensed; but even when not condensed it can produce a 
reflection when the sight is weak. An example of this is what used to happen to a 
man whose sight was weak and unclear: he always used to see an image going 
before him as he walked, and facing towards him. And the reason why this used 
to happen to him was that his vision was reflected back to him; for its enfeebled 
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state made it so weak and faint that even the neighbouring air became a mirror 
and it was unable to thrust it aside’ (Aristotle, 1952, 251). 
 
This sentence refers to the extramission theory, a widely accepted conception by Greeks, 
mathematically formulated by Euclid in his Optics (ca. 330 B.C.) whereby visual 
perception occurs through rectilinear light beams emitted and received by the eyes. 
 
Medieval intellectuals perpetuated such an interest in optics (rising to the highest rank), 
fuelled by their strong reference to Aristotelian texts and conditioned by the art of 
glassmaking dominant during the Middle Ages. “In his Speculum Maius (c. 1250 AD.), 
the thirteenth-century Dominican monk Vincent de Beauvais judged glass mirrors 
‘silvered’ with lead to be superior to those of polished metal because ‘glass is better 
receptor of light rays due to its transparency’” (Bonnet, 2014, 15). 
A significant contribution to this field (and to its prominence) was given by the Franciscan 
theologians and philosophers from the school of Oxford, who since the twelfth century 
wrote optical treatises. Amongst these were Roger Bacon (1214-1292), Robert 
Grosseteste (1175-1253), and John Peckham (1225-1292), who specifically classified 
mirrors depending on their material, shape (e.g. concave or flat), and reflection they cause 
(e.g. feeble or strong, opaque or vivid), in his work on optics: Perspectiva Communis. 
 
C. MIRROR OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE, AND TRANSFORMATION 
Many Greek and Roman thinkers deemed the mirror as an active mirror of transformation, 
a tool for instilling temperance, moral self-knowledge and measure in those who were 
altered by their own excesses. It was not merely the passive mirror of imitation. 
In his Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Diogenes Laërtius (c. 180 - 240 AD) recalls that 
Socrates ‘recommended to the young the constant use of the mirror, to the end that 
handsome men might acquire a corresponding behaviour, and ugly men conceal their 
defects by education’ (Diogenes, 1925, 165). In Plautus’ play Epidicus, the character of 
Periphianes wonders: 
‘It would be good if people had mirrors not just for the sake of their faces […] but 
also mirrors with which they could see into […] the resources of their hearts; after 
examining them, they could then think about how they lived their lives long ago 
in their youth’ (Plautus, 2011, 375). 
 
In his Natural Questions (I, 17), Seneca The Younger (4 BC - 65 AD) affirmed that: 
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‘Mirrors were invented in order that man may know himself, destined to attain many 
benefits from this: first, knowledge of himself; next, in certain directions, wisdom’ 
(Seneca, 1971, 91). 
In his Apologia (XIII, 5-14), Apuleius argued that the mirror is just a physical means for 
reflection, without any magical implication. He also praised the accuracy of this tool: ‘For 
all representations that have to be handmade require lengthy effort, and even so the 
resemblance does not appear as it does as in a mirror’ (Apuleius, 2017, 43). 
 
The common metaphor of the eyes as mirror of the soul has is origin in the following 
passage of the Platonic dialogue Alcibiades, concerning the Delphic principle of self-
knowledge: 
“SOC. […] - ‘See thyself,’- how should we apprehend the meaning of the 
admonition? Would it not be, that the eye should look at something in looking at 
which it would see itself? 
ALC. Clearly. 
SOC. Then let us think what object there is anywhere, by looking at which we can 
see both it and ourselves. 
ALC. Why, clearly, Socrates, mirrors and things of that sort. 
SOC. Quite right. And there is also something of that sort in the eye that we see 
with? 
ALC. To be sure. 
[…] 
SOC. And have you observed that the face of the person who looks into another's 
eye is shown in the optic confronting him, as in a mirror, and we call this the pupil, 
for in a sort it is an image of the person looking? 
ALC. That is true. 
SOC. Then an eye viewing another eye, and looking at the most perfect part of it, 
the thing wherewith it sees, will thus see itself” (Plato, 1964, 209-211). 
 
To Plato, like the eye, the soul (the human essence) needs a reflection from a true mirror 
to see itself, corresponding to the eyes and soul offered by the lover or friend. 
 
D. MIRROR OF MIMESIS 
1. Looking either at or through the Mirror of Mimesis 
Plato determined the way western culture relates to the mirror image, by referring to 
mirror (or rather the mirror’s double) in a passage of Book X of The Republic to explain 
the very concept of mimesis with concrete examples and metaphors: 
“‘If you are willing to take a mirror and carry it around everywhere; quickly you 
will make the sun and the things in the heaven; quickly, the earth; and quickly, 
yourself and the other animals and implements and plants and everything else that 
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was just now mentioned.’ ‘Yes, […] so that they look like they are; however, they 
surely are not in truth.’” (Plato, 1968, 596). 
 
While discrediting the deceptive nature of reflection (considered as the lowest form of 
knowledge),  Plato also concedes that its immateriality and resemblance allows for an 
alternative spiritual and analogical kind of mindfulness. 
 
The mirror addressed by Plato in The Republic is the mirror of imitation, the model for 
any form of mimesis; and not the mirror of temperance and self-knowledge presented in 
the Alcibiades. 
Plato divided reality into two realms by referring in both cases to the visual word ‘image'. 
The hyperuranion is the realm of truth, embodied by perfect and autonomous eidos (or 
ideas), visible uncoloured forms, while our transient and passant world is only made of 
eidola, mere copies, the reflection of the eidos1. Our concrete world is merely the mirror 
of the other abstract and immutable realm. Our soul, including conscience, mind, selfhood 
and intellect, all in a unique spiritual entity, belongs to the Hyperuranion, whereas our 
body is part of the mutable reality. In other words, the body is just a reflection of our soul; 
it depends on it. 
 
The Nous (the Greek term for intellect) was conceived as the highest amongst the three 
parts of the soul, which were, for instance, intelligence, spirit (or will) and appetite (or 
emotion). For all Greek epistemology, the rational part corresponded to a mind collecting 
images. Specifically, for Plato the intellect had the skill to ‘see properly', to recognize the 
stable and unchanging ideas (or forms) behind their mutable and material copies, the 
eidola. In other words, the nous is the noblest part of the soul because the illusion of 
becoming does not affect it, but it sees through such deception and then through mere 
reflection. The mind, the nous, becomes with Plato the mirror that adequately reflects 
ideas (as clear images); the nous becomes henceforth the ‘mind’s eye’ (or mind of the 
soul) addressed in the dialogue Phaedo (66e) and distinguished from the deceptive bodily 
eyes. 
Although Plato groups the creation of sight ‘with the creation of human intelligence and 
the soul’ (Jay, 1994, 26), “in his philosophy, ‘vision’ seems to have meant only that of 
the inner eye of the mind. […] We see through the eyes, he insisted, not with them” (Ibid., 
27). 
                                                            




As Rorty has remarked, Aristotle otherwise conceived the intellect (nous) as the Mirror 
of Nature, as “both mirror and eye in one. The retinal image is itself the model for the 
‘intellect which becomes all things’” (Rorty, 1980, 45). During the middle ages, this 
conception, as most of Aristotelian philosophy, will be incorporated by the theologian 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) in his own thought and will become an essential part of 
Thomism, which is the philosophical school inspired by the latter. 
Both Aristotelianism and Thomism developed a hylomorphic epistemology whereby the 
‘eye of the mind’ and the ‘eye of the body’ are the same entity. Aristotle has in fact 
"resisted dualism by thinking of ‘soul' no more ontologically distinct from the frog's 
abilities to catch flies and flee snakes ontologically distinct from the frog's body" (Ibid., 
40). However, this did not prevent him from deeming the intellect as an exceptional 
immaterial faculty endowed with ‘the power of receiving the form of, for example, 
froghood' (Ibid., 40), a mirror reflecting the general characteristics, the idea, the ideos - 
which is the Greek word for image - of a particular being. 
 
2. Aristotelian Theatre 
As already noticed by Baudrillard, the theatre was created after the imagery of the mirror. 
In this regard, Aristotle in his Poetics defines theatre as it follows: 
‘Epic poetry and the composition of tragedy, as well as comedy and the arts of 
dithyrambic poetry […] are all […] imitations’ (Aristotle, 1996, 2 47a). Aristotle 
mitigates the Platonic critique of the mimetic arts, by evaluating the imitative function of 
art as a technique. Moreover, he deems imitation as a natural human disposition: 
‘Imitation comes naturally to human beings from childhood […]; so too does the universal 
pleasure in imitations’ (Ibid., 3 48b). Each form of theatrical performance imitates a 
specific set and class of objects in a specific manner, as accounted by Aristotle. ‘Tragedy 
is an imitation of a complete, i.e., whole, action, possessing a certain magnitude' (Ibid., 5 
50b); ‘Comedy is an imitation of inferior people' (Ibid., 3 49a-49b); epic poetry is also an 
imitation of admirable people as such is Tragedy. ‘But they differ in that epic uses one 
verse-form alone, and is narrative' (Ibid., 3 49b). 
However natural, imitation appeared to Aristotle, it was only with the development of 




In ritual performances “through the painting, masking, and reconfiguring of the physical 
body, the actors […] seek not only metaphorically but literally to become the text, their 
goal being to project the fusion of human and totem, ‘man and God,’ sacred and 
mundane” (Alexander et al, 2006, 39). Moreover, everyone belonging to the community 
must participate in the ritual, without any distinction yet between observers and attendees. 
Simple social organization (as such as tribes) were and are always based on this fusion of 
elements, which also formed the composition of their performances. 
Such ritual models also perpetuate in more complex but rigidly organized societies to 
maintain a strict hierarchical order, as exemplified by pharaonic Egypt: 
‘A state imposed by force and coercing its subjects to pay taxes and perform civil and 
military service […] could hardly have maintained itself, if it had not rested on a core 
semiology that was as persuasive as the state itself was demanding’ (Assmann, 2002, 74). 
 
As noted by the American sociologist Jeffrey Alexander, it is only with the development 
of Greek democracy and with its internal social differentiation that theatrical performance 
emerged from the ritual performance: 
‘Greek theatre emerged from within religious rituals organized around Dionysus, 
the god of wine […]. As Greek society entered its period of intense and 
unprecedented social and cultural differentiation […], the content of the 
dithyramb gradually widened to include tales of the demi-gods and fully secular 
heroes whom contemporary Greeks considered their ancestors. The background 
representational system, in other words, began to symbolize – to code and to 
narrate – human and not only sacred life.’ (Alexander et al, 2006, 47). 
 
The elements composing performance starts de-fusing, whereby the symbolic realm 
ceases being juxtaposed to the social and to the material spheres. ‘The social, 
organizational and cultural background to these developments were crucial […] as the 
emergence of dramatic performance fed back into social and cultural organization in turn’ 
(Ibid., 46). Therefore, theatre, polis and philosophy are in Greek society, three 
interconnected phenomena whose synthesis Aristotle represents at its best. 
“When post-ritual drama emerged in ancient Greece, Aristotle […] explained that a play 
is ‘an imitation of action, not the action itself’” (Ibid., 57). While the ritual is an action 
where all the elements of society are fused in one stable community, theatre separates 
through its mimetic nature between audience (observers) and actors, who imitate the 
action of different kinds of people (from the inferior to the most edifying). In other words, 
in ritual performances, everyone is an actor, involved in a process without any mimetic 
process. The community actually is its rituals instead of being represented by them. On 
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the contrary, the theatre is a space of reflection, where actors imitate the citizens of the 
polis; in turn, the citizens of the polis assist with such imitative performance and judge 
its accuracy. The theatre is nothing more than a mirror and Aristotle its first codifier. ‘His 
Poetics makes the natural artificial, providing a kind of philosophical cookbook, 
instructions for meaning-making and effective performance for a society that had moved 
from fusion to conscious artifice’ (Ibid., 49). The artifice of theatre replaces the natural 
dimension of the ritual, as the artifice of philosophy (as did the post-Socratic one above 
all else) by differentiating the soul/self from the body, ideas from the world, etc. Both 
theatre and philosophy replicate the reflection of the mirror: they are both artificial means, 
like the mirror, which arbitrarily create a strict separation between two classes of objects. 
Nonetheless, such separation does not exclude a relationship between the two classes, a 
relationship that is always of submission and imitation of one specific kind of object to 
the other (see above). 
 
To summarize, reflection/mimesis always corresponds to a relationship between 
separation and participation, whereby vision is both divisive and communal, as indicated 
by the term theoria (see above), from which the word theatre also stems. Theatre is in 
fact a space of communion amongst citizens, but it is also a space of separations, as 
illustrated above. Moreover, the ideal forms of the Greek art, with the perfect proportions 
of their statues and temples, is also expressed by their deep involvement in theatrical 
performance. Herein the imitation of human acts is never a mere reproduction, but an 
exemplary embellishment. 
 
In conclusion, the reflective scopic regime of the mirror phase, and ancient history still 
implies, even if in limited terms, a participative relation, while the hegemonic lenses of 
the modern age will allow only for a relationship of pure control, and then separation and 
distance. In this regard, since the Eighteenth Century, modern aesthetics will question the 
concept of mimesis applied by Aristotle to art, replacing it with emotion and passion as 
the new drivers of art. The shift from the classical objective model of beauty to subjective 
aesthetic judgment (Kant’s Critique of Judgement) and intimacy (Rousseau) will move 
art (including theatre) from being a form of imitation that follows precise and static rules 
to a spontaneous form of expression and creation. Romanticism will even emphasize this 
new conception through the figure of the genius, whose essential elements will be 




E. EIDOLA: REFLECTED IMAGES 
In book VI of Dionysiaca, the Greek epic poet Nonnus, who dates back approximately to 
the late period of the Roman Empire (4th or 5th century AD.), recounted the cardinal 
orphic myth of the Titans’ dismemberment of Dionysus-Zagreus: 
‘The Titans cunningly smeared their round faces with disguising chalk, and while 
he [Zagreus] contemplated his changeling countenance reflected in a mirror, they 
destroyed him with an infernal knife. There where his limbs had been cut 
piecemeal by the Titan steel, the end of his life was the beginning of a new life as 
Dionysos’ (Nonnus (2014), Dionysiaca Books 1-15, translated by Rouse W.H.D. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, VI: 169). 
 
Zagreus was often identified with the orphic-Dionysus, although the ancient Greek and 
Hellenistic religion known as Orphism had never addressed him with this name. This first 
version of Dyonisus had as mother Persephone instead of Semele, and his 
dismemberment was celebrated during the orphic practices as a rite and a symbol of death 
and rebirth. 
 
In the Fourth Ennead, Plotinus (204/5-270 AD.), the major Neo-Platonist philosopher 
during the Third Century Roman Empire, combines the figure of Narcissus with the figure 
of Dionysus: 
‘But the souls of men see their images as if in the mirror of Dionysus and come to be on 
that level with a leap from above: but even these are not cut off from their own principle 
and from intellect. For they did come down with Intellect, but went on ahead of it down 
to earth, but their heads are firmly set above in heaven’ (Plotinus, 1984, 3:12). 
To Plotino, the universe is hierarchical: everything emanates from the ‘Supreme’, the soul 
of the world, the transcendent undivided One. ‘Plotinus considers the tangible world as a 
reflection emanating from the world of eternal forms and the body as ‘a reflection that 
the soul makes visible when it encounters matter, exactly in the same way as a human 
being makes a reflection when it meets a polished surface’ (Ibid., 109). He thus applies 
his emanativist conception of the cosmos to a Platonic two-world view. The irrevocable 
separation between spiritual and corporeal spheres, the many and the one, present in 
Plato’s philosophy is replaced: 
Within Plotinus’ view, ‘Narcissus represents a moral and spiritual state, the result, after 
the constitution of the sensible world, of what transpires when the soul directs its attention 
toward the body’ (Hadot, 1998, 10). What Narcissus suffocates is his own soul, by 
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identifying himself only with his body, through a love embrace. From a Plotinian and, 
more generally, Neoplatonic perception, Narcissus ‘fails to see that the reality of the body 
comes from the soul' (P 10) and by default from the Supreme ‘One', in the process of 
continuous reflection of one superior level to another. Each soul is generated as a 
reflection of the 'One', a mirror on which the light of the Supreme is reflected, as the body 
is just a reflection of the soul on the mirror of sensible reality. Multiplicity only derives 
from Unicity through a play of mirrors: mirror as the producer of diversity and diversity 
as a mere reflection. 
 
Neoplatonism (Plotinus) and Gnosticism defined both copies and reflections such as 
bodies, with the term eidola. For instance, eidola were, in ancient Greece, the statues 
representing gods and goddesses since copies, reproductions of ethereal entities. Eidolon 
(the singular form of Eidola) also meant shadow in Greek. 
The Greek philosopher Democritus and the Roman Philosopher Lucretius also referred to 
eidola, but only in atomistic (early materialistic) terms as very fine corpuscles, and to 
develop an explanation of reflection opposite to the hegemonic Euclidian theory of 
extramission. In De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things), Lucretius argues: 
‘whatever similitudes we see in mirrors, in water, in any bright surface, since they 
are possessed of the same appearance as the things, must consist of images thrown 
off from those things. There are therefore thin shapes and like semblances of 
things [eidola], which singly no one can perceive, yet being flung back by 
incessant and unremitting repulsion give back a vision from the surface of 
mirrors’. 
(Lucretius, 1924, 285). 
 
F. SPECULATION 
1. Speculation and Medieval Tradition 
Mirrors were so relevant to classical antiquity, and the birth of philosophy. They 
contribute to the development of a discrete amount of scopic regimes, as such as reflection 
and speculation. Both reflection and speculation correspond to visual interpretation of 
thought processes and to optical methods of thinking. 
 
Speculum is the Latin word for mirror that stems from the root spec, as many other Latin 
words with visual connotations2. 
                                                            
2 Like the verb specio (to see, to look at) - as in conspicio (to observe, to face), respicio (to look back at, 
to gaze at), inspicio (to examine) -, specula (observatory) species (image, appearance), specimen (mark). 
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The Latin Speculum is not a passive surface on which the image is reflected, but it is 
instead the object that actively reflects the image, as proved by its derivate ‘spy’. 
Moreover, the Latin word speculationis (speculation), and thus the corresponding 
specular tradition, particularly in the Middle Ages, emphasized that ‘sacral communion' 
already present in the Greek theoria (see above) and put aside the distinction between 
subject and object implied by contemplatio, which is the Latin translation for theoria. In 
fact, according to the twentieth century German philosopher Martin Heidegger: 
‘In theoria transformed into contemplatio there comes to the fore the impulse, already 
prepared in Greek thinking, of a looking-at that sunders and compartmentalizes […] 
normative in knowing’ (Heidegger, 1977, 166). 
Speculation was otherwise an absolute self-reflecting and thus self-referential mirror, 
addressed by the medieval tradition through two approaches: 
- The rational approach following the Neoplatonic and Aristotlelic heritage 
addressed speculation as the eye of the mind with its privileged, clear, and distinct 
access to pure abstract forms. Thomas Aquinas was the finest expression of this 
‘approach’: 
‘For Thomas Aquinas, speculation coincides with the necessity of philosophical 
thought as such, to the extent that philosophical reflection transcends the factual 
given and moves toward its ultimate determining grounds. Such speculation, since 
it was tied to the scholastic and theological form of philosophical thought, was of 
course restricted to the interpretation of all finite substances as deriving from the 
one divine substance’ (Gasché, 1986, 42). 
 
- The irrational approach of mysticism addressed speculation as the ecstatic vision 
of the seer, dazzled by the light of God. 
 
2. Speculum Inferius and Speculum Superius 
‘[The] positive value accorded to mirrors was so great that manuals for devotion 
were sometimes called specula because they were assumed to reflect the truth. 
Christian theologians in fact often resorted to the mirror to solve their most 
troubling questions: Why did a perfect God descend into an imperfect world of 
matter? How could He love a creature less perfect than Himself?’ (Jay, 1994, 37). 
 
This medieval speculum was a survey summarizing all knowledge and urging humanity 
toward absolute reflection (speculation), such as the Speculum Doctrinal3 of the already 
mentioned Vincent de Beauvais. 
                                                            
3 originally subdivided in three parts: Speculum Naturale (Mirror of Nature), Speculum Doctrinale 
(Mirror of Doctrine) and Speculum Historiale (Mirror of History). 
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Other notable metaphorical mirrors recurrent in literature since Early Middle Ages until 
the Renaissance were the ‘mirror of princes’ (principum specula), which constituted of ‘a 
moralistic genre in which readers were invited to look upon an ideal model for their 
behaviour’ (Bonnet, 2014, xi). 
 
The medieval Christian tradition also emphasized the ambiguity of the mirror, and along 
with it the ambivalence of the visual, on two different levels. Firstly, both medieval texts 
and iconography envisaged the mirror image as either “‘an idealized vision or a pejorative 
projection,’ either a reflection of God or an instrument of the devil’’ (Ibid., 108). 
Secondly, medieval Christianity distinguished between material mirrors and divine 
mirrors, insofar as humanity and the creation were themselves conceived as secondary 
physical mirrors subordinated to the mirror of the Trinity, capable of reflecting the light 
of God and its eternal truth. 
Such ambiguity of the mirror persisting in the Middle Ages, and the medieval 
understanding of the mirror have their explanation in the two passages of the New 
Testament. 
The first passage is within The General Epistle of James: 
‘For if any be a bearer of the world, and not a doer, he is like unto a man beholding 
his natural face in a glass: 
For the beholden himself, and goeth his way, and straightway forgetteth what 
manner of man he was’ (James 1:23-24). 
 
The second is within The First Letter of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians: 
‘For now we see through a glass, darkly’ (1 Corinthians 13:12). 
 
St James’ mirror is a warning against the foolish and inconsistent vanity of man, who 
risks losing sight of God by focusing exclusively on his image. St Paul’s mirror is a partial 
and indirect knowledge, necessary as starting point to achieve the superior knowledge of 
revelation. This notion becomes a relevant conceptual frame for Dante’s Paradiso and 
scholasticism. 
For instance, Dante’s journey through paradise is a transition from the speculum inferius 
representing the multiplicity of created things (St Paul’s ‘glass’) to the speculum superius 
of spiritual illumination. 
The second canto focuses on material mirrors through an optical experiment proposed by 
Beatrice to Dante: 
Three mirrors shalt thou take, and two remove 
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Alike from thee, the other more remote 
Between the former two shall meet thine eyes. 
Turned towards these, cause that behind thy back 
Be placed a light, illuming the three mirrors 
And coming back to thee by all reflected. 
[…] 
The image most remote, there shalt thou see 
How it perforce is equally resplendent. 
(Dante, 1867, II: 97-105) 
 
By following the light of divine rays Dante moves from the secondary mirrors of creation, 
passing through all spheres of the Heavens and he finally looks ‘upon Him thou penetrate 
as far as possible through his effulgence (Dante, 1867, XXXII: 43-44). The position of 
the concrete mirrors (specula inferiora) of Beatrice (in the second canto) echoes and 
foresees the last three circles of Heaven: the circles of the Trinity (specula superiora). In 
fact, at the end of the poem Dante stares at Beatrice’s eyes as they were looking-glasses 
reflecting the divine light. All of a sudden, ‘unto the Eternal Light [his eyes] turned’ (Ibid., 
XXXIII: 43 ). ‘Unlike the material mirrors, the circles are not separate reflecting surfaces, 
but inseparable images of each other. The second circle is reflected from the first, and the 
third from the first and second.’ (Miller, 1977, 266). 
 
The two kinds of mirror between which Dante’s Paradiso is deployed, also correspond to 
the two different meanings of the word ‘esperienza’ (experience). The material mirrors 
of Beatrice (speculum inferius) correspond to experience as a scientific experiment; a 
partial knowledge, which is necessary only as the first step to achieve ultimate truth. On 
the contrary, the circles of the Trinity (speculum superius) correspond to experience as 
spiritual experience; ultimate truth achieved through revelation. Therefore, material 
mirrors (the mirror of creation) are just impure mirrors representing physical multiplicity, 
reflecting the light of God, only as an appearance, whereas the divine mirrors of the 
Trinity (the truthful mirror of God) are pure mirrors, showing the light of God as it is. 
‘Creation [itself] becomes a hierarchy of mirrors, each casting an image of God. The 
farther off the individual mirror is from God, the smaller the image of Him it reflects, but 
his brightness never diminishes’ (Ibid., 266). 
 
Dante’s Cosmology especially reflects the thought of the Italian Franciscan theologian 
and philosopher Bonaventure (1221-1274 A.D.) and Thomas Aquinas, assigned to the 
Heaven of the Sun (Cantos X-XIV) by Dante himself. Inspired by the hylomorphic 
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conception of Aristotle (see above), Thomas Aquinas regarded the human mind as an 
inferior transient mirror, only capable of partially reflecting the superior ‘mirror of 
eternity’. In De veritate (On truth), he remarks: 
‘[God] sees [everything], as it were, from a great distance, in the mirror of eternity4. 
However, it might also be called fore sight because of its relation to other things in whose 
regard what He knows is future’ (Aquinas, 2008, 2: 12). 
 
Bonaventure interpreted creation as a hierarchical subdivision of speculum inferius into 
three subordinate mirror and thus reflections, a shared concept amongst theologians5 
since the twelfth century: 
- First level: God as the most perfect creature, and hence the only one capable of 
creating from nothing. He generates light and then spreads it all over the creation. 
- Second level: Angels, so perfect, immutable and immaterial that they directly 
reflect and diffuse the light of God. 
- Third level: Man, who can reflect the image of God through his rational soul and 
thus achieve partial access to ultimate truths, limited by his body, and its implicit 
finiteness. 
- Forth level: soulless material things, thusly incapable of reflecting clearly the light 
of God. 
To Bonaventure, human soul can ascend to superior mirrors through contemplation, 
starting from beholding the ‘material nature’, secondly looking at himself and finally 
achieving superior knowledge by staring at the divine light itself. 
 
3. Speculation as Double and Unity at Once 
As mentioned previously, speculation attempted to unify conflicting poles, in a purely 
totalizing conceptual space beyond any practical and material reference. It was ‘designed 
to reveal the same amidst all apparent diversity' (Jay, 1994, 32). However, it also shared 
with all kind of mirrors (physical, ideal, inferior, superior, etc.) an inevitable implicit 
duality, in a constant cycling movement between unity and double. On this regard, 
“Nietzsche claimed that mirrors defeat the ideal of specular sameness. In aphorism 243 
of Daybreak, he writes, ‘When we try to examine the mirror in itself we discover in the 
end nothing but things upon it. If we want to grasp the things we finally get hold of 
                                                            
4 In the same text (12: 7), Aquinas nonetheless highlights the mere metaphorical attributes of God as an 
eternal mirror. 
5 like Alain de Lille (c. 1128-1202 AD) 
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nothing but the mirror. -This, in the most general terms, is the history of knowledge’” 
(Nietzsche, 1992, 141, cited in Jay, 1994, n31-32). 
 
The figure of the double and the related human fascination for her/his own image was 
already present in several cultures since prehistoric times, mediated by pools of water, 
one’s own shadow or shiny stones. However, it is with the production of small lead 
mirrors with a polished surface that it was possible to achieve a bright image of oneself. 
Furthermore, it is with the myths of Narcissus and Perseus that the double finds its first 
proper representation. Before Plato, ‘the reflection was an animated and living form, a 
double, luring Narcissus from the bottom of a pool’ (Bonnet, 2014, 101-102). 
The Greek world eidolon, standing for double as a synonym of appearance, copy, 
reflection of an original entity (specifically the Platonic idea) is the same used for shadow, 
but also for idol, image, and likeness (see above). In this regard, Baudrillard argues that 
the double is not a prosthesis, a mere extension of ourselves. On the contrary, it is 
somewhat ‘an imaginary figure, which just like the soul, the shadow, the mirror image, 
haunts the subject like his other, which makes it so that the subject is simultaneously itself 
and never resembles itself again, which haunts like a subtle and always averted death’ 
(Baudrillard, 1994, 99). In the Greek literature, eidola were in fact ghosts, phantoms, 
spirit-images of dead people - often not adequately buried - that could appear to the living 
– usually acquaintances of theirs - just as mere shadows of what they once were. 
 
The coexistence of unity and double, unity and multiplicity in mirrors, their inherent 
ambiguity illustrated through this entire chapter, and the influence they had on both 
ancient history and the Middle Ages, did not yet lead to the radical distinction between 
subject and object. The mirror phase is the first artificial distinction operated in the human 
world; it is the first strong result of our entanglement as intelligent beings with glass, over 
any other material. However, this distinction, the double of mirrors, has still a tendency 
toward a unification that which before was ‘natural’ and unmediated. 
With the development and extensive application of lenses during modern ages, the soft 
dualism of reflection and its inner unitary function - which is to see oneself, even though 
it is through a reflection - will be subordinated, and replaced by the extreme distance of 




II   LENS PHASE (FROM THE REINASSANCE TO THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY) 
 
A. RENAISSANCE: THE RISE OF PERSPECTIVE 
Italian Reinassance constituted a turning point, the end of the mirror and the beginning of 
the lens phase, caused by a set intertwined transformations: 
- The typical rigid proximity between art and technique of Italian Renaissance6, 
which will characterize all Early Modern Age (specifically 17th century Dutch 
art). 
Italian art was developed in artisans' workshops known as corporations. These 
corporations were mostly workplaces where the words "artist" and "artisan" 
referred to the same person and where the romantic concept of self-expression had 
not yet been developed. Moreover, each workshop had a different specialization, 
with an inner differentiation between masters and pupils, one who was already 
acquainted with his job and the other who was only at the beginning of his 
experience as artisan/artist. Finally, these corporations were always in need of 
customers and patrons to finance their activities. It is in this specific work 
environment that the Albertian perspectival theory was practically developed. 
- The advancement in glass making occurred in Sixteenth-century Venice. 
A large-scale production of a great variety of glass vases and mirrors began, so its 
exportation to all European courts. Glass became a luxury and an artistic and not 
merely functional item. Finally, this is the first technical innovation in the early 
modern age to extend the range and accuracy of the ocular apparatus. 
- The beginning of that process of detextualization so fundamental for the 
subsequent scientific revolution and thus the modern age. Such tendency was 
common to all Italian Renaissance: ‘In the medieval tradition the story was often 
illustrated, scene following scene […]. During the Renaissance the narrative 
sequence disappeared’ (Berger, 1972, 49) in favour of single moments in 
mythology and religious stories (the Albertian istoria). Therefore, the construction 
of meaning stops being the main reason behind painting and becomes mainly its 
pretext. For instance, the fascination of Leonardo for sight as a physical 
                                                            
6 Although, it was already present in Greek philosophy, which linguistically refers to both as techne, 




mechanism brought him against the former medieval painting: he tried to 
emancipate the pictorial from the textual, images from words. 
- The strong commitment of the Italian tradition to mathematics, reflected in both 
Alberti's idea of painting and later Galileo's idea of how the new science should 
be developed. 
However, it is important to recall how the latter was deeply involved in the study 
of the Dutch applications of the lens and how this interest brought him to perfect 
the telescope (essential for his later discoveries). Still, Galileo remained firmly 
seated in the Italian tradition, where priority was given to mathematics. In his 
tradition, the world was interpreted as a book written by God in geometrical and 
arithmetical types. 
- The use and refinement by painters (like Leonardo da Vinci) of the camera 
obscura, a ‘dark box’ with a pinhole on one side projecting an inverted image on 
the opposite wall. 
This instrument was already used since antiquity to observe safely solar eclipses. 
However, it is only in the Reinassance that it became a help for both art and 
science, insofar as it was implemented with a lens instead of the pinhole. 
- The related codification and application of the first and most relevant scopic 
regime of the lens phase: perspective. 
 
Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) embodied the passage from the mirror to the lens phase. 
On the one hand, he was ‘one of the first to propose the camera obscura as its model’ 
(Alpers, 1983, 46), and thus to conceive the eye as a similar instrument. On the other 
hand, he considered the mirror as a model for the mind, echoing that hylomorphism 
already developed by Greek philosophy, particularly by Aristotle, and recurring during 
the Middle Ages (see above). As a result, the works of Leonardo (both writings and 
painting) always oscillate between seeing and looking attentively, a reflection of the 
world as it is and a mental, abstract and artificial eye. Italian Renaissance will follow the 
second conception, which had been codified by Leon Battista Alberti (1404-1472) in his 
On Painting (1436) as perspective7. 
 
                                                            
7 From the Latin word perspicere, meaning ‘to see through’. 
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Incidentally, Alberti influenced the artisan world as much as the latter influenced him. 
Not by chance, he built his aesthetic theory on a vitreous metaphor. He used the window 
metaphor: 
‘First of all, on the surface on which I am going to paint, I draw a rectangle of whatever 
size I want, which I regard as an open window through which the subject to be painted is 
seen' (Alberti, 2004, 66-67). 
Once again, in Italian culture, a metaphor with a concrete referent is soon overtaken by a 
mathematical instance: perspective is indeed a mathematical representation of reality, 
based on a geometrical structuration of subjective perception. On this basis, Alberti 
formulated the method of one-point linear perspective, which marks a turning point in the 
development of naturalistic representation. 
 
Perspective worked similarly for both the new artistic order and the new scientific order. 
In fact, it would definitively become the representative optical effect of a naturalized 
visual culture after the separation of aesthetic and religion operated by the Reformation. 
Perspective would also contribute to the eradication of narrative from the scientific 
cognitive method, which produces eternal truth regarding an objective and mechanical 
external reality. 
 
The perspectival subject has a frozen gaze on the world, the same as the one who draws 
maps in the modern era. The Albertian painter perfectly embodies such a notion, as the 
model of artist it builds abstracts himself from his actual body positioned in the world. 
Here the world is out there, beyond the window that protects us from any direct influence. 
Therefore, such frozen gazes exclude any form of sincere desire, as opposed to a mobile 
glance (a scopic regime that will inversely characterize the impressionists, strictly 
engaged by the invention of photography). 
 
‘The convention of perspective […] centers everything in the eye of the beholder 
[the subject]. It is like a beam from a lighthouse - only instead of light travelling 
out, appearances travel in. The conventions called those appearances reality. 
Perspective makes the single eye the centre of the visible world. Everything 
converges on the eye as to the vanishing point of infinity. The visible world is 
arranged for the spectator as the universe was once thought to be arranged for 
God’ (Berger, 1972, Ways of Seeing, 16). 
 
The monocular unblinking fixed eye of the lens at the center of a flat world and detached 
from it replaces the two stereoscopic embodied eyes immersed in a world full of depth. 
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Behind perspective, there is a mathematical conception of reality, still embedded into a 
certain religious background, where God finds his embodiment in the subject. 
 
The Italian invention and application of perspective also affected the relationship between 
the subject and object. This technique sharply distinguishes between the point of origin 
and the scene, which make up the two sides of the pyramid, at the basis of Albertian linear 
perspective theory. The pyramid itself is a structure of geometrical and thus mathematical 
nature. 
‘Now the participatory moment in theoria [see above] […], was lost as the 
spectator withdrew entirely from the seen (the scene), separated from it by 
Alberti’s shatterproof window. No longer did the painter seem as emotionally 
involved with the space he depicted; no longer was the beholder absorbed in the 
canvas’ (Jay, 1994, 55-56). 
 
- Perspective consequently contributed to the Cartesian notion of space as regularly 
ordered and homogenously inserted within an objective, uniform and purely 
extensive grid. 
In fact, Cartesian plans, where ordinates and axis crossed each other indefinitely, 
recalls Alberti’s ‘velo’: ‘a veil loosely woven of fine thread, […] divided up by 
thicker threads into […] many parallel square sections […], and stretched on a 
frame. I set this up between the eye and the object to be represented’ (Alberti, 
2004, 65). 
This reduction of space to objective plans and coordinates, and the priority of 
space over the objects in it, facilitate the domination of the planet. Here is where 
the Cartesian notion of res extensa comes from: the world as a purely visual field, 
as overseen from a very high spot, and flattened to be well managed. Moreover, 
the abstract positions outlined by the Albertian and Cartesian grid replaced the 
substantive and varying meaningfulness of places, typical of the tribe, the polis 
and the medieval community. As a result, space overshadows the objects in it. 
- The mentality of exploration and the first phase of colonization (16th century), 
dominated by centralized absolute monarchies as such as Spain and Portugal. In 
this context, exploration represents both an act of constant observation and 
mobilization. The same distance developed by perspective substitutes the direct 
relationship with the world, making it prey for conquests. Finally, perspective is 
based on an active external subject looking at the horizon of reality, like the 
explorer scanning through its telescope the ocean around him to find new lands. 
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- The subsequent scientific revolution (see above). 
- The birth of capitalism: 
“Separate from the painter and the viewer, the visual field depicted in perspectival 
paintings could become such a detached commodity available for capitalist 
circulation. Moreover […] only the exaggerated capitalist separation of the spaces 
of production and consumption permitted a radical disjunction between working 
the land and merely viewing it from afar, as an aesthetically ‘pleasing prospect’, 
which was the real estate version of perspectival art” (Jay, 1994, 58-59). 
 
B. NEW ‘VITREOUS’ INSTRUMENTS: THE MICROSCOPE 
In the early Modern Age, ‘As technically-limited and amateur-infested as it was, the 
microscope thus had a conceptual role to play’ (Willson, 1988, 89). In fact, many 
scientists and philosophers, from rationalists to empiricists, occultists to non-occultists 
and so on, charged the microscope with both expectations and suspicions. Leibniz and 
Hooke had high hopes that its use would demonstrate and sustain their own philosophical 
views, while Locke was quite sure on the practical uselessness of such instrument: 
‘if by help of […] microscopical eyes […], a man could penetrate further than ordinary 
into the secret composition and radical texture of bodies, he would not make any great 
advantage by the change, if such an acute sight would not serve to conduct him to the 
market and the exchange’ (Locke, 1846, 192). 
Locke belonged to a large group of detractors of the microscope, who regarded it as a 
useless wonder produced by the new mechanical age, meant to show passively a ‘new 
world' that could not be exploited in any possible way. 
‘The microscope constituted an actual impediment to knowledge in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century because it revealed things that were beautiful, but which could not lead 
to the acquisition of any new theoretical information, or which suggested  to observers 
theories of the wrong sort […] and made a quantitative handling of phenomena seem 
impossible or unimportant' (Wilson, 1988, 106). It is, in fact, interesting to notice how, at 
the beginning of its history, some scholars regarded the microscope as a means to prove 
the existence of ‘occult’ effects as such as magnetism.  There were very few texts 
portraying the microscope as a debunker of occult approaches. Therefore, the 
entanglement between visibility and invisibility, between scientific view and occultism 
were the underlying themes driving interest and development of the microscope, at the 




The microscope divided opinion. On the one hand, there were philosophers who saw it as 
a threat: George Berkeley (1685-1753) thought that the use of this instrument could 
shatter the divine character of nature by reducing all varieties proper to the world we 
behold unassisted to undifferentiated particles: 
‘The like may be said of all the clockwork of nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully 
fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope’ (Berkeley, 2005, 52). 
On the other hand, some scholars found possible assimilation between the divine 
characterization of the world and microscopic ‘investigation'. The microscope was, in 
fact, exploited by several physic-theologists (like Sir Thomas Browne) to see into tiny 
things (as such as insects, seeds and leaves) a common underlying, subvisible structure 
connecting the microcosm with the macrocosm and interpreted as proof for the existence 
of a ‘God-intelligent designer’. 
Moreover, intellectuals like Robert Hooke (1635-1703) and Henry Power (1623-1668) 
overturned the negative impressions of Locke and Berkeley with a positive one: they 
thought the microscope allowed to look into the ‘new visible World’ portrayed by Bacon. 
This newly revealed microscopical world, pure, uncontaminated and free from any 
intellectual speculation, was just ready for innumerable discoveries, as much as the New 
World beyond the Atlantic Ocean. Furthermore, Power considered this optical 
enhancement useful to liberate humanity from many superstitions: 
‘Our Modern Engine (the Microscope) will ocularly evince and unlearn their opinions 
again: for herein you may see subtil divider of matter Nature is’ (Power, 1966, b 2). 
To demonstrate once again how wrong the point of view of Locke8 might have been, in 
the seventeenth century Dutch painters were ‘reproducing exactly, often with the help of 
the lens, the surface textures of cloth, mirrors, glasses, insects, fur, and feathers’ (Willson, 
1988, 100). Similarly, the first microscopists were interested in studying and replicating 
the appearances of ordinary objects. 
 
However, along with the debate amongst supporters and opponents, another argument 
over the microscope broke out amongst its strongest devotees. The supporters had, in fact, 
                                                            
8 In this lack of interest, Locke exhibits his liberalist view even on the microscopical world, which is the 
conceptual base for any form of exploration and colonialism: a new world is of certain importance (and 
use) only if exploitable through labor and appropriation. It is not the case with microscopic world, for: 
- it is not an explorable place but only a too far observable land;  
- it is not exploitable, which means it does not ensure any actual resources and then labours necessary to 
obtain them. 
- it will never be a property due to its too small size. 
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developed two main explanatory theories, which were both meant to generate a first 
mapping of the ‘new invisible world'. These two conceptions of the very small were 
obviously in competition with one another, and both embodied some specific 
expectations. 
The first was the corpuscular-mechanistic conception of the micro-reality, represented by 
Cartesian philosophy. The second was the monadic conception of the micro-reality, 
conceived by its most committed supporter Leibniz. 
 
Descartes-whose thought showed once again its strong link with the optical advances of 
early Modern Age-supposed purely deductively (and without any empirical basis) that 
matter was composed of fundamental, indivisible particles, which would mechanically 
cause motion through their interaction. This theory (particle theory) is the microscopical 
application of the general Cartesian view on extensive, purely spatial matter, the so-called 
res extensa. It even shares the same mechanistic background for two reasons: 
- the ‘Cartesian conception of the body composed of invisible sub-machines’9 
(Ibid., 102). 
- The relationship  between the different particles that altogether constitute reality, 
is a causal one relationship, the same which applies also to their motion: physical 
extensive movement (applying only to res extensa) is only transmitted from one 
body to another. 
 
While Descartes directed his curiosity toward all optical instruments, Leibniz was mainly 
fascinated by the microscope. He has, in fact, been regarded as a microscopist himself: 
the ‘smallest things' are the central point of his entire philosophy. 
Furthermore, Leibniz is one of the first thinkers to address infinity, two centuries before 
this concept became central with the diffusion of idealism and romanticism. While his 
contemporaries (Descartes primarily) often represented only the finite, the opposite goal 
also   attracted his attention: representing the infinite (which was to be the project of Hegel 
too, even if developed on a very different scale). He did so by approaching the infinitely 
small (and not the infinitely large, as Hegel would later do), to transcend the organic (the 
                                                            
9 The corpuscularism of Descartes was quite similar to atomism but not identical. What distinguishes 
these two positions is that the former maintained that there could be no vacuum, and all matter was 
constantly swirling to prevent a void as corpuscles moved through other matter.  
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finite). Therefore, he chose to represent openness, the unformed instead of the formed 
and the figural: 
Leibniz demonstrated for the microscope an enthusiasm so great to overwhelm even his 
interest for telescopes: 
‘Observatories are founded to look at the stars, and these structures are founded 
to look at the stars, and these structures are spectacular and require a great [deal 
of] apparatus, but telescopes are far from being as useful and from revealing as 
many beauties and varieties of knowledge as microscopes’ (Leibniz, 1988, 53). 
 
Such enthusiasm matches with Leibniz’ combined application of both analysis and 
analogy: 
‘We also find order and marvels in the smallest whole things […], when we are 
capable of distinguishing the parts and of seeing the whole at the same time, as it 
appears in looking at insects and other small things in the microscope’ (Ibid., 51). 
 
To Leibniz, this entanglement between parts and the whole, and the infinite subdivision 
of matter disclosed by the microscope and proving the divine and spiritual character of 
reality confirm his theory of monads. Therefore, Leibniz represents a counter-tendency 
in a time dominated by a mechanistic imaginary in both empiricist and rationalist 
viewpoints10. However, ‘had the microscope actually revealed atoms […], Leibniz could 
have hardly become such an enthusiastic supporter’ (Willson, 1988, 104). 
Leibniz was far more dedicated to the new micro-world than Descartes. While the latter 
applied his mechanistic view to the microscopic universe to reinforce its general notion 
of motion and objectified space, the former, as already mentioned, deployed the very idea 
of infinitely small as the base of his philosophy. To sum up, while the microscope and the 
smallest belong only to the suburban areas of Cartesian Philosophy, being merely 
secondary components of his philosophical system, they are of paramount importance to 
Leibniz as they are central to the very construction of the entire monadic theory11. 
                                                            
10 The adversity of Leibniz toward mechanism does not concern only the microscope and the new world 
of micro-universe, but it also represents a quarrel between the rationalists. In fact, both Leibniz and 
Descartes are rationalist philosophers, in opposition to the empirical position of thinkers as such as Locke 
and Hobbes. On one side, we have the privilege of thought, logic and deduction upon experimentation, 
external reality, and induction and on the other side the overturning of the same position. However, many 
times this approach differed only methodologically, while converging on many points, as proved by 
comparing Descartes and Hobbes, or the former and Locke, for all three of them were supporting 
mechanism. There had even been divergence within the same school of thought, as demonstrated through 
the quarrel between Descartes and Leibniz on the smallest things. 
11 The specific context of this work is not suited to examine precisely the monadic theory of Leibniz and 
what a monad is. Concerning this philosopher, what is of interest to us is only the implications of the 
invention of the microscope within his thought. 
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Indeed, Leibniz imagined a microcosm that could be endlessly zoomed in by microscope 
lenses, a microcosm that has no limit to its subdivision: 
‘Every portion of matter […] is actually sub-divided without end, every part divided into 
smaller parts. […] Every portion of matter can be thought of as a garden full of plants or 
a pond full of fish. But every branch of the plant, every part of the animal (every drop of 
its vital fluids, even) is another such garden or pond’ (Leibniz, 1991, 10). This infinite 
divisibility of things informed Leibniz’s   conception of nature in panpsychist terms, and 
thus bodies (a word that here stands for ‘physical entities') as deprived of every 
substantiality, fluid and in pre-established harmony between each other: ‘without this 
infinite dividedness it would be impossible for each portion of matter to express the whole 
universe' (Ibid., 10). 
Finally, a non-mechanist universe not composed of any fundamental particles requires 
that every part of nature, from smaller to larger, ‘has some motion of its own rather than 
having only such motion as it gets from the motion of some larger lump of which it is a 
part' (Ibid., 10). 
 
The Cartesian and Leibniz’s reaction to the microscope shaped the Modern Age’s 
perception of a new visible world and possibilities which had been ignored until that time 
(with the exception of the Greek philosopher Democritus and the Roman Lucretius, 
whose atomistic intuitions remained an uninfluential episode, being deprived of any real 
technical and thus effective counterpart). 
In conclusion, ‘What the microscope did, in revealing layer after layer of articulate 
structure was to restore the solidity and accessibility to the understanding of an otherwise 
atomized and mathematized world’ (Willson, 1988, 107). In its early days, the microscope 
‘gave sense to the idea of a non-occult interpretation of nature, so binding knowledge to 
power in a way which the irredeemably fictional mechanical models, as well as the search 
for linguistic essences, had been unable to accomplish’ (Ibid., 108). 
 
C. PHILOSOPHY AND CAMERA OBSCURA 
While the microscope inspired Leibniz' philosophical system, Decartes’ philosophy 
found his technical counterpart in the camera obscura. This optical device led to the 
invention of the photographic camera and influenced the thought of many modern 
philosophers, not only Descartes but also John Locke: 
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‘Dark room. […] external and internal sensation are the only passages I can find 
of knowledge to the understanding. These alone […] are the windows by which 
light is let into this dark room: for, methinks the understanding is not much unlike 
a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little openings left, to let in 
external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without: would the pictures 
coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found 
upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man, in 
reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them (Locke, 1846, 94). 
 
Through this passage, Locke put forward the basis of the human understanding of the 
darkroom metaphor: the mind is a tabula rasa, an empty tablet that passively records any 
external objects that come into its sight, without the help of any personal deduction and/or 
intuition. This interpretation of the camera obscura, meant to define the mind, takes the 
opposite direction of the Cartesian one, which views the dark room as both a physical 
proof and metaphor of the distinction between the subjective mind and the objective 
world, of the immateriality of the former and the pure passivity of the latter. To sum up, 
for Locke, the camera obscura highlights the flexibility of the mind in its relationship with 
reality, while for Descartes the camera obscura highlights the absence of proper extension 
to subjectivity and thus to the mind. 
What both Descartes' and Locke's analogies share is the belief in the soul-mind as an 
immaterial subject. It does not matter if this ethereal sphere passively depends on external 
reality, or if it has a certain independence from it. Both these two thinkers (and the 
philosophes influenced by Locke too) imagined the relationship between our mind and 
the external world through the metaphor of the camera obscura. For instance, Decartes’ 
adoption of a perpectivalist painter approach, reproducing the observed world through a 
camera obscura, makes him an ideal visual philosopher. 
Decades before, Kepler had compared the apparatus of the eye to the camera obscura, 
providing a mechanistic explanation of vision coherent with an immaterial conception of 
the soul. 
All seventieth-century philosophical reflection endorsed this separation between material 
processes of sensation, and conscious perception of the soul. Mechanics of the eye and 
cognitive activities of the mind as the darkroom provided such a fruitful model of vision 
without threatening the prevalent metaphysics of the soul, even though the camera 





Furthermore, self-reification is another effect of the dark room on Cartesianism and 
modern thought more generally. This phenomenon: 
‘was at the root of the typical Cartesian problem of wondering how inverted and 
reversed images on the retina can be turned into normal sight. The camera obscura 
version of sight assumed by this question was based on a fallacious attempt to 
reconcile the eye as an object, whose functioning could be compared to a camera 
lens […], and the subjective experience of seeing’ (Jay, 1994, 290). 
 
It is this view which would lead three centuries later, to Sartre’s accusation that all the 
Cartesian tradition has ‘considered a dead eye in the midst of the visible world […]. 
Consequently, how can we be surprised later when consciousness, which is absolute 
interiority [for Descartes], refuses to allow itself to be bound to this object?’ (Sartre, 1993, 
305). Seen from this point of view and the already examined analysis of John Locke, the 
camera obscura contributed to the objectification and alienation of the concrete person. 
Furthermore, the darkroom also evaporates the individual from the world: up to the 
nineteenth century, the atemporal, incorporeal and transcendental order of the camera 
obscura dominated the realm of the visible. Leon Battista Alberti in art theory and 
Descartes in philosophy found in this device, the concrete model for their perspectivalist 
scopic regime: 
‘All beholders would see the same grid of orthogonal lines converging on the same 
vanishing point, if they gazed through, as it were, the same camera obscura’ (Jay, 1994, 
189). The mechanism of surveillance, which had been developed during the entire arc of 
modernity (and which will be the focus of one of the next chapters) had a certain 
resemblance to the mechanism of this instrument: ‘The camp was to the rather shameful 
art of surveillance what the dark room was to the great science of optics’ (Foucault, 1991, 
172). Both the camp and the darkroom represent hierarchized, empty, flat and impersonal 
spaces build to be crossed passively by an absolute gaze. The subject-mind-soul embodies 
such gaze, where the eye (‘I’) works as a bridge between physical and immaterial. 
Through technical development, spirituality itself assumed a new form, utterly different 
from the medieval one: it seeks a scientific, rational and sure foundation. 
 
Finally, the camera obscura a priori prevents the observer from seeing his or her position 
as part of the representation, which means that the subject is incapable of self-
representation as both subject and object. ‘Thus, the spectator is a more free-floating 
inhabitant of the darkness, a marginal supplementary presence independent of the 
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machinery of representation’12 (Crary, 1990, 41). The dark room operated as a threat to 
the previous mirror phase, by inspiring the passage from a self-reflecting phase to a phase 
orientated towards an unqualified exterior. 
 
D. FROM MIRROR TO LENS: FROM EYE OF SOUL TO EYE OF MIND 
The eye/lens of the Modern Age coincides with the ‘I', with the ego, with the subject. 
While the Ancient age, as the age of the mirror, sought the self: for the creation of an ‘I', 
Modernity developed itself from an already constituted and well-constructed concept of 
subjectivity to organize the ‘external world’ according to its invisible and ethereal stare. 
Henceforth, the difference between world and subject became a standard philosophy 
throughout the seventeenth century, albeit through a great variety of different forms. 
In one view there is the ‘eye of the soul' conceived by Plato, the eye that reflects our inner 
state in search of our daimos. Conversely, the eye of the mind, which means to represent 
and behold reality; to frame it into a particular representation. Therefore, the German 
word weltanshauung, which stands for ‘worldview' corresponds to the most advanced 
conceptual definition and instantiation of this modern eye of the mind. 
 
Ideas themselves stop corresponding to the platonic eidos, in other words, to the timeless, 
abstract objective entitites external to the subjective mind. For instance, Descartes and 
later Voltaire “used ‘idea’ to refer to an internal representation in human consciousness, 
an image in the eye of the mind’ (Jay, 1994, 84). Voltaire and Descartes thus shared a 
dualism of a-spatial consciousness and purely extensive matter although, unlike the latter, 
the former continued the sensationalist tradition of empiricists as such as Francis Bacon, 
John Locke, and Isaac Newton. Voltaire was in fact critical of innate intuition, convinced 
that ideas originate exclusively from the perception of external objects. As a result, with 
the rise of sensationalism during the Enlightenment, observation came to replace 
speculation even further, where the latter corresponded to a Cartesian notion of perception 
(and thus sight) as an active replication of the object through a clear mental image. On 
the contrary, observation or rather sensationalist seeing “is the passive blunting of light 
rays on opaque, impermeable ‘physical objects’ which are themselves passive and 
indifferent to the observer” (Ibid., 84). This visual supremacy of observation over 
                                                            
12 A shift of the same dimension in the field of geographical representation will occur only after four 
centuries with the composition of the global satellite system, something we are going to examine further 
in the next part.    
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speculation followed the removal of the residual active functions assigned by Locke to 
the mind. David Hume, Étienne Bonnet de Condillac, and other philosophes contributed 
to such deletion. 
Nonetheless, the concept of the mind as camera obscura was still supported by both the 
rationalist progenies of Descartes and the empiricist progenies of Locke. Therefore, the 
lens of modernity is the realm of chiasmus, both expansion, and division, while the mirror 
for ancient Greek is the realm of depth and intensity. The eye itself, both metaphorically 
and realistically, mutates its function along with the tool to which it is applied (see above). 
 
E. DISTANCE BETWEEN SUBJECT AND OBJECT, RES COGITANS AND 
RES EXTENSA 
As previously suggested the camera obscura is the technical counterpart of the Cartesian 
distinction between two different kinds of substance: res cogitans and res extensa, mind 
and matter. 
This kind of divide is also present in Locke’s thought, even though it is framed by a 
different approach. Apart from the fascination this English thinker had for dark rooms, 
(see above) he also built a political-philosophical system where matter and mind occupy 
very different planes (the very concept of private property echoes such distinction, as 
exposed below). Although in Locke's political system the subject still holds a prominent 
position it does not have the metaphysical characteristics of the Cartesian res cogitans. In 
fact, Locke conceived the mind as an empty box capable of absorbing as much data as 
possible –the very concept of tabula rasa- all extrapolated from the external world 
without any inner intuitions or deductions as espoused by Descartes. Therefore, in 
Lockean theory subject (mind) is also separated from the object (matter), not as a result 
of strict isolation and self-sufficiency from the latter, but by virtue of its skill of 
possessing and elaborating the latter. In other words, while for Descartes the mind/subject 
can create data independently of the so-called external world, Locke interprets the mind 
as being capable of constructing images –which etymologically and even conceptually 
correspond to ideas- only as copies of perceived external ‘objects'. In other words, the 
mind builds itself only through its perception and experiences, thus through its 
relationship with the external/extensive/objective/sensible world. Such a conception of 
subjectivity (also echoing the camera obsura mechanism), inevitably applied itself to the 
concept of private property: If the subject is formed through its relationship with a 
nonetheless distant and separate outside (objectivity), then such relationship is an 
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unequivocal relationship of possession and appropriation, which can be achieved only 
through labour. In fact, a Lockean subject owns an item, a place, an intellectual creation 
only by its work on it. The consequence of such statement is another very liberal (early 
capitalist) concept: production. 
 
Despite their formal differences, both Descartes' and Locke's philosophy shared the same 
visual regime: the gaze. In fact, only such a way of conceiving sight can be brought to the 
theory of the dichotomy between the subject/object (and by proxy mind/matter), and as 
already mentioned technological achievements have strongly influenced our perception 
of this divide as being prominently visual, thanks to the beautiful scopic nature of the 
lens. In fact, telescopes, microscopes, and dark rooms, all require and develop the 
distinction between an invisible, transcendental and immaterial entity (finally defined 
subject) on one side of the device and a visible, static, flat, strictly spatially determined 
object on the other side (finally defined object). 
The philosophical outcomes of such concrete use of optical tools based on the lens are 
the very modern concepts of mind and matter. In Cartesian terms, the res cogitans 
corresponds to an observer, while re extensa is the domain of the observed and 
corresponds to the space in which we observe things. 
 
There are also two less philosophical and more sociological reasons behind the 
development of subjectivity and objectivity in early modernity which both evolved from 
the manufacturing of new optical instruments and exploration, which by emancipating 
individuals from their community facilitated the flourishing of various subjectivities (a 
topic that will be specifically addressed in chapter H). However, such endeavours led to 
the discovery of new sources to trade and exploit, where things and environment were no 
longer conceived as elements that define a community, and hence an individual, but rather 
as entities, void of any meaning and meant only to be taken and used: objects (in terms 
of the anonymous res extensa). The visual regime of the gaze made possible by the new 







F. LENS IN POLITICS: MONARCHY, REVOLUTION, AND 
BONAPARTISM 
The seventeenth century had been the scene for different events that altogether 
contributed to the decline of the Church, of its institutions and hegemony throughout the 
entire continent. Moreover, these events brought about a more general secularisation of 
the entire European society, politics, and power: 
- Reformation, counter-reformation and the wars between Catholics and 
Protestants; 
- The scientific revolution, mostly through the shift from a geocentric conception 
of the cosmos to a heliocentric one 
- The emancipation, in general, of modern philosophy from theology and religion. 
Along with secularisation and all its causes, the seventeenth century had other 
phenomena which helped it to develop a still centralized but more rational 
conception of power; 
- The crisis of the feudal system due to a new and more efficient way of organizing 
the territory, along with new agricultural techniques, and the transfer of power 
from castles, rocks, and fortresses to cities and mansions; 
- The discovery of new lands and their following colonization by the most 
prominent European states, with the ideological support of the new liberal theory 
of private property (John Locke); 
- The development of the State (parallel to the dismantling of the old feudal 
system), supported by the new political theories of philosophers as such as 
Hobbes. 
All these events contributed to the reinforcement and centralization of Monarchy and 
State, whose entanglement constituted the dominant political model of the following three 
centuries. This phenomenon needed an aesthetic counterpart to grant it prestige and 
further cement the political power of the king: 
‘In a century that also saw rapid material advances in the manufacture of plate 
glass, eyeglasses, and interior lighting, the very ability to look and to be seen in a 
social setting was markedly improved. When Jean Baptiste Colbert smashed the 
Venetian monopoly on mirrors, the way was open for Louis XIV’s unprecedented 
Galerie des Glaces at Versailles, as well as the so-called glaces à repetition or 
vista mirrors with their infinite reflections, which became a staple of aristocratic 
interior decoration' (Jay, 1994, 88). 
 
Within this context, glass transcends the function proper to the lens and finds a new 
application, and thus a new form. It becomes, not only an instrument for the improvement 
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of sight, but a luxury, and symbol of the visibility of power. This alternative application 
highlights the importance glass had in human history, especially during modernity, on a 
variety of levels, even though the lens remains the glassy archetype of the Modern Era. 
However, the previously mentioned luxury goods and lenses both share and demonstrate 
the scopic relevance of glass, and how this material shaped different scopic regimes 
coexisting during the same historical period. 
 
As mentioned before, Versailles perfectly exemplifies the impact vitreous design had on 
monarchy: surrounded by the dazzling sight of his Court the king became a God-like 
figure, the sun itself. He represented both the absolute gaze and the source of all light. 
Therefore, the secularization mentioned previously did not work to achieve the partial 
departure of religion and God from this world but assisted in moving God down to Earth. 
Besides, the new heliocentric theory (whereby the Earth orbits around the Sun and not 
vice versa), at first refused, became itself a symbolic instrument of the renovation of 
European society towards centralization in the hands of few. 
 
The image of Napoleon represents the enhancement of the visual economy proper to all 
the modern world. Napoleon eliminated all the weaknesses still present in the kings of 
the ancient regime and of the old hereditary European monarchies: 
Napoleon’s reign was the transitional moment, when the emperor: 
‘combined in a single symbolic, figure the whole long process by which the pomp 
of sovereignty, the necessarily spectacular manifestations of power, were 
extinguished one by one, in the daily exercise of surveillance, in a panopticism in 
which the vigilance of intersecting gazes was soon to render useless both the eagle 
and the sun’ (Foucault, 1991, 217). 
 
Bonapartism symbolized the perfect union of revolutionary ideals with those of the 
Enlightenment, and an increased and more efficient idea of surveillance, insofar as the 
revolutionaries themselves created an imaginary as oculacentric as the Ancien Régime. 
The Apollonian imagery of the revolution replaced the Sun King, by keeping him now 
under strict surveillance. Henceforth, Napoleon improved this new face of the 
heliocentrism that characterized both the science and the politics of all Modern Age. This 
shift was possible as French Revolution was not a rebellion against the old regime, but 
only an enhancement of an already developing new system of control. In turn, 
Bonapartism was the ideology which ushered in the modern way of managing 
surveillance: Panopticism was applied to every social and political sphere. 
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This new ideology would involuntarily influence the entire nineteenth century, despite 
the attempts of the old monarchies to erase it through the Restauration. In late 18th/19th 
century society, the fall of the monarchic system, centred on an absent spectator, the king, 
in favour of the rise of the bourgeois, made of observed spectators, would cause the rise 
of Human Sciences, and thus humanism. 
"[The] absent sovereigns, visible only in their reflections in the small mirror on 
the back wall of the painter's studio, are the ones who ‘see' the picture in front of 
us. But in this doubled space of representation, the seeing subject can only be 
inferred, not perceived directly’ (Jay, 1994, 404). 
 
This phenomenon resembles the already mentioned way of working of camera obscura: 
the subject is not visible and not reducible to an object because not representable. The 
second phase of Modern Age sees this assumption fully undermined by what Foucault 
defined the rise of Man (along with the rise of human sciences): 
‘man appears in his ambiguous position as an object of knowledge and as a subject 
that knows; enslaved sovereign, observed spectator, he appears in the place 
belonging to the king […] but from which his real presence has for so long been 
excluded' (Foucault, 2002, 340). 
 
G. FROM REFLECTION TO OBSERVATION 
New technologies-not only vitreous but also typographic (the invention of print)-led to 
‘Modern individualism (the eye = I), the depersonalization of the external world, and the 
glorification of observation as the only valid way of knowing the world’ (Jay, 1994, 67). 
Observation was predominantly linked with materiality, after the enhancement, and large-
scale use of telescopes and other devices based on lenses. Therefore, this scopic regime 
entirely belonged to the new lens phase and aligned with the typically modern reduction 
of the world to an objectified space: the visual world replaced the visual field. Moreover, 
the centrality of observation was inevitably supported by the recent development of 
science, whose birth was strictly related to the invention of several new optical 
instruments: 
‘The science was a far more active and interventionist enterprise than the 
contemplation of the ancients. As such, it roughly paralleled those other great 
exploring ventures of the early modern era, the voyages to unknown lands, which 
were themselves fuelled in large measure by visually charged curiosity’ (Ibid., 
63). 
 
Amongst the several modern wonders of technology, the telescope-more than the camera 
obscura- is the reason behind observation, as much as observation is the reason behind 
the telescope. This relationship is the same as that occurring between science and 
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technology: as the great process of modern technological enhancement required the 
development of a new methodology (science) based  largely  on experimentation and 
induction, so this new methodology found in its  technical application, its true raison 
d'être. This last sentence means that: 
- First, the material enhancement or invention of practical research instruments are 
necessary to improve or even establish science as such; 
- Second, the entire enterprise of science finds its essence, not in knowledge, but 
technology, in the effective reduction of nature to a mere source to exploit. The 
curiosity that identifies this new kind of knowledge completely diverges from the 
passive wonder of ancient times. 
The latter point finds its first theorization in the sixteenth/seventeenth century English 
philosopher, Francis Bacon, who is probably the thinker who embodies most vividly the 
active and aggressive nature of observation, due to his empiricist advocacy of the 
scientific method. 
Bacon first underlined how knowledge comes only from observation, and not from 
theory: 
‘Man, being nature’s servant and interpreter, is limited in what he can do and 
understand by what he has observed of the course of nature - directly observing it 
or inferring things from what he has observed. Beyond that he doesn’t know 
anything and can’t do anything’. 
(Bacon, 2017, 4) 
 
Several times in this aphorism the entanglement of ‘knowing' and ‘doing' is underlined, 
whereby both terms rely intensively on sight. However, Bacon, in the following passage 
of his most important book (the Novum Organum) argues that observation does not work 
alone, but needs artificial support: ‘Not much can be achieved by the naked hand or by 
the unaided intellect. Tasks are carried through by tools and helps’ (Ibid., 4). 
Furthermore, Bacon supported once again the idea that knowledge should be irreducible 
to a powerless contemplation -as it was in ancient times- but be conceived as an 
enhancement of actual power: 
‘Human knowledge and human power meet at a point; for where the cause isn’t known 
the effect can’t be produced. The only way to command nature is to obey it; and 
something that functions as the cause in thinking about a process functions as the rule in 
the process itself’ (Ibid., 4).  'Operation' replaces contemplation: knowing the causes of 
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phenomena helps to know how to operate on nature itself and have control of it. 
Therefore, observation comes to be an instrument to tame and even transform nature13. 
 
In several other aphorisms of Novum Organum, Bacon also highlights the importance of 
experimentation over theory, of trying new ways of action lying idly on the old, hence 
'invention' above all: 
‘If something has never yet been done, it would be absurd and self-contradictory 
to expect to achieve it other than through means that have never yet been tried. 
[…] Moreover, the works that have already been achieved owe more to chance 
and experiment than to disciplined sciences; for the sciences we have now are 
merely pretty arrangements of things already discovered, not ways of making 
discoveries or pointers to new achievements’ (Ibid., 4). 
 
This sentence vividly expresses the critique of speculation typical in Bacon’s thought, 
whose major aim is indeed to support direct observation as a more fitting substitute: 
‘Nature is much subtler than are our senses and intellect; so that all those elegant 
meditations, theorizings and defensive moves that men indulge in are crazy - except that 
no-one pays attention to them’. (Ibid., 4). Moreover, ‘A syllogism consists of 
propositions, which consist of words, which are stand-ins […] for notions. So, the root of 
the trouble is this: If the notions are confused, having been sloppily abstracted from the 
facts, nothing that is built on them can be firm. So our only hope lies in true induction’ 
(Ibid., 5). The entire Modern Age would follow the tendency expressed by this aphorism; 
the tendency toward an increasingly stronger separation between words and images, a no 
longer textual interpretation of the world. Consequently, language is reduced to the 
functions of description and communication, and no more symbolic and entangled with 
reality: 
‘When a language-drawn line is one that a sharper thinker or more careful observer would 
want to relocate so that it suited the true divisions of nature, words stand in the way of 
the change’ (Ibid., 12). 
Sight and hearing do not match anymore in the modern world, all in favour of the former: 
‘I admit nothing but on the faith of eyes, or at least of careful and severe examination’ 
(Bacon, 2012, 25). Observation through new optic devices as such as microscopes and 
telescopes stand firm in supporting such statements on the supremacy of sight over the 
other senses. 
                                                            




This optical hypertrophy found itself strictly linked to curiosity, which came to substitute 
the Greek concept of thauma (see above), and then became the Stimmung of modern 
scientific revolution. While Thauma (wonder) let things be, curiosity dissects them, 
expressed the desire to know how they work, so to reduce natural entities to exploitable 
machineries and thus support the triumph of a mechanistic worldview. Curiosity achieved 
this relevance during the modern era only after a long process of liberation from that 
traditional medieval demonization started by Saint Augustine of Hippo (354-430 AD). 
To him curiosity was in fact a vice, a ‘disease’ affecting society, and a perverse 
entertainment. 
As curiosity was the drive for the birth of techno-science and its inventions, so to 
specifically cause and increase curiosity were ‘the powers attributed to [observation] 
since Bacon and the technical improvements introduced in it by the invention of the 
microscope’ (Foucault, 2002, 136) (see above). 
 
In conclusion, it is notable that the enhancement of sight and development of observation, 
the scientific revolution and, finally, curiosity are three entangled phenomena constitutive 
of the Modern Age and lens phase. 
 
H. EXPLORATION, INDIVIDUALISM AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY 
As demonstrated by Foucault, the birth of individualism is strictly related to the birth of 
observation. The Cartesian distance between subject and object, the strict subdivision of 
duty proper, to industrialization, required the constitution of separate entities charged 
with precise responsibilities. This latter concept assumed the characteristic of 
functionality henceforth: different kinds of responsibility corresponded to the different 
functions that each person has in society. 
However, another phenomenon that concurred to create individualism was the time of 
exploration, whose beginnings correspond to the discovery of America by Christopher 
Columbus: 1492. 
 
In the Modern era, exploration meant facing death and risking one's own life. It 
represented the passage from the ancient communitarian way of living, to the modern and 
subjective way of living. In modern times, a man could be considered free only by his 





Through this very notion of position, space ceased being the signifying one of community, 
and became the objective and meaningless space of geography and maps. The result is 
the passage from the imaginary of the genius loci to the representation of space through 
Cartesian plane; from the feeling of being part of a specific place to the reduction of space 
to cartography, a space submissive to the movement of explorers and conquerors. This 
transition from stasis to movement means, once again, passing from a communitarian set 
of values to a subjective one. 
 
Exploration embodies the 'explosive' tendency of modernity-which inverts during the 
Contemporary Age (see above) into implosion-, a tendency that brings the inner, 
subjective states toward a pre-supposed and distant outer world. To a certain extent, many 
philosophers of the sixteenth century have helped Colonization to build its basic ideology: 
- Descartes  constructed the concept behind any form of observation: the telescopic 
distance between res cogitans and res extensa and the fundamental grid for 
mapping the latter and putting it under the control of the former; 
- Locke conceived the idea of private property, which corresponds to the reduction 
of land to something purely visual and without significance. The territory is 
dismissed by its semiotic and symbolic relationshipship with its inhabitants, in 
favor of the development of the State and the individual. Labour (and, after that, 
production) is, in such a context, inevitably viewed as the only possible 
relationshipship  between a pre-supposed subject and the physical world. An 
individual works on a particular lot and hence he deserves it as his property; 
- Francis Bacon had incepted into the modern world the idea that humankind has to 
force Nature into sharing its secrets with humanity.. 
Several other theories (as such as Darwinism) would come centuries later, during the last 
phase of the Modern Age, in support of a more organized form of Colonialism. However, 
only the previously quoted philosophies can be considered as the background to the 








I. DUTCH GOLDEN AGE: THE RISE OF MAPPING 
During the 17th century, Dutch artists introduced mapping, a new form of objectification 
of space alongside the already established perspective and its renewed Cartesian version. 
This new scopic regime, like the older perspective (see above), was the result of the 
intertwinement of craft, art and natural knowledge, with a special regard to the new 
optical instruments. In fact, the Dutchmen were renowned for their proficiency with 
lenses and mechanical aids to vision. For instance, the philosopher Spinoza ground lenses; 
Huygens (a major figure of the scientific revolution) built a refractor telescope; the 
spectacle-makers Hans and Zacharia Jansen invented the microscope. Moreover, by 
spending part of his life in Holland Descartes grew such an interest for the new optical 
instruments, particularly for the invention of the telescope, to write La Dioptrique (1637). 
This short treatise presented detailed instructions to build these devises. 
 
However, the guilds of the Dutch Golden Age did not mathematize optics as the 
corporations of the Italian Renaissance did. On the contrary, they had a more pragmatic 
approach toward the use and craft of lenses, privileging measuring and experimentation 
over geometry. Such skills explains their exceptional talent as cartographers and 
merchants, which was proved by the rise in the 17th century of Dutch maritime supremacy 
and decline of Spanish and Portuguese armadas, and by the subsequent transformation of 
colonization into a means for trade (as proved by the United East India Company) instead 
of exploitation and political power. 
 
Continuing a process started by the Renaissance (when painting was an instrument of 
both knowledge and possession), ‘the Dutch mixture of trade with art’ (Alpers, 1983, 100) 
definitively made objects into mere properties and exchangeable goods. Increasingly after 
the 17th century, paintings also became commodities, defining the social status of their 
client. In fact, Dutch painters soon became ‘the purveyors of luxury goods to the rich’ 
(Ibid., 115). 
 
Oil painting, available in Northern Europe since the fifteenth century, supported this 
proto-capitalist mentality along with Dutch descriptive attitude. 
Firstly, ‘the period of the oil painting corresponds with the rise of the open art market’ 
(Berger, 1972, 88). 
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Secondly, ‘Due to its ability to reduce ‘everything to the equality of objects’ (Ibid., 87), 
with its impact on colors and textures, an opaqueness and solidity spread on the canvas, 
this specific technique came to define what we still mean by pictorial likeness. 
 
Consequently, the Dutch art was descriptive instead of prescriptive. It was more 
concerned with still life, landscapes, and domestic scenes than the idealizing religious 
and mythological themes of the Italian Renaissance. ‘The Dutch art [...] [added] actual 
viewing experience to the artificial perspective system of the Italians’ (Ibid., 27). Its 
approach was less hierarchical and static, and more concrete and vivid: it placed the 
beholder inside the scene as a mechanical automaton. A dissecting mechanical eye, which 
is altogether with the world it observes, replaced the abstract distant eye of the mind. The 
single objects were once again relevant, and not only the space were they in. However, 
there was no participatory relationship with them as there had been with the Greek theoria 
(see above). 
 
‘Northern artists characteristically sought to represent by transforming the extent of 
vision onto their small, flat working surface’ (Alpers, 1983, 51), avoiding the direct 
relationship with an external viewer created by the fictional third dimension of 
perspective. As a result, the canvas surface contained a self-sufficient complete 
semblance of the world, democratically including different coexisting views without any 
hierarchical deep focus. In contrast with Italian painting, the patterns are usually 
asymmetrical, there is no prior frame and the viewer is position within and not outside 
the representation. In fact, the mapping and concretely descriptive technique 
characterizing Dutch art, tendentially decentralizing pictures. 
 
Such democratic way of seeing was also the result of the peculiar historical situation of 
17th century Holland. The bloodshed of the Reformation had not stained the Netherlands, 
explaining its incomparable religious tolerance, along with the Spanish-Dutch Peace 
Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648. Moreover, Holland was the commercial center of 
Europe, characterized by a sizeable urban middle class, and gathering merchants from 
every part of the continent. 
 
Dutch descriptive attitude of mapping, oil painting and ability with cartography increased 
the detextualization and objectification of space started by the Italian perspective. In fact, 
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mapping extended the commodification of reality and thus that search for possession 
already inaugurated by the Albertian imposition of an abstract and geometrical grid on 
space. 
Consequently, the birth of modern geography is not only an epistemological and cognitive 
revolution, but it also represents a new proactive and interventionist approach toward the 
planet, based on both mapping and perspective. 
Furthermore, both perspective and mapping would influence the centuries to come in their 
method of conceiving the organization of power and society. The new political entity of 
the state would enhance these two optical techniques by applying them to the mechanism 
of surveillance. 
Ultimately, Dutch mapping would contribute as much as Italian perspective already did 
(see above), to the emerging capitalism. In fact, to constitute private property and to 
reduce the Earth to a resource to exploit as it occurs in a liberal conception, the world has 
to be described objectively through maps and distantly observed through telescopes. 
 
J. LENS SOCIETY: PANOPTICON AND SURVEILLANCE 
In the second half of the modern age, the Panopticon was to society, what the observatory 
was to science. 
In fact, the observatory and the Panopticon were both invented in the late eighteenth 
century, under the lens phase, and under the same ‘telescopic’ visual regime. The 
Panopticon itself worked as a social observatory and as a model for any other social 
observatories, like schools: 
‘The school tends to constitute minute social observatories that penetrate even to the 
adults and exercise regular supervision over them’ (Foucault, 1991, 211). 
 
The ‘designer’ of the Panopticon was the Philosopher and Jurist Jeremy Bentham, who 
lived between the second half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth. 
This structure for social reformation was supposed to be a prison building designed as 
follows: 
‘The building is circular. The apartments of the prisoners occupy the 
circumference. […] These cells are divided from one another, and the prisoners 
by that means secluded from all communication with each other, by partitions in 
the form of radii issuing from the circumference towards the center […]. The 
apartment of the inspector occupies the [central tower] […]. It will be convenient 
[…] to have a vacant space […] all round, between such centre and such 
circumference. […] Each cell has in the outward circumference, a window […]. 
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The inner circumference of the cell is formed by an iron grating, so light as not to 
screen any part of the cell from the Inspector's view’ (Bentham, 1843, 40-41). 
 
Through this new social device, discipline and observation were closely linked. 
The spreading of the lens and its enhanced applications changed society drastically. 
Armies, schools, the State, prisons, and other institutions assumed observation as the 
primary model of action. 
As mentioned before, all modern philosophy, mostly deriving from Descartes and Bacon, 
had developed observation over the ancient theory and contemplation to give to it all the 
conceptual instruments it needed. Cartesian plan and Cartesian subdivision in res extensa 
and res cogitans are the symbolic and subliminal level of a world based on lens, and thus 
on beholding. 
 
Panopticism meant disciplining and thus coercing through observation social life outside 
the disciplinary spaces, which is also the indirect scope of Cartesianism: mapping, 
categorizing, distributing and individualizing. Such worldview accepted no blurring 
masses and thus resulted in the ‘production’ of individuals. 
It is now of paramount importance to distinguish between two concepts: subject and 
individual. 
- As already mentioned, the subject was a conceptual product, and a necessary 
conceptual tool of the 17th century. It worked as the cultural counterpart for the 
new technical innovations, as such as the telescope and the dark room, and for the 
new figure of the explorer/conquistador. The subject specifically corresponded to 
the invisible observer behind the lens. 
- As previously discussed, the individual is a social product of the 18th-century 
application of the scientific observatory to the detention system, and then to the 
entire society. In fact, Bentham conceived the Panopticon not only as a 
development of the prison system, but as a more general model of social 
reformation. 
This giant telescope/observatory, instead of simply creating a subject of power was 
imposed on the development of individuals. As the prison was the first place where this 
machine was built and used, so inmates were the first examples of individuals. In a 
panoptical regime a convict is permanently visible, and never aware of ‘whether he is 
being looked at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so’ (Foucault, 
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1991, 201). These two properties, which could also apply more generally to individuals, 
assure the automatism and homogenising effect of power. Through panopticism: 
‘The crowd, a compact mass, […] is abolished and replaced by a collection of 
separated individualities. From the point of view of the guardian, it is replaced by 
a multiplicity that can be numbered and supervised; from the point of view of the 
inmates, by a sequestered and observed solitude’ (Ibid.). 
 
While, as already analysed, power before the 18th century was mostly embodied by a 
subject or few (i.e., conquerors and kings) gazing from above towards the objectified 
world or ‘lower level people', the same telescopic sense of power after this century starts 
being less subject-centered and more depersonalized. Power stops being a personal 
property and becomes an impersonal, specific and rational arrangement of gazes and 
illumination, surfaces and bodies, which determines the formation of individuals. The 
sovereign power becomes obsolete, and with it all its rituals, ceremony and so forth. We 
could hence state that while the first half of the Modern Age focused on the subject who 
beholds through the telescope, the second half dismissed the seer, to focus on the other 
side of the telescope, the observed individuals. From the invisible soul who gazes at 
everything and everyone (subject/mind) to an organized and mapped series of 
differentiated and individualized bodies. This internal change occurring into the lens 
phase probably occurred once the usage of optical instruments (microscope in particular) 
was extended to humankind itself and not only to the world. Such an extension signals 
the birth of the very concept of humanity, a concept that, along with individuality, does 
not correspond only to a mere objectification/reification of our species. Otherwise, they 
both underline the interchangeable character of these two ideas: single individuals and 
the whole of humanity are now gifted with the possibility of switching between being 
objects and being subjects, depending on the situation. 
This form of self-observation and self-surveillance operated by panopticism does not 
refer to self-reflection and mirroring. It is more a form of self-alienation, or rather the 
basis of the entire phenomenon of alienation. 
 
Observation, discipline, and individuals work together as parts of a unique mechanism, 
the so-called mechanism of production. Referring to lens it is arguable that the 
contemporary birth of science and construction of the first lenses allowed for the 




There is also a strong relationship between space and discipline: 
‘This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals 
are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in 
which all events are recorded, in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the 
centre and periphery, in which power is exercised without division, according to 
a continuous hierarchical figure, in which each individual is constantly located, 
examined and distributed among the living beings, the sick and the dead – all this 
constitutes a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism’ (Ibid., 197). 
 
Here the Cartesian space based on objective coordinates finds its application. 
 
The main objective of the panoptic system of surveillance was not political power but the 
social efficiency necessary to improve productivity, and consequently economic 
conditions and standards of education. Surveillance corresponded only to the mechanism 
of the Panopticon and not to its function. Surveillance was necessary to generate 
production itself, whereby the Panopticon, instead of favouring the tyranny of few 
subjects, worked as a democratic means through its inner mechanism of reciprocal 
surveillance. Panopticism constituted individuals through this advanced disciplinary 
mechanism: 
‘[The] Panopticon, subtly arranged so that an observer may observe, at a glance, 
so many different individuals, also enables everyone to come and observe any of 
the observers. The seeing machine was once a sort of dark room into which the 
exercise of power may be supervised by society as a whole’ (Ibid., 207). 
 
In this passage from Discipline and Punish by Michel Foucault the metaphor of the 
camera obscura appears again as fundamental for the entire modern world. 
 
Another concept highlighted by the 20th-century French philosopher is that the 
Panopticon worked as the reference for every relationship with power, by taking as its 
model the telescope itself: 
‘Side by side with the major technology of the telescope, the lens and the light 
beam, which were integral parts of the new physics and cosmology, there were 
the minor techniques of multiple and intersecting observations, of eyes that must 
see without being seen; using techniques of subjection and methods of 
exploitation, an obscure art of light and the visible was secretly preparing a new 
knowledge of man’ (Ibid., 171). 
 
Henceforth, lenses, knowledge, and power were developed as an untied unit which 





Observation geometrically shaped society, as it did with the Earth: calculated disposition 
of individuals to maximize efficiency and results. Panopticon, as a social observatory, yet 
an observatory, was a geometrical machine itself, a concrete example of strict geometric 
architecture. 
Observation and then panopticism (its 17th century by-product) would prepare the way 
for industrialization, for a relationship with the thing based on production: 
‘As the machinery of production became larger and more complex, as the number of 
workers and the division of labour increased, supervision became ever more necessary 
and more difficult’ (Ibid., 174). 
 
The scopic regime of surveillance, which includes also supervision, and more generally 
the lens phase with all its different components (from social to technological to 
philosophical to epistemological), would find in Paris its culmination in an urban context. 
 
K. PARIS, CITY OF SURVEILLANCE AND MAPPING 
The late days of Modern Age were testimonies of the expansion of the lens phase in new 
fields and new forms of expression, phenomena which brought about its internal 
differentiation and ultimately its future demise. Previous chapters have examined how 
gaze, reflection and observation corresponded to the primary forms of perception 
developed and enhanced by the technology of the time. The focus having been 
overwhelmingly on the visual the way lenses inevitably engender. Furthermore, we have 
examined the typologies of society and institutions devised by this technological 
apparatus: centralized and hierarchic, spreading out through exploration, but with a 
tendency toward the levelling of the class system. 
This chapter will investigate how many of the mechanisms proper to modern society, 
embodying the lens phase, contributed to the complete reshaping of Paris in the 19th 
century. 
 
Paris in the 19th century, became the representation of panopticism, mapping and gaze 
applied to a city. All the technical, philosophical, political and social changes of Modern 
Age were interlinked in the French capital.  Hausmann was the planner of such an urban 
version of the lens phase: 
‘In 1859, six years after becoming the Prefect of the Seine, Baron Georges-Eugène 
Haussmann began his massive rebuilding […] of the capital. […] One of his 
ancillary goals was to render Paris less obscure, less opaque […]. Here, we might 
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say, the Cartesian perspectivalist scopic regime seemed to find its perfect urban 
form-a judgement symbolically supported by the fact that only in 1853 was Paris 
as a whole surveyed and definitely mapped for the first time’ (Jay, 1994, 117-
118). 
 
Paris became the urbanistic application of the geometrical theories at the basis of the 
objectification of space. One aim of such a deed was the improvement of the surveillance 
on citizens. In fact, the old medieval neighborhoods, tangle of narrow streets, were 
destroyed and replaced by long, linear, wide roads, the boulevards, which created ‘long 
and broad corridors in which troops and artillery could move effectively against future 
barricades and popular insurrections’ (Berman, 1988, 150). The transformation of French 
people from king's subjects to citizens acquired over French Revolution required the 
modification of the specific city where that event started. The city was mapped, which 
means that it was considerably reduced to an ordered, flat and qualitatively invariable 
locus. 
 
However, as argued by Marshall Berman (1940-2013) in All That is Solid Melts into Air 
the actualization of Hausmann-Napolon’s town plan also: 
‘opened up the whole of the city […] to all its inhabitants. Now […] it was 
possible to move not only within neighborhoods, but through them. Now, after 
centuries of life as a cluster of isolated cells, Paris was becoming a unified 
physical and human space. 
The Napoleon-Haussmann boulevards created new bases-economic, social, 
aesthetic-for bringing enormous numbers of people together. At the street level 
they were lined with small businesses and shops of all kinds, with every corner 
zoned for restaurants and terraced sidewalk cafes. […] Haussmann's sidewalks, 
like the boulevards themselves, were extravagantly wide, lined with benches, 
lush with trees. Pedestrian islands were installed to make crossing easier, to 
separate local from through traffic and to open up alternate routes for 
promenades. Great sweeping vistas were designed, with monuments at the 
boulevards' ends, so that each walk led toward a dramatic climax’. (Berman, 
1988, 151). 
 
Therefore, the post-Haussmann Paris was not just a city embodying the dominant visual 
regimes of mapping and surveillance, but it also displayed a visual spectacle which 
anticipates of few decades new optical devices (Lumiere’s invention of cinema) and kinds 






L. MECHANICAL AUTOMATA 
As already mentioned, one of the events which expressed a new degree of technical 
enhancement was the invention of the first machines, the so-called automata, an event 
strictly linked to new philosophical conceptions. 
The term Automaton (the singular form of automata) –which stands for ‘acting of one's 
own will' - was coined by the Greek in reference to all –even mythological- devices 
capable of self-motion once activated – from the fantastic artificial man of Bronze Talos 
forged by the god Hephaestus to the actual mechanical devices produced quite often in 
the Hellenistic world. It denotes moving machines developed before the advent of 
electronics (see above) whose movement was based on laws of mechanics, hydraulics, 
and pneumatics. Although their purely scientific and impractical use and invention during 
Hellenism, derives from the Renaissance It was during the Seventeenth century that they 
became increasingly popular and diffused throughout European Courts, but especially the 
French. In this early modern time, automata mostly corresponded to clockwork and 
mechanical toys with elaborate features of animals which were made for the amusement 
of the aristocracy. Nonetheless, automata became also the conceptual standard of 
comparison for Nature and the organism, thanks to the Cartesian use of the word automata 
to define animals as purely extensive and not thinking entities. In fact, Descartes argued 
that their bodies were only complex machines, whereby every organ could have been 
replaced with mechanical pieces like cogs, pistons, and cams. 
It is curious to notice that a very young Louis XIV had miniature horses along with 
footmen, page and a lady within a coach designed by an artisan named Camus; all these 
figures exhibited a perfect mechanical movement. It is even more curious to notice that a 
more mature Roi Soleil would make his court in Versailles a place with plenty of such 
wonders, but on a much broader scale. Such a relationship between the French monarchy 
(the ideal model for any European monarchy during the late seventeenth century) and 
automata does not only echo the ‘philosophical machines' of Descartes, but also hints to 
a political application of this both modern and French interest in automata. 
 
Meanwhile Descartes theoretically distinguished entities between thinking and purely 
extensive, the French king (the utmost modern absolutist king) created a political division 
between himself and his subjects. Mechanical automata, animals from the Cartesian 
perspective and the subjects to a king occupy the same ontological space: they are all 
philosophical zombies, tools capable of acting by themselves only once activated by an 
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entirely independent and free entity. What lies beneath such a picture is the very modern 
idea of a strict division between who controls and who/what is controlled, between 
emancipated subjects and reified/alienated subjects (or objects), between automata and 
puppet masters. The relationship between control and subjection that makes possible such 
division corresponds to the purely visual and one-sided one existing between observers 
and observed which finds in the lens its actual medium, expression, and symbol. In fact, 
haptic interactions are always avoided between a subject and an object, king and subjects, 
artisans and their automata. Otherwise, the division would be overtaken and no gaze 
would be possible, because every relationship of control is based on the visual regime of 
the gaze. 
 
Lastly, the automaton worked also as a standard for a renewed conception of God. In fact, 
the rise of a mechanistic image of the world during the Seventeenth Century -which found 
in these same machines both an application and an inspiration- brought to the next century 
the development of a very innovative religious conception: Deism. God was then 
conceived as an artisan and the world (humankind included) as its automata, like 
clockwork (an image used by Voltaire); once activated, reality can act autonomously but 
only under a strict deterministic mechanical law. Such an interpretation of God had 
already been outlined by Thomas Hobbes, whose merit had been to link in a very rigid 
and accurate scheme all the factors constituting the modern conception. This scheme –
which finds in the Leviathan its representation – coherently assembled modern politics, 
society, theology, philosophy and scientific worldview in one system, all under a mostly 
mechanist vision.  In fact, through the prominent figure of the Leviathan Hobbes had 
constituted a machine that runs itself through a strict, parallel, vertical relationship 
between God, the king, the state, the individual subject and Nature (understood in 
mechanical terms). The stability of each of these five figures requiring constant and 
specific interaction with the others: 
- God ensures the royalty of the King and makes possible the movement of the 
nature-clockwork; 
- The subject, whose selfishness is a characteristic that Nature gifted him/her, needs 
the institution of the State and the remission of any freedom to one sole King to 
have granted its safety; 
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- The King needs both the blessing of God to see its special status justified and a 
contract with his subjects to represent fully and legally the entire State (the 
Leviathan); 
- The State is formed by subjects, unified through the figure of a common ruler (the 
King) ,and works as a whole; on the other hand, it grants the security and peaceful 
existence of those same subjects; 
- Nature (the external world) is ruled by a strict mechanical law and also 
corresponds to a state of the constant reciprocal struggle between the creatures 
that constitute it. Such a condition together with the existence of independent 
subjects is what makes necessary the institution of the State and the centralized 
control of the latter under only one ruler. 
 
Even though Hobbes’ system is probably the first and best compendium of all the 
constitutive elements of modernity, the automaton standard would in the next century up 
to the twentieth century, see other more progressive and evaluated instantiations in 
political, social, scientific, philosophical, religious and technical terms. Automata, once 
toys and clockworks, were to evolve within a century, into the engines of the Industrial 
Era, the last phase of the broader Modern Era. The gaze of the king and the State, the 
ghost in the machine, will change features: the entrepreneur on one side and the labourer, 
on the other would perpetuate the modern difference between mind and body, subject and 
object that finds in the automaton its actual archetype. Marx, and all movements and 
philosophy inspired by him denounced alienation and reification, because of the reduction 
of people to automata (a better and more specific term than the term ‘thing') operated by 
the various industrial revolutions. Only the development of electronics would overtake 
such a hierarchic relationship through a significant transformation in the way machines 
are built and work (see above). 
 
M. PHOTOGRAPHY: LAST STEP AND TWIILIGHT OF THE LENS 
Photography, arguably a later evolution of the camera obscura, best represents the century 
of its own invention (the nineteenth-century), the apex and the crisis of the lens phase and 
its dominant scopic regimes (i.e. representation and perspectivalism). 
 
Photography firstly appeared as the apex of an entire epistemic conception. The public 
reaction to its presentation at the Academy of Science on August 19, 1839 was 
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enthusiastic, mostly because of its ability to reproduce accurately reality moment by 
moment. This self-evident charactersitic inspired the Realist reaction to Romanticisim in 
every intellectual and artistic field, and it also corresponded to the commonplace view. 
As perspective and mapping inaugurated the denarrativization of reality in the 
fifteenth/sixteenth centuries, so the photographic image was viewed as ‘a message 
without code’ for all the nineteenth century; a century witnessing: 
‘a series of stages in the thrusting progress of a vast aspiration which emerges as the 
quintessence of the bourgeois ideology of representation’ (Burch,1981, 5). As 
consequence, this ‘plagiarism of nature’ (as critically stated by the poet Alphonse de 
Lamartine in 1858) deprived art and philosophy were deprived of their primary way of 
describing reality. 
 
However, emerging suspicions concerning the realism of the camera since its outset 
revealed puzzling implications of photography, and predicted its imminent contribution 
to the crisis of traditional perspectivalism in the 19th century. 
 
First, photography became from an instrument of knowledge of both society and nature 
to its opposite for the following reasons: 
- The mid-1840s discovery that photos could be retouched or combined, whereby 
nature is not only recorded but also improved. 
- ‘With the onset of motion photography, artists who were immersed in the ideology 
of realism found themselves unable to express reality and obey the photograph’s 
verdict at the same time’ (de Duve, 1978, 115). 
- ‘The camera isolated momentary appearances and in so doing destroyed the idea 
that images were timeless. […] What you saw was relative to your position in time 
and space’ (Berger, 1972, 18). 
Second, in addition to the 'active force' of this new device, there are also several 
differences, noticed by Joel Snyder, between the image it produces and our embodied 
experience of sight, as there were between the latter and perspective: 
- ‘Our vision is not formed by a rectangular boundary’ (Snyder, 1980, 505); 
- ‘Even if we were to close one eye and place a rectangular frame of the same 
dimensions as the original negative at a distance from the eye equal to the focal 
length of the lens (the so-called distance point of perspective construction) and 
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then look at the field represented in the picture, we would still not see what is 
shown in the picture’ (Ibid.); 
- “The photograph shows everything in sharp delineation from edge to edge, while 
our vision, because our eyes are foveate, is sharp only at its ‘center’” (Ibid.); 
- Moroever, ‘the photograph shows objects in sharp focus in and across every plane, 
from the nearest to the farthest. We do not-because we cannot-see things this way.’ 
(Ibid.). 
- Finally, the ‘eye has neither shutters nor exposure time, yet the visual system allows 
us to see a moving object clearly, whereas a still camera would register blur. In 
addition, the shape of the projection surfaces are different. […] The photograph, 
the canvas, and the sketch pad are flat; the retina conforms nearly to a section of 
a sphere’ (Cutting, 1986, 16-18). 
 
Third, photography came lastly to work against individuality itself, instead of embodying 
it in a perfect form, and representation along with its distinction between subject and 
object. This new technical innovation manifested itself as a possible way out of alienation, 
an integral part of modern representation and an inevitable side effect of subjectivity on 
both the single human being and society as a whole: 
‘So far as photography satisfied a wish, it satisfied a wish not confined to painters, 
but the human wish, intensifying in the West since the Reformation, to escape 
subjectivity and metaphysical isolation-a wish for the power to reach this world, 
having for so long tried, at last hopelessly, to manifest fidelity to another’ (Cavell, 
1979, 21). 
 
Forth, as stated by Benjamin: 
‘It is through photography that we first discover the existence of this optical unconscious, 
just as we discover the instinctual unconscious through psychoanalysis’ (Benjamin, 1999, 
510). In other words, photography freed visual experience, and it did so by underminging 
the following limitations of the Cartesian perspectivalist scopic regime: 
- For Descartes it was the subject as res cogitans, as non-material substance, to see, 
and not the two physical eyes. Therefore, sight was neither a means for the 
accurate representations of objects, nor a mechanical apparatus but it rather 
provided a non-material geometry. Photographic images lacked of such natural 
geometry constituting Cartesian perspectivalism. 
- The photographic camera discredited the camera obsura, which was 
paradoxically its technical ancestor and the model of visual experience for the 
entire pespectivalist tradition (see above). It did so by reintroducing and ratifying 
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Kepler’s notion of pictura, the real perceived image impressed on the retina, 
without referring to any Albertian and Cartesian regularly ordered space. 
- After this invention, it ‘was no longer possible to imagine everything converging 
on the human eye as on the vanishing point of infinity’ (Berger, 1972, 18) of 
classical perspective. 
 
Finally, photography brought from the Dutch descriptive art (see above) to the 
Impressionist definitive break with perspective. In fact, photography ambiguously 
brought two scopic regimes parallel: an enhanced version of representation on one side 
and the birth of impression, on the other side. Impression definitely weakened 
representation insofar as it makes the visible an elusive, incessant flux. 
 
The slow but firm passage from representation to impression, along with the development 
of cinematic camera from the photographic camera both anticipate the end of lens phase 





















III  SCREEN PHASE (FROM LATE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY TO THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL) 
 
A. CINEMA 
During the lens phase, the dualism image-movement expressed the telescopic difference 
between the observer and the observed, where images are representations, and things are 
the objects of these representations. It also corresponded to the dominant Cartesian 
dichotomy between res cogitans (images) and res extensa (movement), consciousness 
and thing, quality and quantity, absence of extension and extension. During the lens 
phase, this dichotomy was supported and developed in two very opposite ways: 
- Movement over images: empiricism earlier and materialism later tried to explain 
consciousness as a mechanical and physical phenomenon. 
- Images over movement: rationalism earlier and idealism later tried to reduce the 
entire material universe to organizing, totalizing mental ideas. 
 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, train and cinema together contributed to change this 
old perception of movement: 
- Passengers of trains saw for the first time images in movement under the effect of 
the ‘optical flow’14. 
- Cinema advanced the fusion between images and movement, by inserting the 
latter into the former. 
Moreover, these two inventions are so intertwined, that the very first cinematic image, 
shot by Lumière brothers in 1896, was a train coming toward unexpecting spectators. This 
event sums up the dreadful effect the two new technologies had on humanity: the 
transformation of the world in its own image. However, at its outset cinema was still 
based on a fixed point of view, on a transcendental subject. 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were two reactions to this undeveloped, 
uncertain cinema, still attached to a specific point but already threatening ‘normal’ 
anthropocentric perception, which were also reactions to the crisis of the dualism image-
movement: 
                                                            
14 The apparent movement of objects caused by relative motion, blurred when close to the track, and 
slower when distant. 
66 
 
- Husserl and the movement of phenomenology he founded epitomize the 
conservative reaction against the revolutionary aspect of Cinema. This reaction is 
conservative because Husserl only reformed the old Cartesian dichotomy by 
defining ‘consciousness [as] consciousness of something’ (Deleuze, 2015, 64), 
where the perceiving subject is now anchored in the world, opened to it, but still 
not reduced to a mere physical thing. Therefore, Phenomenology still works under 
a regime of objects as if it were under the lens phase. The subject still focuses on 
specific points through its visual tools; he is still intentional since he decides what 
to look at and what to exclude from his view. Therefore, sight is still modelled 
after heliocentrism and perspective as a light radiating from the subjective eye, a 
clear objective vision, capable of removing all the darkness that surrounds things. 
The world is still a vast horizon (the Albertian vanishing point) posed in front of 
us that cannot be reduced to an image but works as the setting from which we can 
abstract images.. 
Such reactive attitude inevitably condemns Cinema (and thus the rising of the 
screen phase) for it transforms the world into a tale by eradicating the two 
normative coordinates of perception: intentionality and the horizon. 
- Otherwise, Henri Bergson epitomised the radical reaction against the limitation of 
cinema at its outset, as argued by Deleuze. This reaction is radical because it 
completely subverts the telescopic, Cartesian dichotomy still present in 
phenomenology. For instance, Bergson radically considered ‘every consciousness 
[as] something’ (Ibid.), merging consciousness and world, images and movement 
into an acentered, continual flux. Consequently, he firstly criticized cinema 
because it was still bent toward a centred and subjective way of perceiving by its 
fixed viewpoint, with a consequential spatial and strictly immobile shot. 
Secondly, in his Creative Evolution (1907) he condemned cinema for it spatializes 
time, reducing movement to a reconstructed, abstract, homogeneous succession 
of selected images (Zeno’s paradox), or rather ‘snapshots […] of the passing 
reality’ (Bergson, 1998, 306). As argued by Deleuze, early cinematography was 
responsible of such false movement because it was still based on an apparatus for 
shooting combined with the apparatus for projection. 
 
To reveal the real potentialities of cinema and to bring it closer to Bergson’s conception 
would be the ‘montage, the mobile camera and the emancipation of the point of view, 
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which became separate from projection’ (Deleuze, 2015, 3). Now cinema does not just 
see movement but it does move, filling the last gap it had with the train. So, the ‘movie 
camera [demonstrates] that there [is] no centre’ (Berger, 1972, 18). The image now is 
mobile and deframed, and the shot becomes a temporal category. As poetically expressed 
by John Berger’s imaginary talking movie camera: 
‘I’m an eye. A mechanical eye. I, the machine, show you a world the way only I 
can see it. I free myself for today and forever from human immobility. I’m in 
constant movement. I approach and pull away from objects, to creep under them. 
[…] I fall and rise with the falling and rising 
bodies. This is I, the machine, manoeuvring in the chaotic movements, recording 
one movement after another in the most complex combinations. […] My way 
leads towards the creation of a fresh perception of the world. Thus I explain in a 
new way the world unknown to you’ (Ibid., 17). 
 
Even more successfully than the train, cinema has finally completed its implicit task: 
merging image and movement, or rather transforming the world in its own image. 
 
Moreover, Cinema redistributes light over the images. As result, a diffused light replaces 
the beam of light of the lens, without any reflection or filter. ‘There are not yet bodies or 
rigid lines, but only lines or figures of light. […]. In other words, the eye is in things, in 
luminous images in themselves' (Deleuze, 2015, 68). 
 
Finally, the introduction of montage subtracts ideality from a film, by making it 
discontinuous and constituted by several different shots. However, movies also become 
a whole, a single sequence shot, because of the synthetic function of montage, including 
selection, coordination and linkage of parts. 
 
In conclusion, cinema signals the beginning of the screen phase. It is in fact the first 
example of how screens reduce reality to an image, how they overtake the distance of the 
lens, the difference between subject and object, observer and observed, spiritual and 
material. The screen is the membrane where two opposite forces, two different spheres 
collide and became the same undistinguishable multiplicity (for Deleuze) or sameness 
(for Baudrillard). The screen is where movement and image coincide, where reality and 







1. The End of the Panopticon 
During the Cold War, TV eradicated the panoptic absolute gaze, replacing surveillance 
with deterrence. As a result, the screen becomes also the membrane where active and 
passive collide. 
 
Being a subject of right, a subject that has control of his existence and being, or on the 
contrary, subdued to someone else were essentially the two possible human conditions 
during the time of monarchy, exploration, and colonization; on one side a person and the 
other side a savage or an animal. The Cartesian subject or res cogitans and the mechanical 
body without thought (and thus soul) of animals. However, this telescopic relationship 
between an active subject and a passive object represented by the absolute gaze of the 
Panopticon system and modern monarchies is entirely dismantled by the television. Pure 
inflection replaces the focal point of perspective, and subsequently the mechanism of 
surveillance. 
The collapse of any traditional poles, followed by the implosion of meaning and truth, 
occurs because the screen does not represent, does not have any referentiality between 
objective reality and subjective imaginary, as the lens and perspective had. Screen 
exclusively transmits, and therefore television and satellite systems together correspond 
to a pervasive diffusion of media that is more effective than cinema, newspaper, and radio 
used to be. Therefore, after the crisis of perspectival space, circulation is the second 
transformation concerning space perception that occurs with television diffusion. 
 
There is firstly the ancient time of community and penury, followed by the modern time 
of adventure and personal affirmation and finally the contemporary time of self-
insurance, of travel without risk, of tourism. Tourists, like commuters, do not undertake 
journeys, but move within the circular trajectory of safely tested routes. 
Exploration meant betting on the existence of undiscovered virgin lands to achieve self-
enrichment, even if that meant risking one’s own life. On the contrary, tourism is only 
possible in a globalized world such as the contemporary one, where the entire planet has 
already been discovered, mapped and dwelled in and where circulation is the only 
movement that remains available. Moreover, tourism fits with insurance since every new 
journey must be safe and thrilling, whilst also a simulated one, like in amusement park. 
It follows Baudrillard’s comparison of the globalized word to Disneyland: 
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‘a place of the regeneration of the imaginary as waste-treatment plants are 
elsewhere, and even here. Everywhere today one must recycle waste, and the 
dreams, the phantasms, the historical, fairylike, legendary imaginary of children 
and adults is a waste product, the first great toxic excrement of hyperreal 
civilization' (Baudrillard, 1994, 13). 
 
Circulation links with recycling, with an unceasing relocation of things on a globalized 
world. Not only is any sense of belonging to a place abolished. This abolition was in fact 
already occurring in modern time (see above). Yet, position itself meets its end, and this 
is the third significant change of spatial conception. Space is not anymore, an objective 
one, instituted by a superior, distant and ascetic gaze, the gaze of a recognized observer. 
 
The spatial coordinates are brought to their ultimate dismissal by the synchronized 
diffusion of television and the enhancement of satellite systems. The earth that once could 
be represented only through cartography is now a visible globe. The telescope could give 
just a direct but blurred vision of extra-terrestrial space; the earth was still a mysterious 
place to be discovered. Through calculation and trigonometry, it was only possible to give 
an approximate, fragmented and abstract representation of it. On the contrary, after 
satellites and television's invention, the earth is visible in its full global shape. Earth is 
now naked but still through artificial means: satellites that transmit images from their 
orbits to our TV monitors. These images are direct and not just representations, yet they 
are also indirect for being filtered through technological devices; this is the simulative 
character of television, where every image transmitted is filtered meanwhile it appears as 
real. 
 
The fourth spatial transformation concerns the substitution of height with an orbital 
conception of space. During the time of the Panopticon, the modern age, the top of a 
tower, of a castle or a palace or the peak of a mountain were symbolically and effectively 
considered as the best spots for a perfect view. The top was considered as the place par 
excellence for having the most accurate absolute gaze, the furthest from the ground and 
then the most stable position. The Panopticon perfectly matches with this description: an 
isolated tower built at the centre of the prison, so to control the criminals. Absolute 
monarchies followed this very model: a central power that overlooks its land from a 
privileged and isolated fortified spot as a castle.  Therefore, the modern world drew an 
image of space constituted by a centre and a periphery, a highest and absolute gaze and 
an objective world to observe and whose constitutive law is the gravity law. The modern 
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world did not just discover gravity, but it established it to institute a system based on a 
higher and central control power. Gravity also ensured the relevance of an entire 
geographic conception of reality, where the earth was still a flat land, even if its 
approximately spherical shape was theoretically already known (only theoretically). To 
draw a map meant representing a specific part of the earth as if watching it from a higher 
point of view. The contemporary world successfully twisted such a conception through 
satellite and television: ‘The first orbital space flights marked the completion of the 
process of globalization, but also the moment when progress itself became circular, when 
the human universe was reduced to a vast orbital machine' (Baudrillard, 1993, 31). 
 
Orbital space dismisses any form of centrality; every object becomes peripheral through 
its expulsion out from the atmosphere. Since televised images are neither utopian visions 
nor representations of reality, they are also the expression of the orbital era, in which 
everything could turn into an endlessly circulating satellite. Since gravity does not affect 
outer space, any law of attraction toward a unique point loses its effectiveness with a 
consequential abolition of height. The contemporary world thus appears as a secular 
world deprived of any hierarchy, included the hierarchy of meaning, a world deprived of 
any division between a high class and a low class, deprived of the difference between 
signified and signifying. 
 
Weight is the other feature to be stripped away from objects. If height is the feature of 
hierarchy, weight is also a feature strictly related to meaning and depth. If height matches 
with the absolute gaze, with the possibility of abstracting oneself from an objective kind 
of reality, weight is the feature corresponding to the attraction to the centre of the earth; 
it is the feature of fall and tendency toward a centre. The loss of gravity defines an era of 
weightlessness, where everything becomes eccentric to the human body. 
‘It is as though our model were a niche in space whose kinetic energy cancels our 
Earth's gravity. The centrifugal force of our proliferating technologies has stripped 
us of all weight and transferred us into an empty freedom of movement. Freed of 
all density, all gravity, we are dragged into an orbital motion which threatens to 
become perpetual' (Ibid., 34). 
 
This self-ejection similarly experienced in shopping malls and expressed by the 
phenomenon of gentrification. In fact, the diffusion of hypermarkets and so-called new 
towns is the empirical example of the contemporary tendency toward decentralization.  
Before the orbital era, hence globalized era, the vital part of the city was the city centre, 
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with its commerce and his monuments (physical expressions of meaning), with its castles 
and palaces, symbols of actual power. Moreover, in modern times every building was a 
representation of a specific function in a specific social system, delimited by walls, which 
represented the urban version of the division between an internal and an external world, 
intimacy, and objectivity.  In the contemporary world, walls are either destroyed or 
restored for touristic consumerism, so that they are stripped of their function and become 
pure simulacra under the circulatory movement of tourism. This dismantling of urban 
defences inevitably corresponds to the end of the double of inside and outside that follows 
screen phase's affirmation. 
However, not only walls, but also the entire city centre is eradicated by transforming it 
into a tourism resource, by stripping away from it any meaning, any density, and any 
weight. The historical relevance of city centres is secularized and then reduced to a 
simulation under the regime of tourism circulation, which means that the city does not 
represent anything anymore. 
Its history, and meaning is archived and therefore reduced to data; it is reduced to a 
satellite ejected into space, whereby the centre itself is not a gravitational point attracting 
toward it anymore but has also become peripheral. New cities assume a suburban 
character by abolishing the difference between periphery and centre, beyond and inside 
the walls and by assuming a model of flexible multifunctionality. 
 
These new metropolitan areas are satellites moving along the orbit traced by the 
hypermarket. 
The traditional market was monofunctional, interdependent with the other facilities with 
specific functions, as such as palaces and town halls, and it was placed in the urban core. 
On the contrary, the shopping centre is multifunctional, satellites the new cities through 
a programmed traffic network that services the hypermarket itself and finally convert the 
entire population of a region into suburban commuters constantly moving from and to it. 
Therefore, hypermarkets echo not just the transformation of the Panoptic gravitational 
space into the orbital space of television, but also expresses the circulatory movement of 
TV and hence of screen age. In addition, the hypermarket reflects another mentioned 
change in space conception, which is the crisis of Renaissance perspective: ‘No relief, no 
perspective, no vanishing point where the gaze might risk losing itself, but a total screen 
where, in their uninterrupted display, the billboards and the products themselves act as 
equivalent and successive signs' (Baudrillard, 1994, 75). With television, there is no 
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external reality anymore, but just an earth that has fully revealed its global shape by losing 
the flatness that maps projected on it. It is an earth where everything has been discovered 
and thus where there is no more vanishing point; an earth completely visible through 
satellites and spaceships. 
 
The fifth change in spatial conception and perception is the passage from a space of 
surveillance and thus repression to one of deterrence. Shopping centres exemplify this 
new kind of space through the persuasive effect of both the circuits of surveillance 
cameras and the huge billboards. The cameras only allude to repressive measures and 
mostly communicate security to customers, while the billboards invite them to buy in 
complete relaxation and calm. This double oriented system of deterrence constitutes a 
closed world within the shopping centres, where buyers are neither dwellers nor 
travellers, trapped by the self-assuring gaze of the security cameras and by their own  view 
of themselves on the ‘policing’ televisions. 
 
Screens15 as such as TV, security monitors or billboards act all as a system of deterrence, 
which greatly contribute to the formation of a globalized world. In this context, new towns 
and hypermarkets constitute different scales of the same kind of world: a crystalized self-
sufficient one, an apparatus without references, where observed and observer coincide. 
 
A self-sufficient deterrence system is a dense, non-mediated, homogenous space of direct 
manipulation, which gathers together men and things without distinction. The 
manipulation occurring, in this case is the self-manipulation by an entire system without 
external reference and so, without any interiority. This space of deterrence is a 
transparently visible, multivalent space of contract and consensus, unified by a constant 
fictional threat to safety. 
During the lens phase, telescopes were also the symbol of the only possible relationship 
with the space beyond our atmosphere, a relationship based on the observation from 
below to above, that was based on gravity, weight and height, like those established by 
king, Panopticon and modern territorial right (nation, state and territory). Hence, the 
modern world was a world of control even from below to above. 
                                                            
15 Which still do not include the same interactive skills that video games and computers, even more 
effectively, will feature. 
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However, with television and satellites, with billboards and security cameras, deterrence 
replaces surveillance by making control bidirectional and then circular instead of 
unidirectional as it was under the lens regime. 
 
2. Implosion, Nuclear Power, and Television: The Cold War 
The television here addressed does not refer only to the physical specific technological 
devices but to an entire set of concepts, social coordinates, and languages, etc.; it refers 
to the cold war era. This era does not encompasses only the time of TV, satellites, 
highways, new towns and hypermarkets (see above) but also the time of nuclear energy 
and nuclear threat; thus, a time of deterrence, as stated previously.  The Cold War’s 
technological environment is still active nowadays in its entirety even after the advent of 
the monitors, such as video games and especially computers and having undergone 
several changes. In fact, the globalization, which started after the World War II as 
consequence of TV and satellite diffusion, is itself still ongoing and under development. 
 
During the lens phase, the sky was the symbol of macroscopic and including space, of 
totality, of res extensa, of external reality, ‘the starry sky above me’ (Immanuel Kant, The 
Critique of Practical Reason) in contrast with the inner realm of morality. However, with 
the Cold War, the sky loses this representational function along with reality, for the new 
age is an age of challenge for orbital conquest. 
Whereas the Panopticon was an instrument of direct control, both an evident and hidden 
central presence, where space moved concentrically from it, satellites are decentralizing 
so that the space race is one toward the periphery, toward globalization. Power is no 
longer in a central and transcendent place as it was with the Panopticon, the tower, the 
castle or the palace, but it is now dispersed and in constant circulation. 
Furthermore, while the lens phase unconsciously featured a world of central stasis and 
external movement, television is a technical expression of a world of orbital circulation 
and internal implosion. 
 
Following the discourse of Baudrillard, it should be stated that television has impressed 
on our world two different directions, two primary tendencies, parallel to the bidirectional 
character of contemporary control (which coincides with deterrence): an implosive 
tendency toward the inside and a centrifugal tendency toward the outside. The centrifugal 
force substitutes gravity whereas explosion, revolution, and dialectic by implosion. While 
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gravity is the force that constitutes a concentric space with an attractive common centre, 
centrifugal force escapes the centre and moves toward the periphery, the one toward the 
multitudes; satellites circulating in a space deprived of any attraction toward a unique 
centre, transmitting information without any concern for its meaning. 
 
The modern lens society was characterised by exploration and thus expansion, which 
corresponds to the explosive tendency toward the outside, the same tendency that defines 
revolutions, reactions to a state of alienation. Even the gaze had an explosive tendency, 
the one experienced by the observer through the vanishing point of the horizon and 
parallel to a subjective constitution of meaning. 
With the advent of the contemporary screen society of television, the world becomes an 
implosive one, a self-referential simulacrum where accelerated circulation has replaced 
discovery of new territories. Whether every land on earth is known and visible through 
satellites, the only way left to experience the unknown is through new levels of speed, 
hence acceleration; highways built exclusively to satisfy this need. However, while with 
exploration to be satisfied was the subject now to be satisfied is the mass, a circulating 
mass without an actual destination. 
 
In a system of deterrence, such as in our globalized world, the need for speed is 
paradoxically associated with the one of commodity. Huge parking lots tie the 
hypermarket and the highways into a symbiotic system (see above). The inside of cars 
provide a self-sufficient commodity system like a shopping centre. Every car is not just a 
transport means, but also a comfortable, multifunctional and closed place. It disposes of 
window frames that protect us at best, in case of a crash and that acoustically isolate us 
from the outside; it is provided with several security devices as such as security alarms. 
Moreover, it filters external air through internal air conditioner, thus regulating the 
temperature at one’s will and adapting the air to the cabin (as in a spaceship). Its tyres 
isolate us from static electricity and thunder; its shock absorbers make our journeys 
smoother. The music and voices played on car radio reduce our driving stress. Finally, 
sitting on the soft car seats with leather covers relaxes us, as if we at home on our sofas. 
However, cars are also a means of acceleration and hence instruments of transgression 
and excitement: speedometers designed to exceed the speed limits of freeways, tempt us 
to accelerate without any inhibition. Meanwhile, speed cameras work like soft deterrents 
for such transgressions, as do the security cameras in hypermarkets. 
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To summarise, automobiles are the most representative example of the coexistence of 
security and excitement in an implosive world based on the insurance policy. Masses of 
drivers, whose cars are all insured against every kind of damage, that circulate through 
freeways are persuaded to transgress by their speedometers, meanwhile aware of being 
monitored. 
On the contrary, so hazardous was modern time exploration (and without any insurance 
system) that only a dreamlike meaning could have supported it. It was not a simulation at 
all, but an actual leap into an unknown otherness that could have brought even death. 
Therefore, only proper subjects could have undertaken an expedition toward the sea; the 
act of stepping out from one's community, from one's territory, corresponded to the 
formation of an actual subject. 
 
Insurance, like the satellite system, makes exploration ineffective and superfluous; the 
same occurs consequently to subjects, which are all reduced to a single mass of circulating 
people and products (as if they are all interchangeable); the earth effectively becomes a 
self-reliant globe unaware of any form of otherness. The planet itself is spatialized 
through the model of security, which corresponds to the insurance system. Earth assumes 
the same homogeneity, neutrality and autonomy as amusement parks, freeways and 
hypermarkets. Every action under the regime of insurance is just a transparent simulation 
whose results have already been calculated and prognosticated; future entirely loses its 
meaningfulness and probability replaces it. Every action under the regime of insurance is 
reversible, which means that it does not make any practical difference; subjective deeds 
that distinguish a person form all the others are then impossible. Subjectivity itself 
becomes impossible. As a result, insurance increases the implosive character of the 
globalized world, by contracting everything under its regime into sameness. 
 
Television, like insurance, reduces any action, any relationship and any movement to 
apparently aleatory procedures determined, nevertheless, by specific codes, by specific 
formulae, by specific equations. These processes are purely arbitrary, and thus 
meaningless. They are void of the explosive violence of expanding systems, typical of 
the modern age, the dialectic relationship between two poles fighting each other, and in 
exploration too. 
Both insurance and deterrence embody the abrogation of expansive movement, the former 
by precluding risk and the latter by precluding war. 
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The deterrence Baudrillard addresses is also that occurring through nuclear threat: 
‘The risk of a nuclear annihilation only serves as a pretext, through the 
sophistication of weapons (a sophistication that surpasses any possible objective 
to such an extent that it is itself a symptom of nullity), for installing a universal 
security system, a universal lockup and control system whose deterrent effect is 
not at all aimed at atomic clash […] but, rather, at the much greater probability of 
[…] anything that would be [a real] event in the general system and upset its 
balance' (Ibid., 33). 
 
TV corresponds to the implosive and thus introverted violence of the cold war and the 
entire Contemporary Age, as the lens (i.e. telescopes, darkroom and microscopes) 
corresponded to the explosive and thus extroverted violence of the modern world. 
Explosive violence was the dialectical and liberating violence of production and thus 
earlier capitalism. It was basic for the expansion, formation and renovation of the social 
sphere. Finally, it varied depending on the specific situations it was facing. 
The implosive violence appearing with the cold war and the television diffusion: 
‘no longer results from the extension of a system, but from its saturation and its 
retraction, as is the case for physical stellar systems. A violence that follows an 
inordinate densification of the social, the state of an overregulated system, a 
network […] that is overencumbered, and of a hypertrophic control investing all 
the interstitial pathways' (Ibid., 71-72). 
 
The densification of the social corresponds to the formation of inert masses, which, as 
already mentioned, replace subjects in an implosive universe. This critical mass is the 
same as that occurring in nuclear plants and works as a deterrent. It always threatens us 
through its existence but never really causes a catastrophe, which is then just a simulated 
one. On the contrary, nuclear implosive mass becomes the most effective way to produce 
energy substituting the modern explosive mode. 
 
Shopping centres with all the masses circulating inside are themselves ‘strange new 
objects of which the nuclear power station is […] the absolute model and from which 
radiates a kind of neutralization of the territory' (Ibid., 78). All the signs that constitute a 
land and that characterize it are abolished in favour of products, whose visible and 
transparent images transmitted on TV monitors or billboards screens do not have anything 
to show but themselves. In virtue of its anti-territorial character, a shopping centre is 
homogeneous and equal to any other, exactly like masses; it is perpetual self-replicating 
nucleus. Even the great metropolises have become nuclear power plants, ‘sites of 
implosion […], sites of the absorption and reabsorption of the social itself whose golden 
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age, contemporaneous with the double concept of capital and revolution, is doubtless past. 
The social involutes slowly or brutally, in a field of inertia, which already envelops the 
political' (Ibid., 72-73).  Such phenomenon is the phenomenon of mass production as: 
‘the production of the masses. The masses as the final product of all sociality, and, 
at the same time, as putting an end to sociality, because these masses that one 
wants us to believe are the social, are on the contrary the site of the implosion of 
the social. The masses are the increasingly dense sphere in which the whole social 
comes to be imploded, and to be devoured in an uninterrupted process of 
simulation' (Ibid., 68). 
 
C. PHOTOGRAPHY 
1. Photography as Lens Survival 
It is quite impressive how Baudrillard addresses photography, as far as he does not 
express the same pessimism he has toward television. On the contrary, he considers it as 
the most valuable artistic means to approach otherness: 
‘What could be more closely bound up with travel, with the anamorphosis of 
travel, than photography? […] Hence photography's affinity with everything that 
is savage and primitive, and with that most essential of exoticisms, the exoticism 
of the Object, of the other' (Baudrillard, 1993, 172). 
 
It is necessary to define the context in which Baudrillard analyses photography and, more 
importantly, the photographic image, corresponding to the chapter Radical Exoticism 
from ‘The Transparency of Evil' where the French sociologist goes back in time to 
rediscover the importance of travel in virtue of its relationship with the object and 
objectivity. 
 
In fact, if tourism is the way modern exploration has been erased by globalization, 
photography is an attempt not just to restore an old way of conceiving travel but an 
attempt to find once again the feeling of belonging: 
‘Travel was once a means of being elsewhere, or of being nowhere. Today it is 
the only way we have of feeling that we are somewhere. At home surrounded by 
information, by screens, I am no longer anywhere, but rather everywhere in the 
world at once, in the midst of a universal banality – a banality that is the same in 
every country. To arrive in a new city, or in a new language, is suddenly to find 
oneself here and nowhere else. The body rediscovers how to look. Delivered from 
images, it rediscovers the imagination' (Ibid., 171-172). 
 
By following the view of Baudrillard, it appears that photography could be considered as 
a nostalgic return to the lens phase, a way it survives in a world under the regime of the 
screen. By exhuming a strong relationship with otherness, by associating it with  
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photography and travel, Baudrillard exhumes the entire lens phase, which thus becomes 
a reactive force, a symbol of résistance. The experiment of Baudrillard could be 
interpreted from a vitreous perspective as an attempt to reverse the process that brought 
from lens to screen by applying both an imaginative and realistic perspective. 
From this point of view, photography is still an expression of the lens phase and for two 
main reasons: 
- Firstly, the camera still works as a lens for its distance from the object and 
because it is merely an instrument in the hand of its owner. Therefore, 
photography still works under that automata relationship between the controller 
and the controlled exemplified by all the machines engineered before electronics 
and monitor invention. Except for the digital camera, it does not have any 
interactive relationship yet. 
- Ultimately, by addressing travel and photography, Baudrillard refers directly to 
the eighteenth century as the ‘finest period of the Other: Jean de Lhery, 
Montesquieu, Segalen. It is the moment when otherness erupts that is sublime. 
[…] Try not to apprehend the other as difference. […] No pretension to truth. 
[…] At the same time, do not seek to abolish oneself in face of the other' (Ibid., 
169). As already stated, the time of exploration, the modern age, is the time of 
lens too: time of interest toward the object, a relationship based on the difference 
between oneself and the other, when a telescope was an indispensable tool for 
new land discoveries, both in sky and on earth, when European people 
encountered unknown populations. It is a time whose coordinates were the first 
optical instrument and observation, colonization and science. 
However, what changes from the modern and original form of lens phase is how the 
relationship with the object is being drawn: with photography the subject is absent from 
the scenario, which is not constituted anymore by observation, while in modern age it was 
always declined as self-aware, definite subject framing his object into a representation: 
‘One can tell that a thing wants to be photographed, that it wants to become an 
image, and it is certainly not because it wants to endure: on the contrary, it wants 
to disappear. The human subject is a good photographic medium, moreover, only 
if he enters into the spirit of this game, if he suspends his own gaze and his own 
aesthetic judgement, if he takes pleasure in his own absence' (Ibid., 175). 
 




The French sociologist is eradicating gaze from what survives of the lens phase, and this 
means that he is quite far from any panopticon revival. Through photography, he portrays, 
in fact, a new kind of suspension of all judgments based on the fly's sight ‘with its faceted 
eye and the broken line of its flight' (Ibid., 177). Therefore, the camera becomes a lens 
that, instead of representing the objects, fractures and disconnects them by focusing on 
details. Differently from any artistic image (i.e. painting and cinematic image), the 
photograph does not refer to any unifying totality, concept or narrative. As stated by 
Ronald Barthes (1915-1980) the photo-images are ‘messages without a code’ (Barthes, 
1977, 42), a formula, or an arrangement. The world is no more synthesizable into a 
prevailing view, a weltanschauung, a gaze, but it can be just refracted, proving once again 
the transitional nature of photography, the only way lens phase could survive a dominant 
screen regime. 
 
If a concept weaves together different elements under the regime of subjective 
speculation, on the contrary, the inner scope of a photo is to isolate them, to freeze 
somehow them and to utterly forget the subject who took those pictures. ‘The very detail 
of the object, of line and light, should signify this suspension of the subject, and hence 
also of the world, which is what creates the photograph's tension' (Baudrillard, 1993, 175). 
 
Baudrillard’s interest in Radical Exoticism is hence explained: an otherness not reducible 
to any given form, inscrutable; an absolute other that always remains otherness, without 
any possibility of absorption or fusion: 
‘The survival of exoticism depends entirely on the impossibility of encounter, fusion and 
the exchange of differences. Fortunately, all this is an illusion – the illusion of subjectivity 
itself.' (Ibid., 166). 
 
In Radical Exoticism Baudrillard argues against the levelling effect of tourism on culture 
and time, which means that he rejects any illusion of pure hybridization, of a blending 
that passes through everything, the spinning circulation of media and information, the 
remote control switching channels. Despite his criticism of television and cinema, 
Baudrillard thinks that these two forms of screen could be somehow redeemed: ‘Even the 
cinema cultivates the myth of slow motion and the freeze-frame as moments of highest 
drama. And the paradoxical contribution of television may turn out to be the restoration 
of all its charm to the silence of the image' (Ibid.). The implicit suggestion of the French 
80 
 
sociologist is to bind the screen sphere to a renewed lens phase by freezing its images as 
photography does. 
 
2. Pure Image in Baudrillard and Deleuze 
Photographic image eradicates spatiality and any reference to the world, so that any 
situation whatsoever does not explain otherness. In other words, the context cannot 
circumstantiate otherness. An image capable of extracting otherness out of any space and 
capable of suspending any knowledge, any form of subjective intrusion, is a pure image, 
which coincides for the French sociologist with the photographic image. Deleuze has a 
different point of view. Deleuze was another intellectual who during the second half of 
the twentieth century conceived the idea of pure image. This paragraph will address the 
parallel and opposite articulations of the pure image from the cinematic perspective of 
Deleuze and the photographic conception of Baudrillard. 
 
It is argued by Baudrillard that ‘the photograph is the purest of images, for it simulates 
neither time nor motion and is thus unrealistic in the strictest sense. All other kinds of 
images (e.g. cinema), far from being advances, are perhaps merely less thoroughgoing 
forms of that divorce of the pure image from reality' (Ibid., 175). Once again, the pure 
image is designed as a withdrawal from any context, from the world, where any reality 
should be suspended to seek detail. The pure image is separated from temporality, since 
it tries to freeze otherness, to highlight a specific detail without explaining or 
conceptualizing it. Another method of obtaining a pure image ‘consists of stripping the 
object of all its features one by one: weight, outline, feeling, depth, time, continuity – and, 
of course, meaning' (Ibid.). Image ceases being a representation, which means that it does 
not conform anymore to a not problematized external world. Image ceases being eidos, 
idea, which means it does not refer anymore to a generalization of an ensemble of things. 
To sum it up, to render an image pure is to strip away any referential character from it. 
 
Deleuze addresses the pure image by explicitly defining it as a ‘pure optical-sound image' 
(Deleuze, 2014, 4) in contrast with what he calls the sensory-motor image, which 
corresponds to the classical age of cinema, whose last great example was Alfred 
Hitchcock. It was Neorealism the first cultural movement to break with this kind of image 
and to create pure images: ‘What defines neorealism is [a] build-up of purely optical 
situations […], which are fundamentally distinct from the sensory-motor situations of the 
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action-image in the old realism' (Ibid., 3). The character is rather ‘prey to a vision' (Ibid.) 
than reacting to a particular situation. 
 
With neorealism the entire concept of 'situation' mutates: ‘In the old [American] realism 
or on the model of action-image, objects and setting already had a reality of their own, 
but it was a functional reality, strictly determined by the demands of the situation' (Ibid., 
4). With neorealism ‘objects and settings […] take on an autonomous, material reality 
which gives them importance in themselves' (Ibid.). According to Baudrillard’s point of 
view on the pure photographic image, through pure optical and sound image, the objects 
are isolated, frozen and fragmented. Since pure images can be images of things and people 
withdrawn from their contexts, Deleuze considers them images that unceasingly consume 
themselves, self-denying images. 
 
In line once again with the photographic pure image, this cinematic style no longer 
represents or reproduces reality but aims at it. ‘‘Instead of representing an already 
deciphered real, neo-realism aimed at an always ambiguous, to be deciphered, real. […] 
Neo-realism produced a formal or material ‘additional reality'” (Ibid., 1). As with 
photography, the scope of a pure image even if cinematic remains breaching everyday 
banality, which is subject to automatic and conditioned stimulus-response reflexes. 
 
One of the key differences between the two main reflections on pure and other images 
concerns the definition of our society as a dominated by images. Baudrillard agrees with 
such a definition, by arguing that only pure images (mostly photographic) could exorcise 
our world from all images that circulate through screens, all this amount of information 
without aim, destination, and meaning. Deleuze otherwise argues that our civilization is 
just dominated by clichés, partial and metaphorical images, of what we perceive 
according to our own needs. On the contrary, for 'image' he means an ‘optical-sound 
image, the whole image without metaphor, [which] brings out the thing in itself' (Ibid., 
21). A pure image appears whether our stimulus-response mechanism break or jam. 
 
Similarly, Baudrillard warns his readers on reducing otherness to a metaphor, projecting 
on it personal psychological needs, moral values and ideological biases. He also warns us 
regarding intimacy, because it eradicates the constitutive foreignness of the absolute 
other. Therefore, we should avoid any affective relationship, any intimacy, in favour of 
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seduction, where the attraction toward otherness is perennial, never satisfied and where 
we never grasp our object. It follows that pure images for both Baudrillard and Deleuze 
are alien to any affectivity, of any intimacy; there are no compensatory elements 
characterizing these images. Baudrillard expresses this aversion through his critique of 
tourism and Deleuze through his critique of clichés. In fact, clichés and tourism are 
strictly bound together, and both actively refer to our globalized world. They seek 
affection; they seek attachment toward things, or even people engendered by prejudiced 
images. This is how advertisement and consumerism work, namely by promising a 
satisfaction that is not real but induced; a need of affection firstly sought through cliché 
and secondly placated by consuming. As the clichés circulate through television and 
internet’s advertisement (and not just through that) so people circulate through tourism 
but following the suggestion of the circulation of sensory-motor images. Tourism and 
clichés do not relate directly to objects but simply to what one wants and needs to take 
from them. Commercial tourism does not try to show a place in all its cultural, 
ethnological and natural significance, but it only sells what could be attractive about a 
place through picturesque and often kitsch images. If kitsch is the tyranny of heart, 
tourism follows an emotional necessity where monuments became simply idols. 
Pure image is a form of depuration from the compulsive effect of clichés, an effect that 
will be enhanced even further by the of computer monitors. However, we will analyse 
this phenomenon in part IV, by addressing the computer, the interactive relationship with 
the monitor and its superflat character. 
 
By quoting a sentence from the Italian director Fellini, Deleuze defines cinema as ‘a 
science of visual impressions, forcing us to forget our own logic and retinal habits' 
(Deleuze, 2014, 19). This approach expresses an impressionist view whereby images are 
just pure impressions of things, without any model, any weltanschauung to influence 
them. To both Deleuze and Baudrillard, pure images like impressions are rarefied, 
suppressed of added and intrusive elements coming from a too partial and prejudiced use 
of the eyes. Moreover, the creation of pure images for both authors necessitates the 
fragmentation of the image: 
- To Deleuze ‘it is necessary to make a division or make emptiness in order to find 
the whole' (Ibid., 21) of an image. 
- To Baudrillard, as already quoted, pure images are created by the breaking and 
fragmenting sight of the camera; compared to the fly's sight. 
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To Deleuze, only a clairvoyant kind of cinema (as opposed to a sensory-motor one) could 
create pure images because only it could express all the potentialities of cinema and 
because cinema corresponds to an inorganic eye, an eye without any need to satisfy. Such 
a pure cinematic eye does not have any partial view of things and reflects the inorganic 
eye of the camera. 
 
Echoing the Deleuzian conception of cinema as the cinema of viewer, Baudrillard makes 
two different considerations on photography: 
- He considers ‘savages in their natural surroundings' (Baudrillard, 1993, 172) the 
best objectives of photography: ‘Objects, like primitives, are way ahead of us in 
the photogenic stakes: they are free a priori of psychology and introspection, and 
hence retain all their seductive power before the camera' (Ibid., 173). Seduction 
opposes any sensory-motor schemata. 
- He affirms that ‘Photography records the state of the world in our absence. The 
lens explores this absence' (Ibid.). As a result, the subject forgets their own 
existence through photography. 
It follows from these considerations that ‘the best photographs are photographs of beings 
for which the other does not exist [….]. Only the non-human is photogenic’ (Ibid.). 
 
To obtain pure images is to renounce our humanity; it is to overtake our natural sight and 
both photography and cinema force us to do so. The camera is probably the actual 
common point of Baudrillard and Deleuze, and pure images are just a consequence of 
such statement. Pure images are in fact, nothing else than the product of a not- human 
sight embodied by the camera, which is the tool employed by photography, cinema, and 
even television. It is noticeable once again how any form of vitreous optic reflects the 
dehumanization of sight through vitreous intermediaries. This is the true disposition of 
intelligence: to see behind in order to manipulate and to manipulate in order to see behind. 
Therefore, vitreous tools are the only tools to embody both these two tasks. It is also 
arguable that sight and touch, corresponding respectively to observation and 
manipulation, are two alternating moments of a circuit whose purpose is self-
enhancement. 
 
Nevertheless, this very idea of a mutation of our sight under the pressure of using vitreous 
tools’ presents two noticeable variants between modern and contemporary philosophies. 
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Modern thought, by arguing that optical instruments would have given us a more adequate 
representation of objects, used to consider telescope, microscope and any other 
application of lens as means for the enhancement of our sight. On the contrary, Deleuze 
and Baudrillard focus more on the dehumanizing characteristics of cinema first, and 
photography, second. 
 
It is necessary to highlight that lens was a basic requirement for the foundation of 
humanism, namely for the definition of a universal characterisation of the human, 
unaware of how optical tools modify our normal double sight. The Modern age was the 
time of colonization and panopticons, the time of expansion and gaze, when every 
European monarchy challenged the others by affirming its own image of humanity. The 
lens phase was both cause and consequence of such a policy. However, in contemporary 
times, through photography, the lens works in direct and explicit association with the non-
human. It also loses its original link to modernity by finding itself caught into a world 
actually and virtually dominated by screens. As shown through Baudrillard’s statements 
on photography, lens is no more the symptom of a monarchic world, but the symptom of 
a refugee state in a globalized world, a gentle de-territorialization coinciding with travel. 
 
By addressing pure images Deleuze and Baudrillard move synchronically toward the 
same point despite their departures from two very different devices and phases. The 
cinema of viewer works as a transference of the screen phase toward the static images of 
photography, toward a focalization on details, on specific objects, meanwhile 
photography causes the shift of lens phase toward a new conceptual space, where the gaze 
is abolished in favour of focus. As result, the cinema of viewer, like neorealism, coincides 
with that redemption of cinema auspicated / foretold by Baudrillard. Pure optical images 
are freeze-framed and reduce movement at its minimum after ‘the slackening of the 
sensory-motor connections’ (Deleuze, 2014, 3). Therefore, they end up sharing the same 
dramatic characteristic of photographic images. 
 
In conclusion, pure images reduce the distance between the camera of photography and 
the camera of cinema and television. They are themselves the best expression of the 





D. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCREEN PHASE 
1. The Screen Society of Spectacle 
The passage from the lens phase of modernity to the screen phase of early 
contemporaneity is equal to the passage from a society of surveillance to a society of 
spectacle. The screen both as cinema projection screen, and as a TV screen is the medium 
for show: an assembly of people, both in terms of a bigger group (the audience of a 
cinema) and of a smaller group (family or a generic domestic environment). As stated by 
the British sociologist Raymond Williams (1921-1988), television had ‘unforeseen 
consequences, not only on other entertainment and news media, which it reduced in 
viability and importance, but on some of the central processes of family, cultural and 
social life’ (Williams 1974, 4). In addition, he argues that television “was selected for 
investment and promotion as a new and profitable phase of a domestic consumer 
economy; it is then one of the characteristics ‘machines for home’” (Ibid., 4). 
Instead of the system of surveillance of the Panopticon and more generally of the entire 
modern lens phase, the system of the screen is a system of Show, of reciprocal 
identification between watcher and watched, audience and actors. We have a system of 
differentiated social performances that create a multitude of possible identifications from 
the public. We can select the channel and choose the show we prefer, or rather identify 
with. However, despite losing the tension and coercion of surveillance, the spectacle 
keeps ‘the discipline power’ (Bauman, 2015, 86) of its predecessor. ‘Obedience to 
standards (a pliable and exquisitely adjustable obedience to eminently flexible standards 
[…]) tends to be achieved through enticement and seduction […] and it appears in the 
disguise of the exercise of free will, rather than revealing itself as an external force’ (Ibid., 
86). As noted by Martin Jay, the ‘Big Brother’s omnipresent watchfulness’ (Jay, 1994, 
416) of the Panopticon and of Nineteenth century Paris which Foucault has analysed, is 
replaced during the twentieth century, and specifically during the Sixties, by the 
seductiveness of ‘the Spectacle of modern life’ (Ibid., 416). If Foucault’s critique of the 
scopic regime of surveillance ‘focused on the disciplining and normalizing effect of being 
the object of the gaze, that of Guy Debord […] stressed the dangers of being its subject’ 
(Ibid.) with the spectacle. 
 
In his renowned The Society of the Spectacle (published in 1967), the French philosopher 
Guy Debord (1931-1994) hyperbolically contended that ‘society as a whole had been 
turned into a gigantic spectacle’ (Ibid., 429). ‘From TV to newspaper, from advertising 
86 
 
to all sorts of mercantile epiphanies, our society is characterized by a cancerous growth 
of vision, measuring everything by its ability to show or to be shown and transmuting 
communication into a visual journey’ (De Certeau, 1984, xxi). The contemplativeness of 
the spectacle completely replaces the fully participative characteristic of the festival, 
making impossible any real commonly shared direct experience. ‘The festival was pure 
presence, an end in itself, a communion of souls without anything to mediate between 
them’ (Ibid., 92-93). On the contrary, the isolated spectacle of cinema and even more so 
of television both serves and exploits ‘the needs of a new kind of large-scale and complex 
but atomised society’ (Williams, 1974, 4). 
 
Debord specifically defines the spectacle as ‘a social relationship between people that is 
mediated by images’ (Debord, 2006, 12) and not as a mere ‘collection of images’ (Ibid.). 
The contemplativeness of the spectacle utterly overcomes the participative characteristic 
of the festival, making any real commonly shared direct experience impossible. 
 
Similarly, to Baudrillard, Debord argued that everything once ‘directly lived has become 
mere representation’ (Ibid.). With cinema and TV programs ‘representation takes on an 
independent existence’ (Ibid., 17), which means that the world itself is reduced to its 
objective image, that nothing is represented anymore but everything becomes an image 
that has an absolute, but not relative value. Moreover, the ‘spectacle erases the dividing 
line between self and world, in that the self, under siege by the presence/absence of the 
world, is eventually overwhelmed; it likewise erases the dividing line between true and 
false, repressing all directly lived truth beneath the real presence of the falsehood 
maintained by the organization of appearances’ (Ibid., 153). Therefore, spectacle 
transforms reality into a commodity, into a mere product of consumerism, where cinema 
and TV increasingly, are the medium responsible for the mutation of society and 
perception. The lens phase corresponded to the gaze and to observation, a sight that 
distinguishes between a subject and an object in relationship to a specific set of glassy 
tools that were not coordinated in a synchronized apparatus. On the contrary, the screen 
phase, following the development of a necessary satellite network, works as a connected 
apparatus where everything is objectified into an image. This is the mechanism of 
advertisement and thus commodification; it is what makes visibility correspond to a 
seductive form of discipline: 
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‘The spectacle corresponds to the historical moment at which the commodity completes 
its colonization of social life. It is not just that the relationship to commodities is now 
plain to see - commodities are now all that there is to see; the world we see is the world 
of the commodity’ (Ibid., 29). 
 
To Debord, and later Baudrillard, the reality of objects is replaced by their advertisement, 
by their image on a screen. For instance, the broadcast of advertisements on TV programs 
is an integral part of Baudrillard’s theory. This all started with the contrast between the 
two tendencies of state: monopoly and privatization, or rather a “competition between 
‘public service’ and ‘commercial’ institutions” (Williams, 1974, 30-31). On the basic 
early days of television institutions: “In Britain especially, this has seemed a natural 
perspective, since the unique ‘public service’ definition of the BBC was in the mid-1950’s 
successfully challenged by, and made competitive with […] the Independent Television 
Authority” (Ibid., 31), an institution, from its outset, “of a commercial type, with a built-
in relationship between ‘public service’ and the selling of advertising time. […] The same 
kind of contrast […] can be made in the United States, where the first development was 
commercial and a public-service element was later added, in the margin” (Ibid.). 
 
In his Barbarism (1987), the French phenomenologist Michel Henry’s statements on 
television echoes Debord’s analysis of the spectacle. In fact, the former specifically 
defines this glassy medium ‘as a mode of life, as a practice […] in which life throws itself 
outside of itself in order to get way from itself and to flee itself. […] Television is a flight 
through a projection in exteriority. This is what is expressed when one says that it drowns 
the spectator in a flood of images’ (Henry, 2012, 109). According to Henry, not 
differently from any other production of images, mostly artistic, television is a practice 
that proceeds from a specific emotion in order to develop the ‘self-growth of subjectivity’ 
(Ibid.) and then of life (from his peculiar phenomenological perspective). This specific 
emotion is boredom, which is defined by the French philosopher as ‘the effective 
disposition in which unemployed energy is revealed to oneself’ (Ibid.) and not yet 
redirected to a specific action. Boredom is ‘the nonfulfillment of growth […]. In this flight 
from oneself, something external comes in front of the regard at each moment and 




Differently from any other artistic images, theatre included, the televised image is 
displayed far from us, ‘at a distance from oneself’ (Ibid.), whereby boredom remains 
together with it, ‘as both its condition and its reality’ (Ibid.). 
Firstly, theatre, the closest art to spectacle with its ‘division between spectators and 
actors’ (Jay, 1994, 92), is nonetheless still a coherent employment of pathos, an active 
means for the self-growth of life, mostly whence theatre was reconceptualised around 
pathos in the eighteenth century (see above). On the contrary, Henry argues, televised 
images and then more generally spectacles are empty images, or rather a ‘perpetual 
skipping from image to image in an inconsequential series’ (Henry, 2012, 112), a nil 
expressed in the ‘self-disappearance’ (Ibid., 113) of each image at each instant. Any of 
the ‘inner powers of life, not even that of looking’ (Ibid.), are deployed. ‘There is thus a 
way of looking without looking and without seeing’ (Ibid.). 
Secondly, theatre, as any other art, is not a constant and pressing presence. Its 
‘productions’ having a beginning and an end; they are limited as experiences but made 
coherent by the specific meaning each one has been ‘designed’ to express. On the 
contrary, according to Michel Henry, the television machine ‘functions all the time and 
in all places, and it must multiply channels and the number of sets in each house’ (Ibid., 
111), in a parade of images that never ends. 
Thirdly, since its Greek origins, theatre elaborates the events of common life into edifying 
examples; it does not just simulate them. On the contrary, Henry argues, the spectacle of 
television gets rid of elaboration or preparation through the ‘live broadcast’ (Ibid.), which 
is ‘the fact that everything must be taken directly […]. The truth, in the end is reduced to 
the brutality of the fact, to the instantaneous and thus to disappearance and death’ (Ibid.). 
 
It is possible to conclude that spectacle is a passive scopic regime, despite the 
transformation of the reified persons of the Panopticon system into spectators and thus 
apparent subjects of gaze. In fact, 
the contemplativeness of the spectacle contrasts with the participative characteristic of 
the festival, making impossible any real commonly shared direct experience. 
In this regard, Michel Henry deemed the televised image the highest form of a state of 
self-alienation, and not its cause, as Debord did with the all the images of the spectacle: 
‘it is not a matter of living one’s own life but that of another.’ (Ibid., 113). Television, as 
argued by Raymond Williams ‘in its character and uses exploited and emphasised 
elements of passivity, a cultural and psychological inadequacy, which had always been 
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latent in people, but which television now organised and came to represent’ (Williams, 
1974, 4). 
 
2. ‘The Brain is the Screen’ 
In the mid-eighties, Deleuze linked cinema screen and brain by formulating a prominent 
phrase of his which was first uttered in a 1986 interview on his works Cinema 1 (1983) 
and, especially, Cinema 2 (1985): ‘The Brain is the Screen’ (Martin, 2000, 366). Cinema 
2 was published in mid-eighties, when computerization was already advancing, despite 
not being yet as hegemonic as nowadays, and cinema was starting his way toward the use 
of CGI (computer-generated image). For instance, in 1984, director Ridley Scott released 
the TV advertisement ‘for the first iteration of the Apple Mac Computer, the moment in 
which the personal computer began to settle into the workplace and into the home’ 
(Clarke, 2014, 45). This commercial used ‘images that evoked Fritz Lang’s Metropolis 
(1927) and George Orwell’s novel 1984 (1948). […] a sportswoman, a physically 
dynamic and accomplished figure, disrupts the oppressive status quo’ (Ibid.). The eighties 
are also the decades of the cyberpunk literary genre, which perfectly embodies the impact 
the new information technology was already having on the imaginary, albeit at its yet 
early development. The cyberpunk literature includes William Gibson’s Neuromancer 
(1984), while the cyberpunk filmography includes Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982). 
This genre features a futuristic setting where virtual realities, robotics, electronics and 
computer science have become integral part of our lives, in a world dominated by 
corporatist capitalism. 
The Deleuzian definition of the brain as screen places it squarely into this last moment of 
hegemony of the screen (Cinema and TV), when the monitor phase was already 
advancing through video games and first PCs. 
 
By addressing the cinema of the French director Resnais (1922-2014), one of the 
inspirations for   la Nouvelle Vague (the French New Wave), Deleuze starts pondering 
over the equivalence of brain and screen, or rather his correlation between the relatively 
recent achievements of brain biology and the relatively new artistic forms of cinema. The 
French philosopher specifically defines Resnais’ cinema as ‘a cinema of the brain’ 
(Deleuze, 2014, 210), an intellectual and experimental kind of cinema to which Stanley 
Kubrick (1928-1999) belongs too: 
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‘If we look at Kubrick’s work, we see the degree to which it is the brain which is 
mis en scène. Attitudes of body achieve a maximum level of violence, but they 
depend on the brain. For, in Kubrick, the world itself is a brain […] as in the great 
luminous table in Doctor Strangelove, the giant computer in 2001 A space 
Odyssey, the Overlook hotel in The Shining’ (Ibid., 212). 
 
To Deleuze, the cinema of the brain must reveal ‘the creativity of the world, its colours 
aroused by a new space-time’ (Ibid., 211). This ‘identity of world and brain […] does not 
form a whole, but rather a limit, a membrane which puts an outside and an inside in 
contact’ (Ibid., 212). 
 
In this context, the ‘screen itself is the cerebral membrane where immediate and direct 
confrontations take place between the past and the future, the inside and the outside, at a 
distance impossible to determine, independent of any fixed point […] The image no 
longer has space and movement as its primary characteristics but topology and time' 
(Ibid., 130). 
Deleuze defines two different regimes of images: 
- An organic regime, which is kinetic and concerns organic descriptions, 
independent from its object and corresponding to a cinema of the agent, in which 
environment is autonomous and pre-existing any description. 
This regime corresponds to a veridical kind of narration which ‘consists of the 
development of sensory-motor schemata, as a result of which the characters react 
to situations or act in such a way as to disclose the situation’ (Ibid., 132-133). 
- A crystalline regime, which is chronical, founds a ‘cinema of seer’ and concerns 
descriptions that substitute, create and erase their own multiplied and 
discomposed object. 
The first regime is reactive, based on automatic movements and responses to an external 
world. A typical example of such a conception is the realist view of American cinema, a 
cinema of action-image that follows the pattern of situation-action-situation. Realism has 
two essential elements: a milieu and various modes of behaviour. Therefore, there is a 
reactive and active movement, whereby a specific situation (setting) challenges a 
character who answers through an action that alters a given situation into a new one, 
which once again forces the character to act. This circular relationship matches with an 
organic and spiral representation; whose discrete elements are each submitted to a specific 
function. Functionalism and organicism are two facets of the same coin insofar as every 
organ has a specific role within the same whole, the body. According to Deleuze, both 
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American movies and American society perfectly represent this conception of body. The 
organism can strengthen itself whenever it crashes against a pre-existent reality: ‘The 
American cinema had the means to save its dream by passing through nightmares' 
(Deleuze, 2015, 164). 
 
To Deleuze, the American dream is an ethical form of realism based on: 
- The ‘idea of a humanist community or of a nation-milieu, melting pot and fusion 
of all minorities' (Ibid., 162). 
- The idea of a leader who is ‘a man of this nation who knows how to respond to 
the challenges of the milieu as to the difficulties of a situation' [Ibid., 162-163]. 
Action-image thus is inherently ethical, in virtue of its utter realism. 
However, he also argues that after the Sixties this dream has started its gradual decline, 
even though American Cinema is still economically profitable. 
 
Since the screen is the cerebral membrane, it does not follow a rigid dialectic movement, 
a duel between an environment and an active/reactive ego, but it breaches this distinction: 
the cerebral membrane is ‘where mind and matter interpenetrate’. (Martin, 2000, 77) 
Therefore, the cerebral membrane is neither mind nor organism, neither subject nor object 
but, as a screen, it breaches any dualism, in contrast to the predisposition of mirrors and 
lenses for dualistic separations. 
 
During the modern time, the time of lenses, the flat canvas rendered three-dimensional 
space onto two dimensional, making space more important than the object (see above). 
However, the canvas of the screen is, as noted by Deleuze, is ‘an intermediate reality 
between nature and the idea, a compound of being and thought that has detached itself 
from the one its author designates, though not without having forced him to take his 
wayward mind for a walk in the texture of things’ (Martin, 2000, 76). Since it is the 
screen, ‘the brain becomes world and the world invades the brain at the juncture of the 
canvas, which is as such a material as a spiritual membrane, a psychophysical entity made 
of extension and thought, matter and memory, flesh and spirit’ (Ibid.). 
 
The identity of brain and world and of screen and brain occurring since the cinema of 
the fifties is, as mentioned above, strictly related to Renais’ experimental renewal of 
Eisenstein’s intellectual idea of cinema (the cinema of brain) and to ‘change in our 
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conception of the brain and our relationship with the brain’ (Deleuze, 2014, 216). 
Firstly, both directors Eisenstein (1898-1948), early, and Resnais, more recently, 
conceived ‘the cerebral process as the object and motor of cinema’ (Ibid.). In other 
words, cinema is the most suitable medium for the brain, not just for understanding it 
profoundly, but also for fully expressing its inner potentials. The cinema corresponds to 
the brain itself; only its mechanism can replicate the cerebral process. 
Secondly, Deleuze defines the new conception of the brain in contrast with its 
‘classical’ conception: ‘The classical conception developed along two axes; on the one 
hand, integration and differentiation, on the other association, through contiguity or 
similarity’ (Ibid.). The first axis refers to movement of a whole, or rather a concept, 
whereby changes occur by assimilating new discrete objects. The second axis refers to 
the passage ‘from one image to another. The two axes cut across each other, according 
to a principle of attraction, in order to achieve the identity of image and concept' (Ibid., 
217). This conception corresponds to a dialectical process of representation as such as 
Hegel's philosophy applied by Eisenstein to his intellectual cinema. However, after 
World War II, ‘scientific knowledge of the brain has evolved, and carried out a general 
rearrangement’ (Ibid.) - and concerning it, Deleuze wonders whether the influence of 
science has changed ‘our relationship with the brain' (Ibid., 218) or vice versa. 
The ‘new brain' stops being a centre of control and becomes ‘an acentred system’ 
(Ibid.), a problem because of two main discoveries. On the one hand, the ‘discovery of a 
topological cerebral space’ (Ibid.) subverts the vertical conceptual axis. This 
juxtaposition of several levels, or degrees of thought processes, replaces the traditional 
strict distinction between conscious and unconscious, external medium and internal 
medium, with a wide variety of shades that makes hard the detection of a clear external 
word and a manifest inner world. As a result, a concept is not defined anymore as an 
organic whole, with its mutable nonetheless specific borders, but rather as a force, an 
act.  On the other hand, the horizontal axis of images is subverted by the “discovery of a 
probabilistic […] cerebral space, ‘an uncertain system’” (Ibid.), a continuous network 
filled with micro-fissures, which are ‘mechanisms introducing themselves at each 
moment between the sending and receiving of an association message’ (Ibid.). 
 
In conclusion, this conception of the brain as a cerebral membrane, as a screen, and not 




IV   MONITOR PHASE (FROM THE FALL OF THE 
BERLIN WALL TO NOWADAYS) 
 
A. VIDEO GAMES 
1. Game Consoles and Game Arcades: Private and Public Forms of Play 
Video games constitute the first significant form of haptic relation between a person and 
a display to have an enormous impact on ‘masses'. Before being also extensively available 
on computers, electronic games were mostly played on two different kinds of platforms: 
consoles and arcades. Whereas consoles are physically connected through cables to 
analogical televisions, working primarily as a cartridge (afterward replaced by the 
cheaper cd format) player and usually correspond to private/home settings, arcades are 
coin-operated entertainment machines dedicated each one just to one game and installed 
in public business spaces possibly built just for playing purpose. While the first kind is 
still exponentially increasing its diffusion worldwide after eight generations, each one 
corresponding to a further enhancement of this technology, arcades were mostly diffused 
between the late Seventies and the early Nineties, subsequently declining until almost 
disappearing in the current millennium and ceasing to be a significant social phenomenon. 
 
Even if computers had already been invented, and first video games, such as Pong were 
already being played on these devices, their impact was not yet relevant for society and 
perception. On the contrary, video games arcades and consoles had a significant effect on 
these latter spheres soon after their outset. 
The first game console was the Magnavox Odyssey, released in 1972. Its success was 
moderate by selling merely 100,000 units approximately and cancelled after the great 
success of the Atari's arcade game Pong, released the same year. It was the latter which 
made the game industry publicly and globally noticeable. Therefore, it was the 
amusement arcade (a premises where several arcades where publicly displaced and 
played by inserting a coin) to have the upper hand at this stage. 
The amusement arcades were still places of direct social interaction for the young 
generations and had become symbolic icons for the Eighties and the Nineties. In 
amusement arcades, social relations were still direct, and even two players could play 
games at a time either in collaboration or challenging each other. The virtual challenge 
94 
 
was limited to the same monitor, while the players played physically side by side, with 
each coin-op (the specific booth dedicated to a particular game) next to one another. 
 
It is possible to argue that the Eighties were a time whose most recognizable  feature  was 
the connivance of very physical objects, mostly plastic in their features and fabric, and 
virtual, hyperreal imaginary. Various iconic characteristics of this decade confirm such 
specific liminal constituent of its. Amongst them, the most recognizable are: the movies 
(with special effects between the virtual and the plastic-made, like The Thing and The 
Fly), the peer coexistence of electronic games and toys, (mostly made of plastic, like 
Barbie and the Masters of the Universe) - which would end in the late Nighties in favour 
of the former - and the transition between the old capitalism of production and the new 
capitalism of services and consumerism. Despite the great advances made by electronics, 
the Eighties were, to a certain extent still attached to the physical, the solid, even though 
an artificial one embodied by plastic, ironically in a time of peripheral war for petrol and 
of global petrol crisis. 
 
2. The First Gulf War: War broadcast as a Video Game 
Like the Cold War, the Gulf War (1990) was a simulated war, completed for the 
prevention of a real and catastrophic one. Simulation works once again as the necessary 
tool to avoid the impactful and destabilizing interference of an unpredictable external 
reality: ‘We prefer the exile of the virtual, of which television is the universal mirror, to 
the catastrophe of the real' (Baudrillard, 1995, 28). This statement from Jean Baudrillard 
reflects its continuous parallelism between the implosive regime of the contemporary 
world and the warfare and media system based on television, which had its climax 
between the Eighties and the Nineties. However, a peculiar aspect of this conflict is also 
its reference to videogames. In fact, the Gulf War was not just represented as a reality 
show but also as an electronic entertainment: 
“[By] claiming that the Gulf War never happened, Baudrillard challenges scholars 
of video games to explore the ways in which ‘virtual wars’ feed our willingness 
to ‘unleash the real world’, while also examining the ways in which virtual 
warfare contributes to a ‘hyperrealist logic’ in which warfare reflects a desire ‘to 
disarm and neutralize but not kill’ […]. The blur between real and fantastically 
imagined, given the hyper-presence of war on television (and within video 
games), constructs a war without bloodshed, carnage, or destruction or the 




As already noticed by Baudrillard in his The Gulf war did not take place - a collection of 
three short essays on the Gulf War- the Gulf War represents even a step forward in the 
social impact of warfare than the entire Cold War. The implosive character of the Cold 
War is, in fact, implemented by the Gulf War. 
 
This protracted silent conflict occurred after the explosive WWII between the first world 
and the second world still represents a match between two different ideologies, despite it 
being the synchronized disposition of a system of deterrence from both sides. On the 
contrary, the short surgical conflict started by Bush Senior does not have any ideology at 
stake, but the meaning of warfare itself, and of how society is now developed as a unique 
apparatus without an alternative. 
Whereas the alibi of the Cold War was preventing nuclear annihilation, the justification 
of the first conflict against Saddam Hussein was preserving the peace achieved by the 
American superpower in the nineties. 
 
Moreover, the level of virtualization of war achieved by media has increased so much in 
this decade as to enable the first live satellite broadcast from a city under attack. In this 
regard, Baudrillard portrays the Gulf War as a mere televisual simulacrum without 
reference to any real conflict: ‘the war is also pure and speculative, to the extent that we 
do not see the real event that it could be or that it would signify’ (Baudrillard, 1995, 29). 
What has been shown on TV, under strict American allowance, is just non-human entities: 
airplanes, battleships, tanks, missiles, and technical objectives framed by pointing 
devices, like in a video game. Once they had concluded the four days land campaign, the 
U.S. made it clear that no casualties had affected their army. The propaganda developed 
by Bush, silently supported by his European allies has allowed the broadcast of just one 
image of human enemies: Sadam Hussein. 
 
Gulf War is a war purged of any explosive and carnal characteristics, it is the first conflict 
without warrior’s passion. The Gulf War assumes then the characteristic of a pure and 
clean operation, without any personal value, or any ideological statement beyond it. 
Finally, war itself (like society) is virtualized and made subject to a surgical operation. 
While all modern wars, at least since the impersonal killing machines that were the 
innovations of WWI –e.g. the machine gun, long-range artillery, aerial bombing - are 
‘impersonal’ and ‘objective’, and WWII brought this tendency to its apex, 
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paradigmatically in the inhuman rationality of the Holocaust, all with their accompanying 
registers of propaganda, the Gulf War introduced a subtle new lexicon of ‘collateral 
damage’, ‘surgical strikes’, and ‘friendly fire’. Therefore, ‘nothing personal’ 
(impersonality) works as the untold slogan for this conflict in the Middle East, which 
means that war now is made for pragmatic and not symbolic (ideological) reasons. The 
Gulf War is indeed presented as ‘surgical’ in its goal of removing a cancerous element 
that if not stopped promptly will interfere with the peace finally achieved. 
‘The Gulf War is the first consensual war, the first war conducted legally and 
globally with a view to putting an end to war and liquidating any confrontation 
likely to threaten the hence-forward unified system of control. This was already 
the aim of dualistic (East and West) deterrence; today we pass to the monopolistic 
stage under the aegis of American power’ (Ibid., 83-84). 
 
As a result, ‘after the hot war (the violence of conflict), after the cold war (the balance of 
terror), here comes the dead war- the unfrozen cold war’ (Ibid., 23). War is reimagined, 
rethought as an entertainment, as painless and necessary and then broadcasted on 
monitors. Therefore, war is not merely represented but reduced to its image on TV, so to 
become purely virtual, neither imaginary nor real. Consequently, such process of 
virtualization makes it utterly misleading, because it not merely represents war but 
pretends to be its pure, unfiltered copy. 
 
To sum up the situation of the world since the Gulf War, deterrence becomes the primary 
aim of the military regime once a universal consensus is constituted and then instituted 
on a global scale. Such hegemonic power corresponds to the overlapping of imaginary 
and reality, which Baudrillard has named hyperreality. 
‘Our wars thus have less to do with the confrontation of warriors than with the 
domestication of the refractory forces on the planet, those uncontrollable elements 
as the police would say, to which belong […] wild ethnic groups, minority 
languages etc. All that is singular and irreducible must be reduced and absorbed’ 
(Ibid., 86). 
 
In this scenario, video games may be considered one possible countermeasure for the 
explosion of catastrophic or destabilizing conflicts once they are applied not just as 
prototypical simulations for military training, but as ideological instruments for instilling 
the idea of necessary preventive wars in civilians. 
 
Since the Gulf War of 1990, war is symbolically charged, so to be both virtual and 
virtuous; a mythological aura invests it: ‘Virtuous war is much more than a new form of 
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organized violence. Call it a dream-state, a symbolic realm, or an unreality: virtuous war 
projects a mythos as well as an ethos, a kind of collective unconscious for an epoch's 
greatest aspirations and greatest insecurities' (Der Derian, 2001, 774). In fact, by 
incorporating features belonging to the electronic entertainment industry - which had 
become relevant right between the Eighties and the Nineties - the Gulf War embodied for 
the first time the virtuous/virtual war, which by virtue of its simulated status fuses 
representation and action: 
These new wars “are fought in the same manner as they are represented, by military 
simulations and public dissimulations, by real-time surveillance and TV 'live-feeds'" 
(Ibid., 775). 
Simulation, hyperreality, virtual worlds overcome the difference between reality (action) 
and imaginary (representation): ‘The power of virtuality lies in its ability to collapse 
distance, between here and there, near and far, fact and fiction’ (Ibid., 776). 
 
3. Drone War: War experienced as a Video Game 
In the early Nineties’, the fantasy comedy Toys (1992) foresaw the present scenario of 
warfare, where war is increasingly juxtaposing to the entertainment industry. This movie 
tells the story of a toy factory progressively transformed into a disguised military 
operational area with the appearance of a video game arcade. As a result, meanwhile kids 
are lured in and promised to play electronic games for free, they are employed as the 
unaware pilots of remotely controlled war vehicles. The director of Toys Barry Levinson 
has defined it “a reflection on how ‘unreal and amoral warfare has become’” (Clarke, 
2014, 96). This statement well reflects the reactions to the Gulf War, particularly to its 
feature, to how it was broadcasted to appeal mostly to the young generations, counting 
on the deep influence video games was having on them in the Nineties, even more than 
television. 'Toys' was trying to imagine an answer to the question: 
Is the Gulf War the milestone of virtual/virtuous war having electronic games as the 
model what will the next step of virtual/virtuous warfare be? 
 
Only recently ludic and military industries have come very close to fulfilling the 
predictions of Toys, through ‘American and British deployment of drones – remote-
controlled fighting machines – in combat zones’ (Ibid., 96). By requiring remote control 
and thus keeping the life of many soldiers/pilots safe these new weapons threaten to make 
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war closer and closer to videogames, in a way that might fully disguise war, making it 
‘just an amusing electronic entertainment’. 
The British website Drone Wars UK is a detailed and specialized source, with well-
informed web articles focusing on remote control warfare. By approaching different 
perspectives, this online newspaper faces different recurring discourses and themes 
regarding drones. For instance, the article The dirty consequences of our clean wars by 
Chris Cole on 05/12/2014 refers to the deployment of these ‘robotic weapons’ in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq and Syria by both the US and the UK governments, 
which tend to deny the casualties affecting non-combatants living in war zones and caused 
by airstrikes. These deaths are usually addressed as ‘accidents’ or ‘mistakes’ due to 
mechanical dysfunctions or communication interferences between the machine and its 
controller. 
On the other side, in Countries like Pakistan, one of the countries most negatively affected 
by this new generation of warfare, civilians have developed a compulsive fear of drones. 
They are even frightened by the sound of these ‘intelligent weapons' hovering around 
them. Many children, elders, and adults are not able to sleep, and other wake up screaming 
in the night with hallucinations caused by these machines. As a result, remotely-
controlled warfare generates a double and discrepant reaction in the world. In pacifying 
countries, it appears as the most cleaned and precise war, where ‘accident’ has 
semantically substituted the more emotional terms of casualty, massacre, death. Both 
soldiers and civilians of these nations do not feel directly affected and are distant from 
war fields. In countries that are being ‘pacified’ this new warfare assumes. The Western 
fear of Islamic terrorist attacks, which disrupts our peaceful and wealthy way of life, and 
our democratic values is come to be compensated in the Middle East by the fear of small 
dreadful faceless hovering machines. 
 
"It was incessant." Former RAF Reaper pilot speaks to Drone Wars by Chris Cole on 
30/05/2017 in another article from dronewars.net, which helps us understand how remote-
controlled warfare concretely affects ‘its human pilots'. For instance, the author reports 
and analyses an interview with a former British drone pilot with the pseudonym of Justin 
Thompson. The most poignant statement the latter made refers to the overlap between the 
civilian and the military life he experienced: 
‘The most difficult thing was the flip-flopping between the mind-set of being on live 
operations, and then being at home with the family. This is something that has been 
raised numerous times and it has caused issues for people in a lot of different ways. 
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There were times when you would go home and then take a couple of hours to 
decompress and wind down. It can be quite stress inducing because you are 
occasionally seeing some pretty intense stuff’ (Cole, 2017, 2). 
 
On this note, ‘Justin’ declines the idea that remotely controlled warfare implies 
detachment. On the contrary, he defines it as totally investing; the attention for the details 
is even accentuated than in actual aircraft: 
‘My mind-set was very much one of being there, and I was able to see so much of 
what I was looking at, in so much detail that you develop an intimate and in-depth 
knowledge of what is going on around you. So much more so than the fast jet, for 
example, that would rock up, stay around for 20 minutes or an hour depending on 
how much fuel the planes got and then head off again. Your mind becomes invested 
in it’ (Ibid., 2). 
 
4. Performative realism: Video game as War 
The link between war and games is an old matter that dates back to their common origin: 
‘War, games, and simulation have always been closely intertwined. The oldest known 
boardgame surviving in its original shape, the Chinese Go, represents troop formations 
and has been used as strategic training for more than two millennia […]. Western military 
wargames originated from amended versions of Chess in late eighteenth-century 
Germany, and quickly spread as an integral tool for strategic planning and training 
through military academics around the globe’ (Huntemann, 2010, 21). 
As stated by the Dutch historian and cultural theorist J. Huizinga in Homo Ludens (1938) 
the reason for such close connection is that a game (even solitaire) always corresponds to 
a contest between two or more parties: 
‘The spirit of competition […] which animated the men’s societies or 
brotherhoods and set them against one another during the winter festivities in 
tournaments of dance and song, comes at the beginning of the line of development 
that led to State forms and institutions’ (cited in Huizinga, 2014, 55). 
 
However, video games firstly replace the abstractness of board games with an ever-
increasing photorealism, which makes them more a simulation and an exploration than a 
mere play. 
‘What is […] different about video games that deal with military conflict is they’re 
more realistic. Instead of imagining the battlefield in your mind or having such an 
abstract battlefield like the Chess war, in video games the battlefield is drawn out 
for you in almost photographic, picture-perfect volume. Then you have all the 
other aspects of video gaming: the simulated violence and gore, and the sounds of 
the battlefield (instead of having to imagine the sound as you are moving Chess 
pieces around the board as you pretend to be fighting off an enemy). The video 
game provides it for you and those sounds are designed to be very realistic. So, 
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the link between video games and militarism is that video games continue to make 
play out of warfare in an extremely realistic manner, more realistic than any 
previous entertainment game that is technologically-oriented’ (Huntemann, 2010, 
95). 
 
Secondly, video games also include narrative - even though in a very different way if 
compared to any other medium (see above) - and images so prominently that the nature 
of play itself results changed (see above). 
 
By focusing on war games, performative realism is a characteristic that features only in 
war video games set during actual historical conflicts, absent from any classic war board 
games (from chess and Go to miniatures to Risk). This significant feature mirrors the way 
video employed the same juxtaposition of virtuosity and virtuality as that the military 
industry had since the Gulf War. Not by coincidence, Game Studies, which coined this 
essential concept, were being produced at the turn of the century. Moreover, their first 
great issue was the presence of violence in electronic entertainment and thus its link with 
warfare. It is within this context that the term performative realism was coined. 
 
Performative realism does not only mean representing events accurately through the 
available data, or making them more tangible through a direct audio-visual approach, like 
in an interactive encyclopedia, but it also says that the observer is more than a mere distant 
observer. In other words, it means that he or she directly experiences the reconstruction, 
getting involved actively and making strategic choices during this reconstruction 
(something only the game media can achieve). This vital component shared by many ludic 
experiences, from board games like Risk, Chess, Monopoly, Cluedo, etc. to several video 
games like first-person shooters, strategic war games, etc. cohabits with ritual repetition. 
In fact, videogames usually require players to repeat a section several times to overcome 
it, and pass to the next phase, not only for developing new strategies but also for 
improving one's reflexes. 
 
Since their origin, electronic games have even been scoring players for the quality of their 
‘play', by appealing to various parameters beyond sole strategy: speed, accuracy, the 
number of times one had died and restarted during a certain required series of actions, etc. 
As a result, the gamer is lured into improving his or her own ‘playing' skills until 
perfection, and not just limited to finish a specific ludic experience thanks to a 
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combination of repetition/self-refinement and application of a variety of strategies to 
certain circumstances. Such are the characteristics shared by any performance with social 
impact, not only by videogames. In fact, according to Jeffrey Alexander's definition, 
social performances keep ritual along with strategic elements: 
‘The old-fashioned rituals that marked simpler organizational forms have largely 
disappeared, but ritual-like processes most decidedly remain. Individuals and 
collectivities strategically direct their actions and mobilize all their available 
resources, but their instrumental power usually depends on success of a cultural 
kind. […] It means that pragmatic and symbolic dimensions are intertwined’ 
(Alexander et al, 2006, 76-77). 
 
However, if in a social performance ‘it is a mark of social and cultural complexity that 
the audience has become differentiated from the act of performance’ (Ibid., 73), 
videogames reverse such tendency by fusing the audience/spectator with the act of 
performance in the figure of the player. This phenomenon explains the diffuse scepticism 
toward considering this media as a new form of art. In fact, games generally keep only 
the playfulness of artistic experiences, getting rid of the other feature necessary to define 
an artwork: conceptual detachment. The interactive nature of electronic games makes 
impossible any distant intellective interpretation of its contents. 
 
Performative realism also changes the meaning of realism and not only of social 
performance: whereas realism concerns a representation and its correlation with events 
happening in the world, performative realism concerns simulation and first-person 
experience. It is ‘an attempt to create interactive transparency (an illusion that stands in 
for what we perceive to be the casual verisimilitude of everyday life)' (Huntemann, 2010, 
132), which once applied to war, normalizes it and makes it both inevitable and necessary.  
Therefore, it is not a question of whether this specific genre of entertainment works as 
training-simulation for future soldiers, but it is whether it lures players into believing in 
a historically proved virtuosity of war, in which violence is only virtually present, cleaned 
up, made somehow aesthetical and soft, because detached from its natural reference to 
death. ‘Unlike other forms of warfare, virtuous [virtual] war has an unsurpassed power to 
commute death, to keep it out of sight, out of mind’ (Der Derian, 2000, 772). 
 
These ‘realist performances’ set in World War II stress on the necessity of war to achieve 
or maintain peace. In other words, they reinforce a concept that has become dear to the 
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Western supremacy firstly after the ‘Fall of the Wall’ (1989) and even more after ‘Nine 
Eleven’ (11/9 2001) 
As already expressed by Baudrillard, it is crucial to arrange war as pacification by means 
of simulation, showing how it is necessary to be always prepared to fight to preserve the 
peace achieved on a world scale. While to stress the virtuosity of war, it is necessary to 
portray it as strictly entangled and even confused with peace: ‘with the virtualization of 
war comes the simulation of peace' (Ibid., 776). 
However, ‘in simulated preparations and virtual executions of war, there is a high risk 
that one learns how to lull, but not to take responsibility for it, one experiences 'death' but 
not the tragic consequences of it. In virtuous war, we now face not just the confusion but 
the pixelization of war and game on the same screen' (Ibid., 773). “In this high-tech 
rehearsal for war, one learns how to kill but not to take responsibility for it, one 
experiences 'death' but not the tragic consequences of it” (Ibid.). 
 
5. The Player-Avatar Relation 
Actions in video games operate metaphorically; in other words, on two different parallel 
levels: a physical action on the controller/joystick and the action of the controlled 
character in the virtual reality projected on the TV screen. The cathartic element 
constituting the spectacular society starts being replaced by a new scopic regime, where 
action plays a pivotal role. 
 
We do not have any real contact with ‘the virtual realm'; in other words, we do not have 
a direct tactile experience of objects but a visual recognition of images. Therefore, every 
haptic relationship occurring while playing occurs exclusively through the joystick and 
requires training to achieve faster and more immediate reactions, training in which we 
increasingly and directly associate our movements with the character's ones despite their 
actual physical dissociation. Therefore, one of the main topics of Game Studies concerns 
what relationship is instituted between players and the character they control. Are we 
facing just a typical subject/object relationship or is there a dual agency? Does the avatar 
somehow multiply our identity on a new level? 
 
Heavy Hero or Digital Dummy? Multimodal Player–Avatar Relations in Final Fantasy 7 
(Burn & Gareth, 2004) is a very enlightening article on this kind of issues from the Journal 
of Visual Communication. It specifically explores the player-avatar relation in the highly 
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successful Japanese role-player video game Final Fantasy VII (1997), ‘drawing on 
multimodality theory to analyze textual structures both in the game and in the discourse 
of player-interviews and fan writing. It argues that the avatar is a two-part structure, partly 
designed in conventional narrative terms as a protagonist of popular narrative, and partly 
as a vehicle for interactive game-play' (Burn & Gareth 2004, 1). In other words, the 
Avatar is within this context – year on year incrementally present in all video games,- 
both a heavy hero (narrative component) and a digital dummy (ludic element). 
 
Strong characterization highlights the heavy hero aspect. In this specific instance, the 
protagonist/avatar is Cloud Strife, ‘a mysterious mercenary, in leather and big boots, 
wielding a sword as large as himself; but an oddly childish face, whimsically delineated 
in the ‘deformed aesthetic' of manga, with enormous, glowing blue eyes, framed in 
cyberpunk blond spikes' (Ibid, 1). 
Moreover, many sections of the game (and more commonly in current video games) are 
purely narrative, because they are constituted of texts and cinematic images – the so-
called cut-scenes – or exclusively by the latter. In any case, the player becomes for a few 
moments spectator, and the avatar performs actions independently. 
 
However, with video games, the main character is also played, differently from the 
cathartic identification operating in purely narrative media (cinema, literature, opera, 
etc.). It means that we as players have not just to see and interpret and understand, but 
also act as if we were someone else: “you play the character. […] The words ‘You play’ 
indicate very precisely the grammatical relationship of player and avatar” (Ibid., 2). As a 
result, the player must adapt him/herself to the main character and not merely adjust the 
latter to his/her psychological necessities (as it occurs with catharsis).  The coexistence 
of the representational and the interactive functions explains this entanglement between 
player and avatar. The representational function is how the video game (FFVII for 
instance) ‘represents aspects of the world (in this case fantasy narratives)’ (Ibid.); while 
the interactive function is what the video game ‘offers to do to, for or with its audience’ 
(Ibid.). The article also underlines how the interactive function is itself distinguished into 
two different main modalities: the demand and the one of offer. These two games 
structures are usually mixed in the game, one next to one another in many scenes. 
However, it depends on the circumstances; a modality might overcome or be equal to the 
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other. It follows that the game code influences and direct the player's action almost as 
much as the character's action (who is managed by the narrative component). 
 
Instances of demanded-dominated scenes in FFVII are the battle scenes, ‘where the 
system of the game would seem to be all that matters, the economies of health, hits, and 
magic become critical, and the temporal elasticity of the game shrinks to realtime conflict’ 
(Ibid., 14). “The demand exercised by the text [the game code] is realised in different 
ways by the different modes combined within it. For instance, the music […] is specific 
to the battle scenes […] – the tempo does change (it speeds up); and the rhythm changes 
to a regular 4/4 time, with the mix of midi voices including a martial snare drum. The 
orientation of the music to the player, then, operates as a kind of musical imperative – a 
call-to-arms, as it were. At the same time, the swirling graphics which introduce the battle 
scenes produce a giddy, disorientating sense, a feeling of risk, of danger, in combination 
with the music. As the battle scene appears on the screen, the player sees the characters 
lined up against the enemy, with the battle statistics represented graphically at the bottom 
of the screen. The readiness of each character to attack is shown by a thermometer-style 
bar, which fills up. This specific graphic operates, again, as a form of visual demand, 
effectively instructing the player to wait, but get ready. When the bar fills up, a yellow 
triangle appears above the head of the character, indicating that it can attack – a visual 
imperative equivalent to ‘Attack now!’” (Ibid., 16). 
In this battle sections the player view ‘is positioned much lower down, alongside the 
characters (displayed in their full bodies), as if fighting with them. At times, the swooping 
camera angles even place us lower than the characters. […] Though this is an offer – it is 
distinct from the function of those parts of the text which are demanding specific actions 
– it fuses with our response to those demands, changing our sense of how we act. […] it 
mutes the puppeteer feeling that the demand-response structures create’ (Ibid., 17). 
 
‘Beyond the battle scenes in FF7, the feeling of offer rather than demand is reinforced 
multimodally. The music of these sequences is much less stark rhythmically, either using 
unmeasured rhythms or using regular duple times muted beneath flowing melodies […] 
[The] music suggests that you’re being offered an event and a mood; if there is any trace 
of demand, the modality is that of the weakened form of enticement. This musical 
enticement […] operates in tandem with the system, which invites you to make a move. 
Similarly, you explore and progress through the game world in a fixed camera 
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environment. Here, you are positioned above the action, with the avatar and other 
characters rendered as chunky, polygonal figures. This design distances them from the 
player; or […] makes them more puppet- or doll-like, developing a […] relationship in 
which the player trains and nurtures the avatar like a pet. You are linked to Cloud by your 
control of his movements, but look down on him […] controlling their actions from 
above’ (Ibid. 18-19). This god-like position ‘is a spatial and visual reinforcement of the 
offer mode – it detaches the player a little, and offers stability, unlike the destabilizing 
battle camera, buttressing the demand acts of the system’ (Ibid. 19). 
 
It follows from all this analysis that ‘Cloud as Heavy Hero and Cloud as Digital Dummy 
offer different sets of semiotic resources from which the player makes […] experience of 
the avatar’ (Ibid 12). It can then more generally been stated that ‘The player-avatar 
relation […] is hybrid. The engagement with the character is in many ways developed as 
in conventional narratives, in response to the guise of the game, which offers a narrative 
statement through an unrestricted semiotic of visual design, animation, text and music, to 
compose the character as visible, audible presence, his narrative role and affective appeal 
drawing on the provenance of popular narrative, both folk and mass media. The 
immersive experience of roleplay, by contrast, is engaged through the specific rule-based 
demands of the game, and the player’s improvisatory deployment of the restricted set of 
actions offered; though this is infused by the imaginative engagement with the character 
and game world, so that a highly-restricted set of actions becomes elaborated and 
deepened by a semiotic merger with other modes’ (Ibid., 25). 
 
In conclusion, all this juxtaposition of different structures makes ‘the question of player 
agency […] quite ambiguous’ (Ibid., 13) as ambiguous is the word agency. In fact, this 
term has two opposite meanings: ‘one in which we are autonomous, powerful social 
actors; and one in which we are merely the representative of another (as in FBI agent). 
Both meanings can be read into the player-avatar relation: an unprecedented degree of 
participative agency for the readers within the text […]; or a sense in which players 
merely accept and play out the roles determined for them by game-texts devised by global 
corporations' (Ibid.). 
 
This ambiguity is the same expressed by our current society. The pressure expressed by 
advertisement, politics, culture, the free market, etc. on freedom, self-realization, self-
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flourishing and identity matches with the exigency of the job market, of the technological 
apparatus and again of politics on assuming one’s own responsibility (usually 
corresponding to the sole technical and functional responsibility of one’s own job 
position), efficiency, professionalism, etc. These are nothing less than the two poles of 
contemporary individualism, which dominates our current globalization. Besides, there 
is also another ambiguity occurring within the relation player/avatar: the ambiguity 
existing between the freedom/responsibility of agency-individualism and the escape from 
one's personality. 
 
It is undeniable that video games give the player the opportunity of living an experience 
that transcends one's own everyday life. They provide the chance of self-escape and self-
differentiation: most importantly, they allow the player to be someone else, even though 
inside a purely artificial and enclosed environment strictly designed by an unknown 
person (who produced the game code). As a result, the game console makes the TV screen 
the first example of monitor, where an ambiguous, active multidirectional relationship is 
created for the first time and due to the player-avatar ‘interaction’. 
 
This contemporary declination of individuality/agency, with all its ambiguities, is on an 
utterly different level than the modern stress on the subjectivity of the lens phase. The 
term ‘subject' expresses ambiguity too, specifically concerning the issue of control 
(control and be controlled). In fact, a subject can be a subject of something (of rights, for 
instance) and always related to an object; or subject to someone (the king, for instance). 
Otherwise, agency refers to skill, specifically the one of acting, not of control. In fact, the 
word ‘agency' comes from the Latin agens, which is the present participle of agere, 
translated into English ‘to act'. Acting is also ambiguous as much so as control, but 
concerning pretending or doing. Therefore, acting (and then agency) reflects two 
contrasts: the contrast between acting in terms of being someone else and of doing as 
expression of oneself, and the contrast occurring within the second meaning between 
doing in your own name and doing as representing someone else (herein unfolds the 
already mentioned ambiguity of the word agency). 
 
6. Configuration instead of Interpretation 
While visual art (cinema included) and television in its original use (a mere passive form 
of entertainment) rely mostly on interpretation as the reaction to a specific representation, 
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video games rely primarily on configuration, despite the integration of narrative elements 
into play, which differentiates classic board games from video games. 
 
On the one hand, interpretation is the primary receptive activity of any artistic endeavour 
and many social performances too, like political discussions, school lessons, religious 
ceremonies, etc. 
The dwellers of complex societies are pressed from their birth into developing 
hermeneutical skills. This comes about as a result of the postmodern absence of a 
metaphysical meta-narrative that would make messages/performances clear and self-
justified. It is further shaped by the coexistence of a multiplicity of cultures, values, and 
symbolic heritages to which they refer. ‘Audience interpretation is a process, not an 
automatic result. […] A consciousness of doubleness is inherent in the interpretation of 
performance’ (Alexander et al, 2006, 76). On the other hand, electronic games opt more 
for ‘configuration, the capacity to transform certain aspects of the virtual environment 
with potentially significant consequences for the system as a whole’ (Wardrip-Fruin & 
Harrington, 2004, 60). By doing so, the cybernetic world takes a very different path from 
narrative-centered performances: ‘In the older cultures of print and broadcasting, the term 
literacy came to represent the fundamental capacity to process information – that is, 
primarily to interpret. […] The shift from interpretation to configuration may require 
something more than revision, perhaps even a fresh conceptual start’ (Ibid., 64). 
 
Art and politics as social performances require the employment of a story and spectators, 
listeners or readers' passive immersion inside a specific narrative. In these circumstances, 
authors and actors need to convince the audience or a part of the audience of the 
authenticity of their claims by referring to a certain cultural setting. In order words, they 
must appeal to a shared variety of symbols taken from common cultural memories, 
traditions, and folklore. Such dynamics strongly apply to cinema and TV; it is thus a 
component of the still present but weakened screen phase.  On the contrary, interactivity, 
which defines the nature of videogames, ‘is almost the opposite of narrative; narrative 
flows under the direction of the author, while interactivity depends on the player for 
motive power’ (Ibid., 118). 
Interpretation, however, corresponds to the double bind of catharsis, whereby the process 
of immersion/identification is always alternated with detached conceptual rumination, 
reflection and construction of meaning, configuration corresponds to an 'electronic 
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closure' (Ibid., 65). As interpretation is still present in games, only in a subordinate 
relationship to configuration, the narrative is not eradicated but reduced to a functional 
element for interactivity, an architectural feature, an immersive set for players, which 
lures them into diving into a particular game: 
‘Game designers don’t simply tell stories; they design worlds and sculpt spaces. It is no 
accident, for example, that game design documents have historically been more interested 
in issues of level design than on plotting or character motivation’ (Ibid., 121). The 
abolition of the audience or at least its reduction to a performant without expectations 
from any external social/cultural frame is what makes the player not subordinate to a 
script but to a system, a program, a procedure. 
 
A videogame only rewards the execution by purely technical, logical, and pragmatic 
standards such as speed, flexibility, strategy, etc. It does not reward any symbolic 
communication from the performant as the other social performances do; it does not 
award his or her capacity to be convincing, compelling and authentic. By reading 
videogame reviews from specialized newspapers, it is possible to notice the absence of a 
classical audience who usually judge on the basis of narrative and symbolic well-acted 
and authentic communication. Such characteristics often convince us that there is no 
external social power influencing electronic entertainment. Typically, critics and players 
primarily deem video games as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ focusing on the technical elements that 
do not refer to their designers' intentions, (as it might happen with literary and social 
performances) but to the immersive efficacy of the gameplay, to the overall functional 
efficacy of its entire system. As the game rates players' technical skills in a great variety 
of fashions, so players rate the game. There is a reciprocal relationship between a small 
technological apparatus and who gets involved in it, not figuring in any other social 
performances, which usually retain a humanistic priority for meaning, value, life project 
(both in individual and social terms) and goal. It follows that the performance required 
by games is more like those of military training and sport, where purely agonistic, 
physical, procedural and inflexible parameters are prevalent than the significant, either 
dramatic or comedic classic social performances. 
Symbols and cultural backgrounds are emptied of both their constitutive meanings and 
their internal function as referents for meaningful creation, becoming mere simulacra 
exploitable as ‘bricks' for virtual amusement parks facility, as data of an archive from 
which withdrawing as much as a game designer needs. 
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7. Multiple visual regimes but submitted to the same function 
As explained in the previous sub-section, the cinema already generates a non-natural 
succession of discontinuous images through the technique of montage. This means that a 
series of images shot in a precise manner and showing specific objects is all of a sudden 
followed by entirely different details and perspective. Moreover, in cinema, the first 
person perspective is not the dominant one as occurs with ‘natural perception'. To a 
certain extent, video games feature this same dissociation between a set of images but in 
a very different fashion, where the haptic component plays, once again, a pivotal role. In 
fact, the sharp divergence between images and movement is designed to achieve aesthetic 
and cathartic effects with movies whereas with video games they are submitted to play, 
which requires the interactivity that only touch can allow. It follows that a specific 
typology of a series of images (a more accurate term than shot when referring to video 
games) functionally identifies a particular type of ‘gameplay’ (the pattern of interaction 
defined by the game rules mostly with electronic games) or even genre of game. On the 
contrary, with the cinema different kinds of shots provide images with a specific 
conceptual frame instead of a functional one, as highlighted by the catalogue of images 
produced by Deleuze in Cinema 1 and Cinema 2. 
In other words, video games submit images to configuration instead of interpretation, 
immersion instead of catharsis, which makes this medium an actual simulation and thus 
a step further in hyperreality than movies and TV broadcasts.  In fact, the player does not 
identify with the character he plays (as occurring in films) but he simulates him/her. 
Finally, whereas movies (except animation) re-imagine reality by recording it and then 
reassembling it, video games (as any virtual reality) recreate reality from scratch. 
Therefore, graphics replace the shot as the technique of creative production (namely 
poiesis). 
 
As stated above, video games tend to define a specific gameplay through a certain visual 
perspective, which always integrates the player into it instead of making him/her a mere 
spectator. It is thus possible to arrange a list of the primary visual regimes used by the 
medium whereby image is always submitted to gameplay, in contrast to the purely scopic 
shots which constitute movies. 
 
The first of these visual regimes concerns games that mostly featured a two-dimensional 
perspective before the introduction of the third dimension. This scopic regime was 
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dominant in arcade games, for the following reasons: its immediacy, its speed, because it 
matched well with the abstractedness and deformed graphics of the first generations of 
electronic games, and because it allowed the coexistence of more than one player on the 
same platform. Nowadays, this kind of perspective is kept only for fighting games and 
for games with a retro-style. 
In these games the static, flat, non-stereoscopic and pre-rendered 2D background (the 
game area where play happens), or even 3D in some Role-Playing Games (as such as the 
already mentioned Final Fantasy VII) of the first 3D era (PlayStation), can be shown in 
their entirety as it were a canvas painted on the monitor. Otherwise, it can ‘shift' so that 
new details of a static background appear and older disappear following the movement of 
your character in the pre-rendered ‘environment'. 
 
Panoramic view usually defines strategy games and managerial games (such as Age of 
Empire, Red Alert, Caesar and SimCity) Mostly when referring to the former of these 
two genres, this ludic scopic regime has its roots in the dynamics of chess: from a godlike 
perspective, by looking from above the players move the different pieces on a board 
orthogonally structured and spatially limited to a square. There are different categories of 
pieces/troupes one might use, each one with its common aesthetic features, which 
symbolically refer to specific skills, the way of moving and, most importantly, functions.  
Therefore, this kind of game is not based on moving single characters but groups (as with 
miniatures), where aesthetics is subordinated to both functionality and the creation of an 
immersive atmosphere that the game hopes to transmit to the players (something shared 
by every video game). From a haptic point of view, strategic games require the ‘consumer' 
to click with the cursor on the spot and then drag it to select the entire group of units one 
might need - by including different functional categories too. It is even possible to pick 
just one unity by clicking on just one of them. After this selection, it is possible to order, 
via the menu, the action or movement to perform for the chosen group or unit.  Such 
necessity for clicking, use of menus and a high variety of cursor commands make strategy 
games, (the virtual version of chess) more straightforward to play with the mouse on the 
computer than on the console with the joystick. Furthermore, the computer-mouse 
facilitates the zoom in and zoom out of the game view depending on the player's need for 
either an accurate visual or a more general grasp of the overall situation (an element 




These same scopic-interactive dynamics apply also to managerial games (such as Caesar, 
Faraon and the SimCity series): herein, the perspective of the player is from above the 
game field, as already mentioned. However, in this case, the primary virtual objects to 
select are not troops, movable unities, soldiers, ships, and airships, but, mostly, buildings, 
facilities, and infrastructures, or terrains where to build streets, schools, hydraulic system 
and other amenities. Generally, the humanoid virtual-characters walking on the roads can 
be selected only to display their status, which includes life-quality elements such as 
happiness, health, wealth, etc. Otherwise, they follow pre-set movements from the game 
program. 
 
There are also different kinds of strategy games, whose distinction depends on which role 
time plays in their mechanics. On the one hand, there are real-time strategy games, where 
every faction in the game plays contemporaneously against the other. This requires that 
strategies and tactics be prompt, immediate and fast. Examples of games belonging to this 
category are the Age of Empire  and the Command & Conquer series. On the other hand, 
there are turn-based strategy games, which are inspired mostly by the dynamics of chess. 
In fact, they require players to make a certain number of movements in an unlimited time 
but only during their turn. As a result, the map/board is visibly divided into squares, each 
one corresponding to a movement, a relevant graphical difference from the real-time 
strategy games, which feature on the contrary more fluid movements and chaotic battles. 
Celebrated turn-based strategy games are the Civilization series and Heroes of Might and 
Magic series. 
 
The first person perspective is, another important visual regime central in FPS (First 
Person Shooter). ‘The most compelling aspect of the fighting game is the tight visceral 
match between the game controller and the screen action. A palpable click of the joystick 
results in an explosion. It requires very little imaginative effort to enter such a world 
because the sense of agency is so direct’ (Murray, 1997, 180)  ‘Suspense in a frightening 
film is highest on first of viewing, but upon each viewing the arousal and expectation 
provoked by the film's execution of suspense diminishes over time' (Huntemann, 2010, 
228). On the contrary, due to the major immersion, a more variable set of situations and 
player's reaction, video games offer very different outcomes than movies. These 
conditions are even more applicable to FPS, online war-games, where the greater co-
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operation and dominant presence of human players than in more predictable computer-
controlled NPCs make the experience even more realistic and unpredictable. 
 
As stated by Lukas in the essay ‘Behind the Barrel: Reading the Video Game Gun’ (Ibid., 
75) virtual guns resemble in every feature a real-world gun except for their immaterial 
nature; ‘meaning, that their use will not generally result in injury or death’ (Ibid., 76).  In 
virtue of such characteristic, the virtual guns acquire an even increased fetishist character, 
where the weapon becomes an object of desire by representing ‘some of the most 
powerful feelings of pleasure and revulsion, or purity and danger’ (Ibid.). As opposed to 
actual world weapons, virtual ones do not retain functionality as their primary design 
reason. With electronic games it is aesthetic which bears a prominent position in 
determining weapons' shape, colours, etc. ‘While some players enjoy a weapon for its 
mere destructive potential […], most indicated a preference for a weapon that fits into the 
scheme of the game; thus, its consistency, not its mere destructive potential, mattered to 
more gamers' (Ibid., 83). Therefore, symbolic meaning might have more value than mere 
functionality and effectivity - this is particularly true with Japanese Role-Playing game, 
like the Final Fantasy series, where the visibility of violence is drastically reduced. ‘For 
gamers, the gun signifies pleasure, a means to an end, and even (for some) an 
uncomfortable tool needed for the pleasure of gaming, while for many non-gamers the 
gun signifies hedonism, unrestrained violence, and social deviance’ (Ibid., 76-77). 
Moreover, actual identification with the weapon occurs for the player. In many first-
person shooters and mostly in those referring to realistically represented historical events, 
the character is something of an accessory, a ‘dumb puppet’ that serves only to generate 
credibility and thus improve immersion. As a result, there is not the same complex player-
avatar relation present in Final Fantasy VII and, more generally, Japanese role-playing 
games because the gun replaces the avatar. Weapons are experienced as extension of 
one’s ‘character’s skill set’ (Ibid., 84) or even each of them as ‘something to express your 
character’ (Ibid.). 
 
The third person perspective makes the character external to the player as a controlled 
virtual object despite a viewing angle similar to the one applied to the first-person shooter. 
As a result, the game assumes a slower pace than an FPS, and it is more centred on the 
main character rather than the gun. Such elements favour  the introduction of a variety of 
different typology of actions, such as climbing, walking, jumping, solving ‘environmental 
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puzzles', etc. that a first-person view does not allow (since it reduces gameplay just to 
shooting and moving to advance in the simulated battlefield). Moreover, the player has a 
broader perspective on the virtual surrounding, which means that the objects are easy to 
portray because their beholding does not depend on head tracking and the massive 
presence of the gun does not hinder it. Such perspective applies mostly to action-
adventure games, like the Tomb Raider series (started in 1996) and the Uncharted series 
(launched in 2007). 
 
A rehashed version of the gaze replaces the identification between player and weapon 
(see above), whereby the player controls from a short distance the character, whose back 
(and only the back) is visible in front of you from head to feet. However, the haptic 
relation necessary to video game experience completely alters this old scopic regime, 
making the gaze more ambiguous than it was during the time of the panopticon - and 
more generally of lens phase. ‘Lara Croft’, the protagonist and playable character of Tomb 
Raider, is the most iconic example of how the gaze in video games oscillates between the 
objectification of male voyeurism dominating in the first episodes of the series and the 
empathic immersion into the avatar and its charisma of the most recent chapters. Such 
ambiguity of the gaze in electronic games echoes the avatar-player relation, which has 
been explored in the previous subsection (The Player-Avatar Relationship).  There are 
also other possible scopic regimes or even crossovers between some of them, as already 
discussed by analyzing Final Fantasy VII, where each modality corresponded to an 
equally different visual perspective; from the panoramic viewpoint of explorative scenes 
to the kaleidoscopic side perspective of battle scenes. Such multiplicity is very common 
amongst Japanese role-playing games (JRPG). 
 
Each perspective analyzed above recalls a specific basic film technique. However, 
whereas in a movie various methods are applied to create a particular effect on the 
spectator, video games tend to focus on one or few depending on the game-play applied. 
Therefore, the scopic regimes in video games do not aim prominently for an aesthetic 







8. Immersion and Post-Cold War Society 
As already hinted during all this section on video games, their haptic component is an 
essential instrument for the full immersion of the player. It is also a necessary element for 
making play possible. In fact, touch is a requirement for grasping, controlling and moving 
the joystick or the mouse and the main reason behind the passage from the passive screen 
phase to the active monitor phase. For instance, in order to increase the sense of jeopardy 
and then immersion in the atmosphere of the game, from the console PS1 joysticks have 
been featuring the so-called Dual Shock, a system that, as its name suggests, gives to 
players a sudden sensation, a shock, by vibrating in specific situations during the game. 
For example, in an FPS when hit by the enemy the Dual Shock is programmed by the 
designer to activate so to make you feel even more immersed in the simulated situation. 
 
The previously mentioned atmosphere is another essential instrument for the immersion 
of the player into the game. It is in fact the primary emotional feature of every video 
game, necessary to increase enjoyment, the immersion into play (the magic circle 
constituting the core of every form of ludic experience) and thus fully achieve 
interactivity. It is also the only non-technical component appealing to players, despite this 
commodification of culture and the reduction of spectators/audience to performants. 
‘The most compelling amusement park attractions build upon stories or genre traditions 
already well-known to visitors, allowing them to enter physically into spaces they have 
visited many times before in their fantasies’ (Wardrip-Fruin & Harrington, 2004, 123). In 
the same fashion, game designers are ‘less […] storytellers and more […] narrative 
architects’ (Ibid., 121) aiming to ‘creating an immersive environment we can wander 
through and interact with’ (Ibid., 124). As a result, game designers deem details more 
relevant than the overall, description more than explanation, in contrast with movie 
directors.  "The amusement park attraction doesn't so much reproduce the story of a 
literary work […] as it evokes its atmosphere; the original story provides ‘a set of rules 
that will guide the design and project team to a common goal' and that will help give 
structure and meaning to the visitor's experience" (Ibid., 123). Similarly, game designers 
introduce narratives, symbols, meaning into their products but only by translating them 
into the atmosphere. As consequence, culture and conceptual references are reduced from 





By jamming interpretative, representational, and conceptual skills, it appears video games 
lack the ideological and cultural elements constituting any other social performance; they 
seem to be neutrally charged virtual entertainment facilities. However, their neutral 
performative character may be only a clever deception. As authenticity is the aim of every 
social performance, in which the separation between audience and actors are fused for a 
brief moment, so simulative performances like amusement parks, electronic games, and 
virtual worlds aim to forget the real context in which the player is situated. Nonetheless, 
a certain degree of authenticity is nevertheless required even for these ludic performances: 
visitor and player are pretender explorers who need to be constantly reassured that the 
fantastic atmosphere they are in will never fade away, and never reveal is fictional 
appearance. While audiences of social performances, such as political elections, movies 
and TV shows (all concrete expressions of the screen phase) need to be convinced of the 
authenticity and spontaneity of the actor/performant and of the author, the visitor/player 
is aware of the illusory character of the fake environment he or she is ‘consuming’. By 
contrast, with video games (and more generally with the monitor phase) the role of the 
actor is replaced by the mis-en-scene of attractions and virtual worlds, and the audience 
by the player/executer. 
 
Artistic and social performances “are successful only insofar as they can ‘re-fuse’ these 
increasingly disentangled elements […]. Audiences identify with actors, and cultural 
scripts achieve verisimilitude through effective mise-en-scene” (Alexander et al, 2006, 
29). Otherwise, ludic performances (both amusement park and computer games) are 
successful once the player (both audience and actor or perhaps none of them) identify 
with the reconstructed imaginary environment (both script and mise-en-scene or maybe 
none of them). Moreover, it is commonplace that social power, ‘the distribution of power 
in society – the nature of its political, economic, and status hierarchies, and the relations 
among its elites – profoundly affects the performance process. Power establishes an 
external boundary for cultural pragmatics that parallels the internal boundary established 
by a performance's background representations' (Ibid, 36). On the contrary, it seems social 
powers are absent from ludic performances because atmosphere substitutes meaning 
emotion representation, configuration and interpretation. 
 
The ‘immersion' achieved by video game requires this notion of atmosphere to induce a 
certain emotional reaction in the player. From this perspective, video games and any other 
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virtual reality work as dreams, where emotions free from the central control of the ego 
generate their imaginary world and the sense of interaction we are having with it (which 
compensate for the absence of a real world). "From the 1950s cybernetic notion of the 
'automaton', to William Gibson's 1987 coining of 'cyberspace' as a 'consensual 
hallucination', the virtual has shared an isomorphic relationship to the dream" (Der 
Derian, 2001, 774). On the contrary, during our wakefulness the events occurring in the 
world and affecting us are what compel us toward certain emotions, inverting the 
relationship between world-emotion of the dream state. Emotions, in turn, require a 
physical response, an extensive body movement. In fact, world ‘emotion' has its origin 
after the Latin ex movere, to bring outside, to move, which clarifies its characteristics, 
which are both to induce us to act and to instil turmoil. For this reason, the emotive 
element corresponds to the direct access we have to our corporality, to the continuous 
movement which invests and constitutes our body. Therefore, even a slumbering body is 
traversed by such kinesthesis, which are, in this context, expressed, and discharged 
through dreams. As addressed by Deleuze in Cinema II concerning ‘dream-images' 
(Deleuze, 1985, 59) the hallucinatory world of dreams breaks the sensory-motor schemata 
at the base of the relationship between ego and common world, whereby a specific, 
concrete situation (a state of the world) works as an input for one particular perception. 
Then, the latter is followed by an emotional state that finally brings about an 
action/reaction that changes the original situation. 
The dream state is able to break such mechanisms because of the absence of a centre of 
control (ego) and of a concrete and perceived world: ‘the sleeper’s perceptions exist, but 
in the diffuse condition of a dust of actual sensations – external and internal – which are 
not grasped in themselves, escaping consciousness’ (Ibid., 58). It follows that our entire 
affective sphere (including emotions and kinesthesis) is free from any functional 
constraints and drives the construction of the worlds we dream of and leads to our 
perception of it as real. Video games and virtual reality somehow follow this same track: 
- First, the body reduces its movements massively to the sole hands in a state of 
quasi-total rest, where the joystick (mostly in its later implementations) is 
programmed to vibrate according to specific circumstances during the game. This 
stimulation of our sensory system is meant to increase the immersion inside a 
virtual world the same way our kinesthesis  does during the dream state. 
- Second, the atmosphere that video games necessitate for achieving convincing 
immersion  relies on emotion to build virtual worlds, which are mostly visual and 
117 
 
secondarily auditory. The haptic element is also necessary but only in strict 
relationship with the sole ludic component of video games (with the exemption of 
the above-mentioned optional implementation of vibration into joysticks). It also 
does not have the same characteristic of the ordinary way in which touch is 
experienced in life. 
- Third, video games do not discharge emotions as they occur through either 
catharsis or extended body movement or coping with one's troubling past, etc. On 
the contrary, they keep them on an extreme level by continuously stimulating 
them through their playful mechanics. 
- Fourth, both virtual worlds and dreams balance the inactivity of a sedated and 
inhibited body; in other words, a sleeping body that needs to compensate for the 
absence or low presence of extensive movements by replacing them mostly with 
intensive ones (corresponding to emotions). 
 
Due to the central role played by the atmosphere in video games, this form of 
entertainment artificially increases emotions instead of liberating us from their excesses, 
as occurs with catharsis. To a certain extent, video games have been working on our 
society as a reversed model, where a lack of, and a need for emotions has been replaced 
by the need for a passive liberation from them. Such replacement corresponds to another 
critical change from screen to monitor, from the spectator to the player or more generally 
to an ‘interactive user' (as the next paragraphs on computer and smartphone will also 
analyse). Such anthropological mutation corresponds to the transformations that occurred 
in visual ideological communication following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the arrival 
of the post-Communist era. It especially corresponds to the movement away from 
ideology conceived as a specific and totalizing image of the world (mental ideology) to 
ideology as a particular kind of image without any referent and which is meant to satisfy 
a need for a specific stereotypical emotion (emotional ideology). 
 
During the Cold War, ideology was still based on the conception of weltanschauung 
(overall view), of an image meant to demonstrate the linkage existing amongst different 
events, despite the mechanism of deterrence having replaced the old hot expansive 
conflicts, whose last exemplar had been World War II. As shown in the previous chapter, 
the situation between the two blocks was entangled with a specific technological 
environment – whose central elements were nuclear plants, satellite system and TV – 
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which favoured the development of a situation of frozen stasis and constant escalation 
between the two superpowers. As a result, the visions of the world that each one of them 
embodied became self-referential and self-righteous. In more conceptual terms, the notion 
of weltanschauung took a detour from its original version (which had been one of the 
scopic regimes of the lens phase) because the representation it gives does not refer 
anymore to a distinct reality but anticipates it. Then, if each view of the world becomes 
itself a specific autonomous world, the definition of 'first world' and 'second world' during 
the Cold War has never been more accurate. 
 
In similar terms, Hiroki Azuma in Otaku Japan’s Database Animals affirms that the crisis 
of transcendental grand narratives that followed ‘the appearance of new technology of 
reproduction, the origins of information theory’ (Azuma, 2009, 71) is ‘something 
gradually occurring over the seventy-five years between 1914 and 1989, with a single 
focus in the 1970’s’ (Ibid., 72). He also highlights how this loss of a weltanshauung 
characterizing the twentieth century took the form of snobbery or cynicism during the 
Cold War, when ‘one had to believe in the semblance of a grand narrative’ (Ibid.). In 
other words ‘no one really believes in the ruling ideology, every individual preserves a 
cynical distance from it and everybody knows that nobody believes in it; but still the 
appearance is to be maintained at any price’ (Žižek, 1989, 197). Regarding the ways 
ideology has been framed during the Cold War, the Japanese sociologist Ōsawa Masachi 
has divided post-war Japan "into two periods-the idealistic age from 1945 to 1970 and 
the fictional age from 1970 to 1995. […] the ‘idealistic age’ is the period when grand 
narrative functioned alone while the ‘fictional age’ is the period when grand narrative 
functioned only as a fake” (cited in Azuma, 2009, 73). Such understanding might be 
extended to all the globe to show how ideology has become progressively self-referential 
and fictional. 
 
All these various analyses on the society of screens (cinema earlier and TV later) has been 
enabled by the development of weltanshauung as ideology and of its downfall as empty 
simulacra during the Cold-War. During this latter phase, ideology became performative 





In 1989, with the Fall of the Berlin Wall to symbolize the decline of the Communist bloc 
the grand transcendental narratives are wholly abandoned, according to whom? Azuma 
reads such event as the fulfilled transition from modernism to postmodernism. This 
research will understand it as a shift of dominant phase (which does not entirely erase the 
previous one): the end of a social dimension forged by the screen phase and the beginning 
of one based on the monitor phase. The world stops being divided into two ideological 
blocs and globalization can be fully achieved. It is inside this new post-Cold War frame, 
where ideology is no more necessary, that the video game becomes a more representative 
medium than TV. 
 
The role emotion plays helping players relate to the images of a video game, related to 
the notion of atmosphere well exemplifies what kind of new processes contemporary 
images generate in virtue of this new ‘post-ideological' age. Therefore, with video games, 
society moved from a time of representative images to what is an age of non-
representative and emotive images. Due to their loss of reference to a shared reality, 
Images instead of representing the world or a specific object work nowadays as a form of 
addiction. Instead of using images to understand the world, we look for explicit images 
to feel a particular emotion or sensation because the comprehension of the world as an 
objective and totalizing unity has faded away. 
 
B. COMPUTER AND WEB 
1. Computer and Game 
Console gaming exploits the television, expanding its haptic features beyond the mere 
choice of the channel by remote control. Therefore, what is herein developed is a bridge 
between a screen and a monitor, from a glassy device that makes interaction possible on 
a passive level to a glassy device which then makes interaction possible on an active level. 
The distance between the two sides of the spectrum (watcher and watched) is even 
reduced further. In other words, game consoles once turned on, makes TV itself a monitor 
instead of a screen because of their haptic/active feature, where spectatorship is replaced 
by interactivity. 
 
Despite sharing this same active and interactive features, the computer allows for a more 
extensive set of functions than a game console (at least if we do not consider the last 
generations) and more significant ‘storage' for data that can be downloaded and used. In 
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other words, a computer is multifunctional while a game console tends to be mono-
functional – it is made for playing mostly. Moreover, mostly since the Nineties, video 
games have been also been played from the computer, and not only via arcades (now 
almost ‘extinct') and consoles. Strategy games are the first example already given, of an 
electronic entertainment more comfortable by mouse and keyboard than by joystick. 
Electronic games elaborate with constant technical enhancements a strict relation between 
visual and haptic as never seen before. The computer as well has developed such 
correspondence but not in the same direct, fast, intuitive and active way as video games. 
Not by chance, with games made for consoles the time left for reflection is usually 
reduced compared to the slower pace available in games more suited for computers, as 
such as strategic and managerial. Such difference relates to the kind of physical controls 
used by the two ‘platforms'. 
 
The previous paragraph has already suggested the difference between mouse and joystick 
concerning playing. Such differences are even increased once focused on the multiple 
uses of the joystick in coordination with the keyboard, and how their combination brings 
us far from a mere interaction with images. In fact, while joysticks generate a fast, very 
immersive interaction with the monitor, the computer has uses that are not just limited to 
play, and which do not follow a precise pace, where control and rationalization increase. 
In other words, the computer is not limited to the isolated ‘magic circle’ the game creates 
around who plays. As stated by Huizinga, in reference to an ancient Indian version of the 
game of dice, the magic circle is: 
‘the place where the game is played. Generally it is a simple circle, […] drawn on 
the ground. The circle as such, however, has a magic significance. It is drawn with 
great care, all sorts of precautions being taken against cheating. The players are 
not allowed to leave the ring until they have discharged all their obligations’ 
(Huizinga, 2014, 57). 
 
2. Rhizome Model and Database Model 
Approximately twenty years later, Azuma stated something similar to what Deleuze and 
Guattari had  in their 1980’s work A Thousand Plateaus: ‘before the arrival of the 
postmodern, in the era of modernity – when the grand narrative was still functioning- the 
world could be grasped, roughly, through a kind of tree model […]. On the one hand, 
there is the surface outer layer of the world that is reflected in our consciousness. On the 
other hand, there is the deep inner layer, which is equal to the grand narrative that 
regulates the surface outer layer […]. However, with the arrival of postmodernity, the 
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tree-model world image collapsed completely' (Azuma, 2009, 31).  Furthermore, Azuma 
applies this characteristic of our world also to the Internet: ‘An easily understandable 
example of [postmodernism] is the Internet. The Net has no centre. That is to say, no 
hidden grand narrative regulates all Web pages' (Ibid.). Herein, the term postmodernism 
refers to the already mentioned (see above) complete postmodernism occurring after the 
Fall of The Wall (1989), when transcendental grand narratives have been fully dismissed.  
In other words, it refers to the ‘age of monitors’ rising during the Nineties and prefigured 
between the Seventies and the Eighties thanks to information revolution (invention and 
development of telematics). 
 
Moreover, after extending the ‘1990’s model shift’ from social to technical, Azuma 
extends such shift also to the conceptual area: 
‘For me, the shift in models is not simply a social shift, such as with the emergence 
of the Internet, but also was clearly demonstrated in the scholarly world by the 
ideas of complex systems theory, such as the self-organization of molecules, 
artificial life, or neural nets, that become widely known in the 1990's' (Ibid., 32). 
 
Such statements are reinforced by how the plurality of network theories developed during 
the whole twentieth century anticipated (and influenced) the network conception 
dominating today in almost every scientific and cultural field (and even common sense). 
Essential instances of such conception are Deleuze and Guattari's ‘Rhizome’, Bruno 
Latour's ‘ANT’ (actor-network theory), Edgar Morin's ‘Complexity Theory’ and Gregory 
Bateson's ‘Cybernetics’. 
 
As the theoretical realm has coded indirectly and inadvertently the technological world 
to come, so informatics technology has operated unwarily as a model for several 
contemporary scientific conceptions since its outcome. For instance, genetic theory tends 
to apply the way telematics systems work to life, as already pointed out thirty years ago 
by Baudrillard. It is interesting to notice in this regard that the DNA model has been 
designed mostly thanks to the possibility of the computer. Another example of such 
computerization of reality is cognitivism: the way we interact with reality is reduced to 
the mere exchange of information as if our brain were a hardware. Finally, Bruno Latour 
develops several definitions of familiar concepts by borrowing ideas from informatics 
and computer terminology. For instance, he rethinks habitus (and consequently 
competence) as intentional and volitional downloads and plugs in: 
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“I prefer the more neutral term of plug-ins, borrowing this marvelous metaphor 
from our new life on the Web. When you reach some site in cyberspace, it often 
happens that you see nothing on the [monitor]. But then a friendly warning 
suggests that you ‘might not have the right plug-ins’ and that you should 
‘download’ a bit of software which, once installed on your system, will allow you 
to activate what you were unable to see before. What is so telling in this metaphor 
of the plug-in is that competence doesn’t come in bulk any longer but literally in 
bits and bytes. […] Being a fully competent actor now comes in discreet pellets 
or, to borrow from cyberspace, patches and applets, whose precise origin can be 
‘Googled’ before they are downloaded and saved one by one” (Latour, 2007, 207) 
 
Azuma and Deleuze together with Guattari apply two very different models to a world 
shaped by networks and computers, despite commonly describing it as acentric, not 
strictly hierarchical and not based anymore on grand narrative (all the opposite of the 
modern world of the lens). Deleuze and Guattari refer to the Rhizome, while Azuma at 
the database model. 
 
In the early Eighties, when information technology was still at the outset, Deleuze and 
Guattari theoretically developed the Rhizome, a revolutionary model, code, and 
anticipation for the Internet and the corresponding future society. In other words, before 
being a concrete phenomenon both technologically and socially applied, the web was a 
theory, whose origins date back to the Eighteenth century. In fact, despite its diffusion in 
the last century, the first mathematical formulation of networks, even if still in the form 
of an early approximation, corresponds to the Seven Bridges of Konigsberg, a 
mathematical problem developed by the Swiss mathematician and engineer Leonhard 
Euler in 1736 and applying to a concrete situation. 
In the Prussian city of Konigsberg, there were at the time seven bridges built to connect 
the two sides of the Pregel River and the four districts the latter shaped. The objective of 
Euler was to demonstrate how to cross each of them only once through purely 
mathematical calculation. Five years later, he published the solution to this problem, 
pointing out that the physical map did not mathematically matter, but only the list of 
connections and points to connect did. He then reduced the four regions to four nodes, 
and each bridge to a connection between two nodes. Since the number of connections 
touching each node was odd, and since only an even number would have allowed passing 
through the regions by crossing each bridge only once, this specific problem had a 
negative solution. In other words, it was not possible to devise a walk crossing every 
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bridge only once. The abstract representation of the Seven Bridges of Königsberg is the 
origin of the graph theory, the mathematical foundation of networks. 
 
It is just two centuries later that this theory finds more cogent, elaborate, convincing and 
not merely mathematical reformulations, like the Rhizome. Deleuze and Guattari, in their 
jointly authored work ‘A Thousand Plateaus', builds a new way of systematizing. The 
book itself is presented “as a network of ‘plateaus’ that […] can be read in any order” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2014, vii). A Thousand Plateaus does not just create a theory of 
open system (rhizome), but it is itself ‘conceived as an open system'. The text applies 
rhizomatic system. 
 
According to the two authors, a rhizome is defined by seven ‘approximate characteristics' 
(Ibid., 5), or principles: 
- First and second principles of ‘connection and heterogeneity: any point of a 
rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be. (Ibid.). 
- The third principle is of "multiplicity: it is only when the multiple is effectively 
treated as a substantive, ‘multiplicity,' that it ceases to have any relation to the 
One as subject or object, natural or spiritual reality, image, and the world. This 
principle eradicates neoPlatonic and specifically Plotino's understanding of the 
Multiple as the reflection of the One, and so the more general notion of the double, 
so pivotal to the screen phase (see above). This principle also abolishes the 
dichotomy subject/object embodying the lens phase: ‘multiplicity has neither 
subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot 
increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature' (Ibid., 7). 
- The fourth principle is of ‘asignifying rupture’: against the oversignifying breaks 
separating structures or cutting across a single structure. A rhizome may be […] 
shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new 
lines' (Ibid., 8). 
- Fifth and sixth principles are of ‘cartography’ and ‘decalcomania’: a rhizome is 
not amenable to any structural or generative model. It is a stranger to any idea of 
genitive axis or deep structure. A genetic axis is […] an objective pivotal unity 
upon which successive stages are organized; a deep structure is […] a base 
sequence that can be broken down into immediate constituents, while the unity of 
the product passes into another, transformational and subjective, dimension ' 
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(Ibid., 11). In other words, a rhizome is a hyper-flat map that does not represent 
reality (as seventeenth-century maps otherwise did), but rather assembles it, 
constructs it and mingles with it. As a result, the rhizome does not operate by 
reproduction, but rather ‘by variation, expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots' 
(Ibid., 22). 
 
The rhizome model corresponds to a new geometry, a new way of approaching space, 
due to the last two principles of cartography and decalcomania. ‘There are no points or 
positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root. There are only 
lines' (Ibid., 7). 
Globalization is itself rhizomatic in many of its concrete instantiations. The whole 
international airport system is an example of the network system, rhizome, constituted 
not by points but by hubs and nodes. Hubs and nodes are two different varieties of tangles 
of lines. They are not centres and points but formed by the crossing lines. Airports are 
nodes and hubs because they do not create threads to be connected between each other 
but they are constructed under the pressure of pre-existing connections, to facilitate them. 
However, there is a primary difference between these two classes of tangles. The decay 
of a node does not jeopardize the integrity of the entire rhizome, and its lines can be easily 
replaced along with the nodes, whereas the decay of a hub completely jams the rhizome 
and its functioning. The dismissal of secondary airports does not threaten the stability of 
the whole airport system. On the contrary, all major international airports, as such as 
Singapore Changi Airport, Dubai International Airport and New York City's JFK, are 
hubs of the airport network, pivotal notes for its subsistence. Another important 
characteristic of concrete rhizomes is their presence on a global scale, as occurring for 
both the International Airport Network the World Wide Web. 
 
Azuma states that ‘the logic of the Web is penetrating widely and deeply into many other 
genres technologically unrelated to it. For example, books and magazines will continue 
to be published in the future, but the organization and narrative style will increasingly 
approach those of Web pages; and movies will continue to be screened, but the direction 
and editing will increasingly resemble those of games and video clips’ (Azuma, 2009, 
101-102). Azuma deems it easier to comprehend what he defines as the ‘postmodern 
world (and then the web) through a database model (or reading-up model)' (Ibid., 31), 
than through the "rhizome" model, in which, as already viewed, ‘signs are linked in 
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diverse patterns over the outer layer alone (the deep inner layer having been 
extinguished)' (Ibid.). Therefore, the Japanese author interprets the Internet not as “a 
world established through the combination of outer signs alone, as in the case of the 
rhizome model. On the Internet, rather, there is a distinct double-layer structure, wherein, 
on the one hand, there is an accumulation of encoded information, and, on the other hand, 
there are individual Web pages made in accordance with the users ‘reading them up’ ” 
(Ibid., 31-32).  The database model refers to the image of an archive of data (which fits 
perfectly with how computers concretely work). From the perspective of Azuma, the 
double layer structure of postmodernity distinguishes ‘between the surface outer layer 
within which dwell simulacra i.e., the works, the deep inner layer within which dwells the 
database, i.e., settings’ (Ibid., 33). 
 
‘The rise of multimedia plays an important role here. In today’s market for otaku culture, 
the previously accepted order is no longer dominant; no more do original comics versions 
debut, followed by anime releases, and finally the related product and fanzines. […] There 
are multiple layers of these kinds of intricate circuits. In such a situation, it is quite 
ambiguous what the original is, or who the original author is, and the consumers rarely 
become aware of the author or the original. For them, the distinction between the original 
and the spin-off products (as copies) does not exist; the only valid distinction is between 
the settings created anonymously (a database at a deep inner layer) and the individual 
works that each artist has concretized from the information (a simulacrum on the surface 
outer layer)’ (Ibid., 39). 
 
In conclusion, despite the statement of Azuma, there is not such a thing as a better fitting 
model between rhizome and database. They are not only equally explanatory, but they 
also represent two different procedural tendencies of the web and thus of today’s global 
world; they both reflect well the many dynamics of our time. 
 
3. Visible and Invisible 
Computer monitors have the characteristics of inverting what was the classic relationship 
between visible and invisible existing in textbooks. As stated by Azuma on the dichotomy 
between the visible and the invisible: “the world of print media has been operating under 
the logic of ‘making the invisible visible’. The world of the Web, however, is not 
constructed in this way. In it, the status of ‘the visible’ remains in flux. […] a series of 
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commands written in HTML characterizes the essence of Web pages” (Ibid., 98). For 
instance, when ‘we consider the surface outer layer of the Internet, i.e., the Web pages 
displayed on the computer screen, first we must consider the characteristics of the HTML 
source code, because all Web pages […] are supposed to be written in this code. […] 
HTML, in principles, specifies the logical relationship among elements within the page, 
and their visual expression is left up to the user environment’ (Ibid., 97-98). In other 
words, with the monitor “a user confronts exists only as nothing more than an 
‘interpretation’ by the user environment- created by the operating system, the browser, 
the monitor, and the video chip. Yet, the browser is not even necessary for viewing a Web 
page; in fact, the source code (HTML) can be opened with a text editor, as a text including 
tags such as <h1>. That text file is also ‘visible’ insofar as it is displayed as text. In this 
sense, there are multiple ‘visibles’ for a Web page. Therefore, in reading a Web page we 
cannot make the simple assumption that we ‘start with the visible’ as before. […] In this 
world the value of the ‘design’ of a page depends not only on what is visible but also on 
what is invisible. […] There is a significant shift in values here. Print media starts with 
what is concretely visible, while the world of the Web begins with a comparative analysis 
of several visibles. […] Furthermore, the position of ‘the invisible’ is unstable. For […] 
on the Web something invisible in one environment (with a browser) can immediately 
become visible in another (with a text editor)” (Ibid., 99). Finally, “If such a thing as the 
‘true form’ of a computer file exists, it is a mere electromagnetic pattern stored 
somewhere in hardware, and the hexadecimal notation, the text file, and the image are no 
different insofar as they are all an interpretation of it” (Ibid., 103). 
 
The alteration of the relationship between visibility and invisibility was firstly achieved 
through the application of three-dimensionality on PC monitors. ‘The computer is not a 
visual medium. We might argue it is primarily mathematical, or perhaps electrical, but it 
is not in the first instance concerned with questions of vision or image. Yet our 
engagement with computing technology is increasingly mediated through the interface of 
the screen. […]. In the mid-1960s researchers had only one very modest goal: to construct 
and display a three-dimensional image. While contemporary computer graphics are often 
associated with the lifelike simulation of complex physical objects and effects, the 
primary concern for computer scientists at this early moment was simply to simulate any 
three-dimensional object at all. How is an object constructed, what is it made of, how 
does it interact with the world around it? These are the questions that most interested the 
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field. Thus while today we may think of computer graphics as principally a visual 
medium, in fact it is structured by a particular theory of the nature of objects, their relation 
to one another, and to the world around them; in short, an ontology. As such our treatment 
of graphics cannot be limited to their visual representation, and must account for their 
status materially as both image and object. 
 
The earliest model of three-dimensional perspective comes from the graduate work of 
Lawrence Roberts, whose dissertation research at MIT – titled ‘Machine perception of 
three-dimensional solids' (1963) – is a seminal text in the history of the field' […]. By 
introducing embodied perspective – or its mechanization through photography – Roberts' 
program adopted a set of psychological assumptions about how perception functions and 
might be procedurally modelled. To this end he drew heavily on the work of psychologist 
James J Gibson, whose The Perception of the Visual World (1950) he found instrumental 
in formulating vision as diagrammatic and discrete. […] For Gibson, vision is not derived 
from an embodied sense of place or location in space but from the perception of the 
relational boundaries of objects in a visual array, reduced to a discrete set of primitive 
forms. Vision in this formulation is no longer concerned with accurate mimesis, but it is 
instead engaged in the capture and replication of an external relationality’ (Gaboury, 
2015, 40-48) 
 
This new approach not just toward computers but also toward perception itself will 
influence all the future development of computer graphic, highlighting the distance 
between the monitor phase and its two predecessors (lens and screen):  ‘Film and 
photography model visibility on our phenomenological perception of objects in the world, 
based on the science of optics and the physics of light movement and diffusion. As such, 
that which is turned away from the eye or the camera lens is radically inaccessible and 
cannot be seen. Computer graphics do not function in this way. For computer graphics, 
each object must be described in advance if it is to be rendered visible in a given 
simulation. […] Computers must calculate all optical or acoustic data on their own 
precisely because they are born dimensionless and thus imageless. For this reason, images 
on computer monitors … do not reproduce any extant things, surfaces, or spaces at all. 
They emerge on the surface of the monitor through the application of mathematical 
systems of equations. Thus, in order to simulate our perception of objects as fixed in a 
perspective projection, graphics must not only calculate that which is to be seen, but also 
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anticipate and hide that which is known but should not be seen, that which must be made 
hidden and invisible’ (Ibid., 51). 
 
Like the 3D, also the Internet has its origin in the 1960's. However, "the aggregate of all 
Web pages (Web sites) that we usually call ‘Internet' today was born only in the 1990's. 
Strictly speaking, such a system, distinguished from ‘The internet' (which refer to the 
network itself) is called the ‘World Wide Web' (www) or the Web" (Azuma, 2009, 97). 
It follows that both 3D and Internet had been developed [as military technologies] during 
an intermediary period, occurring during the Cold War. Finally, they found their actual 
[‘civilian’] deployment only in the 1990's, what Azuma himself considers, as already 
mentioned, the actual beginning of complete postmodernism when transcendental grand 
narratives are fully dismissed along with the historical defeat of the communist ideology. 
 
In a computer framed world such as ours ‘one cannot help pursuing the invisible precisely 
because the invisible is turned into the visible and lined up on the same plane one after 
another. […] the act of turning the invisible into visible by changing the environment 
(from a drawing application to a text editor, and then to a data fork editor) is […] a 
reverting back through the layers, but in its world (i.e. the desktop screen) it seems more 
than a side-slipping over the same plane. Therefore, at this point another kind of desire 
emerges: the desire to transform as many invisibles as possible into visibles, without 
arriving at the agency at the final level, and to extract as many simulacra as possible from 
the database. For example, because it is as easy to link to an internationally famous Web 
site as to a link to a mere personal Web site, we wander almost necessarily from one site 
to another with the help of search engines’ (Ibid., 104). 
 
The database tendency (see above) of post-Cold War monitor world has definitely 
disconnected ‘the visible’ and ‘the invisible’, whereby, as argued by Azuma, ‘one reverts 
from one layer to another but will never reach a stable final level of agency in the 
hypervisual, postmodern transcendence’ (Ibid., 106). On the contrary, ‘there were first 
small, visible things in modernity and behind them there was a large, invisible thing. […] 







In ‘Cinema 1’, in the paragraph concerning the image-affection, Deleuze associates 
director Carl Theodor Dreyer to the creation of a specific cinematographic technique: the 
flattening of the third dimension, by the abolition of depth and perspective. This reduction 
to a two-dimensional space is immediately linked to affection. According to Deleuze, 
such technique allows the enhancement of other two dimensions through the elimination 
of depth: the fourth dimension of time and the unique fifth dimension of Spirit. It is not 
by chance that this reflection is made in a paragraph mainly dedicated to expressionist 
cinema. From the Deleuzian perspective, the image-affection is, in fact, a kind of image 
mostly developed in German movies between the two World Wars and corresponding to 
the close-up. The close-up focuses on the face, the ‘organ-carrying plate of nerves’ 
(Deleuze, 2015, 98) that ‘has sacrificed most of its global mobility’ (Ibid.) to express 
usual body hidden movements. Therefore, affect is nothing else than a ‘combination of a 
reflecting and immobile unity and of intensive, expressive movements’ (Ibid.). 
 
Deleuze associates this very idea of affect with Bergson's notion of affection as a motor 
tendency, which is a series of micro-movements, on a sensitive nerve, which is an 
immobilized plate of nerves. Hence, affect is not a ‘movement of extension’ (Ibid.), as 
already explored (see above), but a movement of expression. 
Similarly, expressionist painting sacrifices movements, details, realism, and depth (by the 
absence of perspective) to express an emotion, affection or a complex of emotions and 
affections. The geometrization of reality and the primal scream are consequentially the 
main artistic procedures of expressionism, as it is possible to infer by observing a classic 
painting of this vanguard: Der Schrei der Natur (The Scream of Nature) of Munch. The 
close-up transposes such pictorial technique to the cinema because it abstracts its object 
‘from all spatio-temporal coordinates’ (Ibid., 106), raising it ‘to the state of Entity’ 
(Ibid.). To Deleuze, the close-up visually corresponds to the passage from translation (an 
actual movement of an object) to expression, from extensive movements to the intensive 
movement of affectivity. In order words, it means focusing on pure virtuality, possibility, 
and power. In fact, the French philosopher points out four different kinds of power, 
different forms of affection, each one corresponding to a different property of the close-
up: 
1. Brilliance, which is the power (or quality) of sensation. 
2. Terror, which is the power of feeling. 
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3. Decisiveness, which is the power of action. 
4. Compassion, which is the power of state (as status, condition). 
As stated before, each expression defines not a particular kind of sensation, feeling, action 
or “state”, but each one of them as entities. For instance, brilliance does not correspond 
to a specific sensation but to sensation itself. Moreover, the space of the affection-image 
(embodied by the massive use of the close-up by expressionism) is not anymore, a specific 
place as it is for realism (American movies). On the contrary, it is developed as an any-
space-whatever, a ‘space of virtual conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible’ 
(Ibid., 123). This absence of a concrete and specific context makes images with an 
affective instead of a representative connotation even flatter and less three-dimensional. 
 
Flatness becomes even more dominant with the computer monitor, which, in fact, gives 
the observer the illusion of third dimension by overlapping different layers. Therefore, 
perspective is utterly abolished. "The characteristics of the worlds of the Web, computer 
games, and software – moreover the […] world in which we live - can be captured in the 
word ‘hyperflatness'" (Azuma, 2009, 102). Murakami Takashi's concept of superflat 
influenced the term used in the above-mentioned sentence by Hiroki Azuma 
(choheimenteki in the original version). For instance, Takashi used it "to characterize the 
artistic movement centered on his own works. […] Murakami's ‘superflat' is a sensuous 
term, incorporating […] also the characteristics of social structure and communications" 
(Ibid., 139). Murakami pointed out to the Web Journal Artnet: ‘I'd been thinking about 
the reality of Japanese drawing and painting and how it is different from Western art. 
What is important in Japanese art is the feeling of flatness. Our culture doesn't have 3-D' 
(Drohojowska-Philp, 2001). In other words, Murakami (and partially Azuma too) 
appoints this feature specifically to the entire Japanese visual culture, a feature that only 
nowadays has become global due to the new information technologies and their impact 
on society. Moreover, another reason for this flattening of all contemporary mainstream 
and not only is the influence Japanese mass culture is having overseas. In fact, the various 
camera techniques frequently applied to make Japanese cartoons (fix, pan, fading) bring 
to a dilation of time that can also be found in cinematic tradition since German 
expressionism. Animation and the entire expressionist movement (both in painting and 
movies) share a common Japanese conception: time is not framed in chronological and 
objective terms and what matters is the quality and the intensity of every instant we 
directly live. An Anime (Japanese animation) is generally characterised by eternal 
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instants in which the extensive flow of the story coincides with the qualitative flow of 
affection, so the more intense an emotion is, the longer the moment lasts until a complete 
suspension of time through a fix, a panning or a fading. The result is an increased 
emotional involvement and tension for the audience. It is necessary to notice that despite 
being forecast in the TV medium, the dynamics of animation aesthetics reflect the 
computer implementation of the monitor phase. 
 
Flatness is also the spatial characteristic of every network, as highlighted by Latour’s 
ANT (Actor Network Theory) and Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome. In fact, both ANT 
and rhizome lie on surfaces; they do not recognize depth. Being bi-dimensional means 
ignoring the third dimension developed mostly by modernity – with the panopticon as its 
symbol. Latour ironically compares the work of ANT with the actual work of ants, since 
both might be only developed in an unstructured and unframed space, whose best 
representation is the map. The stress on maps is also present in Deleuze’s One Thousand 
Plateaus, where Deleuze indicates them as the opposite of stratification. The latter is, in 
fact, a tri-dimensional and hierarchized structuration of space, where ‘strata’ works as a 
synonym for ‘frame’. To avoid contextualization and framework, Latour always warns 
the reader of being indifferent to scale when describing. Scales are not a priori measures 
of the world, but they are invented, made, constructed: "‘Ups' and ‘Downs', ‘local' and 
‘global' have to be made, they are never given" (Latour, 2007, 186). Depth is thus 
qualified as a constructed category, dangerous for the success of our assembly and our 
description since it overcharges them, forgetting the actual actors. 
As already mentioned, flattening affects two huge frameworks: nature and society: ‘After 
this flattening of the landscape, the outside itself has changed a lot: it’s no longer made 
of society – and neither is it made of nature’ (Ibid., 214). It also affects the definition of 
local and global: ‘No place dominates enough to be global and no place is self-contained 
enough to be local’ (Ibid., 204). 
 
ANT and Rhizome do not spread homogenously on a surface despite their flatness. 
According to that, Latour defines the interactions between actors as: 
- not isotopic: ‘what is acting at the same moment in any place is coming from 
many other places, many distant materials, and many faraway actors’ (Ibid., 200); 
- not synchronic: ‘action has always been carried on thanks to shifting the burden 
of connection to longer- or shorter-lasting entities’(Ibid., 201); 
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- not synoptic: ‘very few of the participants in a given course of action are 
simultaneously visible at any given point’ (Ibid.); 
- not homogeneous: ‘the relays through which action is carried out do not have the 
same material quality all along’ (Ibid.); 
- not isobaric: ‘some of the participants are pressing very strongly, requesting to be 
heard and taken into account, while others are fully routine customs sunk rather 
mysteriously into bodily habits’ (Ibid., 202). 
The absence of homogeneity is also a characteristic of Rhizome, due to it being ‘an 
acentered, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system without a General, and without an 
organizing memory or central automaton, defined solely by a circulation of states’ 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2014, 22). 
 
In conclusion, "Characteristics of the worlds of the Web, computer games, and software 
– moreover the […] world in which we live - can be captured in the world ‘hyperflatness' 
[…] The hyperflat world, represented by the computer [monitor], is flat and at the same 
time lines up what exists beyond it in a parallel layer' (Azuma, 2009, 102). In fact, one 
main change from the television screen to the computer monitor is the absolute abolition 
of an eye, of a residual form of perspective. In this regard, The Japanese psychologist 
Saito Tamaki, referring to the work of Azuma, writes: "[Superflat] indicates an imaginary 
space without depth or thickness, where even the eye of the camera does not exist. I would 
suggest that depth and the camera's eye are replaced by another regulatory system, 
namely, the layered 'contexts' (of plot, of authorship, of publication and distribution)" 
(Chee & Lim, 2015, 95) which constitute the database. 
 
5. Moe-Elements 
Hiroki Azuma analyzed the ‘otaku culture' in his Otaku Japan’s Database Animals (2001) 
to provide an account of how the fast diffusion of information technology on a global 
scale has changed social interaction, with a particular focus on contemporary Japan. 
Otaku are those Japanese […] who fanatically consume, produce, and collect comic books 
(manga), animated films (anime), and other products related to these forms of popular 
visual culture […]. Globally, otaku culture has spawned a large following and strongly 
influenced popular culture not only in Japan but also throughout Asia, the United States, 
and Europe’ (Azuma, 2009, xv). Azuma identifies otaku as the founders of ‘Japan’s 
Internet culture’ (Ibid., 4) and focuses his analysis on the generation born around the 80’s. 
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This generation of otaku has, in fact, ‘experienced the spread of the Internet during their 
teens and, as a result, their main forum for general fan activities has moved to Web sites, 
and their interest in illustrations, to computer graphics’ (Ibid., 7). 
 
It is within the jargon developed by this specific group of otaku into the Web and by the 
use of computers that the term moe has been coined. This recent neologism refers to “the 
strong emotion triggered by an image or a character […]. The term is grammatically 
flexible: one can simply ‘moe-ru’ (in the verb form), or feel ‘moe’ for something, while 
‘moe-elements’ (Azuma’s neologism) are attributes of the object” (Ibid., 129). These two 
declinations of the term moe are the two facets of a common post-Cold War consumer 
behaviour that otaku themselves during the Nineties' called chara-moe: ‘Independently 
and without relation to an original narrative, consumers in the 1990’s consumed 
fragmentary illustrations or settings’ (Ibid., 36) by strengthening empathy toward these 
fragments. Despite being coined inside the otaku culture, the term chara-moe refers to a 
vaster context that constitutes the emotional counterpart of computers and internet, and 
the way users tend to relate to the images assembled and diffused by information 
technologies, as Atmosphere does with video games (see above). In both cases, images 
with affective function replace images with representational or at least fictional purpose 
and such is a primary characteristic of the entire monitor phase. However, while 
atmosphere is reduced to the mono-functionality of consoles, to make playing a more 
efficient experience, chara-moe by referring to a purely consumerist behaviour is not 
reduced to any specific function or any final achievement. 
 
The moe-elements of virtual reality are also comparable to the close-up in expressionist 
cinema (analyzed in the previous subsection): they both eradicate every depth to highlight 
the affectional aspect of existence. However, also this comparison needs a clarification 
not to risk a mere reduction of the former to the latter term. While the close up is a means 
to express affection in absolute terms, a moe-element generates a certain affection that 
the viewer seeks in that specific computer image. By expressing a particular kind or a 
complex of emotions, a ‘superficial' (flat) image satisfies a need of the user, who cannot 





It follows that both interactive and solipsistic relationships occur between users and 
monitors: ‘their needs for [small] narratives are satisfied individually, in solitude and in 
absence of the other' (Ibid., 94). This means that affection stops being social, as images 
stop being representative: "today, emotional activities are being ‘processed' nonsocially, 
in solitude, and in an animalistic fashion" (Ibid.); the contemporary ‘human cannot satisfy 
a thirst for ‘meaning' through sociality, but rather satisfies it in solitude by reducing it to 
animalistic needs" (Ibid., 95). 
It can be stated that ‘the functions of moe-elements in otaku culture are not so different 
from those of Prozac or psychotropic drugs’ (Ibid., 94). 
 
6. Virtual and Actual 
The word virtual is extensively used nowadays to designate something non-physical, in 
other worlds without any spatial extension, but appearing as concretely existing due to a 
software. However, the origin of this term dates to the invention of first computers and 
the internet by the military. It finds explicitly its first recurrent use with Henri Bergson's 
philosophy, inspiring roughly half century later Gilles Deleuze's thought. In fact, it is 
Bergson ‘who develops the notion of the virtual to its highest degree and bases a whole 
philosophy of memory and life on it’ (Deleuze, 1998, 43). 
 
Both Bergson and Deleuze developed the term ‘virtual’ in opposition to the term ‘actual’, 
instead of the classic distinctions between imaginary and reality, ideal and real or possible 
and real. It is a commonplace to oppose "the virtual and the real: […] this terminology 
must be corrected. The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is 
fully real in so far as it is virtual. […] ‘Real without being actual, ideal without being 
abstract’; and symbolic without being fictional. Indeed, the virtual must be defined as 
strictly a part of the real object– as though the object had one part of itself in the virtual 
into which it plunged as though into an objective dimension. […] The reality of the virtual 
consists of the differential elements along with singular points which correspond to them. 
The reality of the virtual is structure. We must avoid giving the elements and relations 
which form a structure an actuality which they do not have, and withdrawing from them 
a reality which they have. […] a double process of reciprocal determination and complete 
determination [defines] that reality: far from being undetermined, the virtual is 
completely determined. When it is claimed that works of art are immersed in a virtuality, 
what is being invoked is not some confused determination but the completely determined 
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structure formed by its genetic differential elements, its ‘virtual’ or ’embryonic’ 
elements’” (Deleuze, 2014,  272). 
 
Moreover, the virtual is not to be confused with the possible, as already hinted. Firstly, 
"The possible is opposed to the real; the process undergone by the possible is therefore a 
‘realization'. By contrast, the virtual is not opposed to the real; it possesses a full reality 
by itself. The process it undergoes is that of actualization" (Ibid., 275), or in other words 
resolution or integration. Possibility anticipates and thus produces what exists (reality) by 
being ‘the negative determined by the concept: either the limitation imposed by possibles 
upon each other to be realised, or the opposition of the possible to the reality of the real. 
The virtual, by contrast, is the characteristic state of Ideas: it is by its reality that existence 
is produced, in accordance with a time and a space immanent in the Idea' (Ibid.). 
Otherwise, a possible assumes a particular space and time only through its realization. 
 
“Secondly, the possible and the virtual are further distinguished by the fact that 
one refers to the form of identity in the concept, whereas the other designates a 
pure multiplicity in the Idea which radically excludes the identical as a prior 
condition. Finally, to the extent that the possible is open to ‘realization’, it is 
understood as an image of the real, while the real is supposed to resemble the 
possible. That is why it is difficult to understand what existence adds to the 
concept when all it does is double like with like. […] The actualization of the 
virtual, on the contrary, always takes place by difference, divergence or 
differentiation. […] [It] is always a genuine creation. It does not result from any 
limitation of a pre-existing possibility” (Ibid., 275-276). 
 
Bergson and Deleuze also replace and correct the two Aristotelian antithetic terms 
potency and act, by rejecting ‘the concept of possibility' (Deleuze, 1998, 43). By doing 
so, these thinkers liberate the term virtual from its original medieval-Latin etymology 
virtualis, coined by Scholastics (whose main inspiration was a Christian interpretation of 
the texts of Aristotle) as a synonym for potential (possibility).  In his journal article 
Virtuous War/Virtual Theory argues: 
‘Unlike the Aristotelian conception of the virtual as potential (dynamic), the virtual now 
has a constitutive capacity of its own, creative of rather than dependent upon the 
actual’(Der Derian (2000, 784). 
 
As already mentioned during the Twentieth Century the ontological difference between 
images and things has been gradually overcome, and thus the separation between 
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conscience and world that was fundamental for the all lens phase, including both idealism 
(Descartes) and empiricism (Locke). Already with cinema and TV (see above), reality is 
reunified under the hyperreal regime and the end of representation (the adequate 
correspondence between an image and an object).  However, such new conception is not 
just anticipating a technological enhancement (the birth of virtual worlds) or a significant 
social change (Baudrillard's account of simulacrum and postmodern society). 
 
The Deleuzian view prefigures the hyperreality so dismally described by Jean Baudrillard 
as a pervading characteristic of the post-Cold War globalized world, whereby the sphere 
of things and the sphere of data/images have merged in one single reality. Furthermore, 
since the 2000's reality, or rather actuality, including individuals and society, have 
become highly dependent on the Internet and thus on the virtual. For instance, finance, 
communication, information, amusement, services, and mass transit operate through the 
Internet and computers; many of their circulations and transactions occur via the Web. 
 
Der Derian gives few concrete examples of the ‘prophetic power of the virtual’ (Ibid., 
785) (in a broad sense) on actuality, considering 
“a single day in the New York Times. An Op-Ed piece by the economist Paul 
Krugman invokes the Wall Street crash of 1987 (which was virtually and literally 
programmed by computer trading) to demonstrate how the economic crisis in Asia 
and Russia will cease to be a 'real-economy non-event' and could be transformed 
into a global slump should the private sector succumb to 'a self-fulfilling 
pessimism'. After the movie Wag the dog became the virtual standard by which 
President Clinton's foreign policy was framed, it is no surprise that in another 
article, this one on President Clinton's trip to Russia, former Secretary of State 
Lawrence Eagleberger said ‘the trouble Clinton is going to have...is that we talk 
so much about him weakened that it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy’. […] The 
front page carried a story on Audrey Santo, a girl from Worcester, Massachusetts, 
‘inert and unspeaking' for 11 of her 14 years because of an accident, who is 
believed by thousands to have miraculous healing powers after blood appeared 
four times in her presence on the eucharistic hosts, the virtual body of Christ’” 
(Ibid.). 
 
Conclusively, ‘In the case of most forms of contemporary culture, the real and the virtual 
express a vital tension—not merely that the virtual/simulated is a faux version of the 
real/original, but that the two are engaged in a dialogic process with one another’ 
(Huntemann, 2010, 76). As a result, the relationship virtual/actual – already growing 
through the screen phase and blossomed with the monitor phase of computers, video 
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games and smartphone - completely subverts the Platonic reflective relationship of the 
two-world view central for the mirror phase (see above). 
 
 
7. Virtuality, Warfare, and Speed 
The French urbanist and cultural theorist Paul Virilio  has underlined how the 
virtualization of reality corresponds to the dissolution of matter. By applying his insights 
on virtuality specifically to warfare, Virilio argues that ‘video games, as part of the 
hegemony of new technology' (Ibid., 96)  reduce ‘our consumption or understanding or 
vision of battle […] to a series of images on screen, demarcating further the ambiguous 
division between the virtual (warfare) and the real (warfare)' (Ibid.). Such reduction 
happens by virtue of the simulative nature of computer games. They indeed replicate 
someone else's actions without the usual consequences that a real situation would bring 
along with it. As in any simulation, and as already expressed by Baudrillard, truth is just 
cast away from such experience. A sentiment reiterated by Virilio; truth never occurs 
when speed is involved, since it operates exclusively on appearances. 
 
It is necessary to compare the character of electronic games with the action of driving a 
car to understand this point. Both experiences require a state of isolation and the 
bracketing of the three-dimensional environment that physically surrounds us. There is 
no direct haptic and effective relationship with the outside space, both as an actual space 
when driving and a virtual space when playing. What is necessary to increase this ‘distant 
immersion' is the constant presence, development, and enhancement of comfort: ‘Comfort 
is nothing other than a collection of ruses that aim to erase these infinitesimal 
inconveniences which are, however, themselves the proof of the existence of weight, 
scale, and a natural motility' (Virilio, 2007, 55) 
 
In fact, regarding the car journey (which could be doubtlessly extended to a computer 
game), Virilio defines it as a dromoscopic simulation. Dromoscopy, which semantically 
refers to the Greek dromos, ‘race’, is the visual and perceptive regime that has nowadays 
been replaced by the modern perspective. The observer is always in motion, and the 
background shifts toward him/her. ‘The vanishing point becomes a point of attack 
sending forth its lines of projection onto the voyeur-voyager, the objective of the 
continuum becomes a focal point that casts its rays on the dazzled observer, fascinated by 
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the progression of landscapes. The generative axis of an apparent movement materializes 
suddenly through the speed of the machine, but this concretization is totally relative to 
the moment, for the object that hurls itself upon the layer of the windscreen will also be 
as quickly forgotten as perceived, stored away in the prop room, it will soon disappear in 
the rear window’ (Ibid., 105). Therefore, driving a car shares with videogames a quite 
similar visual experience, which completely differs from watching movies. Even though 
Cinema generated the first images directly traversed by movement (see above), only the 
former two can achieve an aesthetic not only based on the experience of a spectator, but 
where the driver/player is simultaneously actor and spectator. For instance, game theorists 
have compared the character, the avatar a player personifies (see above), to a vehicle: we 
execute and control its movements by analogical devices (either joystick or mouse and 
keyboard) when we steer the wheel or press down brake, clutch or accelerator. Virilio 
reiterates this concept by reversing the terms of the comparison: “the driver's seat of the 
automobile is only a simulator of landscapes, elsewhere, in certain supersonic vectors, 
direct sighting of the surroundings is often abandoned to be replaced by electronic images 
of the 'flight synthesizers'” (Ibid., 107). Therefore, from the driver's point of view ‘the 
world becomes a video game, a game of transparency and transpiercing that the director 
[metteur en scène] drives as he sets off on the route [de la mise en route]’ (Ibid.). 
Moreover, ‘the ability to control is identified with the ability to move, that is with the 
driving test’ (Ibid.). In both these kinds of dromoscopic simulations figures and images 
are reduced to their retinal persistence, impressions of movement, ‘time lag (the imprint 
of the image on the retina)' (Virilio, 1994, 75) where the light of speed plays a 
fundamental role. 
 
The optics developed in parallel to computer science are based on movement and speed, 
whereas the Greek-Roman Euclidian optics corresponded to a fixed geometry (see 
above). As a result, light becomes light of speed, whereas during classical antiquity and 
the Middle Ages, light was understood either as lumen, a perfect linear form existing 
‘whether perceived by the human eye or not’ (Jay, 1994, 29), or as lux, ‘the actual 
experience of human sight’ (Ibid., 29). 
 
Light of speed is the light produced by movement: ‘what we see in the visual field is such 
thanks to the mediation of the phenomena of acceleration and deceleration in all points 
identifiable with variable intensities of illumination. If speed is light, all the light of the 
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world, then what is visible derives both from what moves and the appearances of 
momentary transparencies and illusions’ (Virilio, 2007, 118). 
The term light of speed was coined by Virilio to explain how after the invention of 
vehicles and cinematic projection, it is movement that allows us to observe the world and 
not natural light to distinguish figures/images: ‘it is speed more than light which allows 
us to see’ (Virilio, 1994, 74). Our entire technological apparatus based on telematics 
strictly depends on this very concept. A perfect example of it is ‘the interface of the live 
television screen or the computer monitor’ (Ibid., 72), where the continual acceleration 
and deceleration of the energy conducted through the electronic circuit allows the 
movement of the pixels and hence the transmission of images. 
While transportation still relies on the spatial notion of distance, because it still requires 
a physical movement, a certain period to travel a specific portion of territory, 
communication technologies need such imperceptible and microscopic movements to 
broadcast and transmit images and information that time is the only variable. ‘Speed is 
no longer particularly useful, as we once thought, in displacement or transportation, if 
speed serves primarily to see, to conceive the reality of the facts' (Ibid., 72). Henceforth, 
distances are overcome by their total compression. 
In more political terms, while driving an automobile exemplifies the centrality of 
enhanced transportation, video games correspond to the information revolution at the turn 
of the last century. Such a shift reflects how in a globalized society time assumes the 
shape of speed and acceleration, while modernity had configured it as progress, in other 
words as the wealth of knowledge achieved (Leibniz and Kant). 
 
The logic of acceleration ‘determines the structural and cultural evolution of modern 
society’ (Rosa, 2013, 279) as remarked by German sociologist Hartmut Rosa in his Social 
Acceleration; so much so that globalization was fully achieved once the ‘foundational 
space-time regime’ (Ibid., 252) of Western societies changed drastically. Such 
transformation corresponds to: 
“[the] confluence of three historical developments around 1989: the political 
revolution of those years, the collapse of East Germany and the Soviet and the 
political and economic opening up of East European states; the digital revolution 
[…], which widened shortly thereafter into a mobile revolution that enabled 
microelectronic communicative availability unbound by location; and finally, the 
economic revolution of flexible accumulation or post-Fordist just-in-time 




These three revolutions might all be considered as parallel interconnected ‘accelerative 
moments’ (Ibid.) reinforcing one another in a virtuous circle - this means that Rosa does 
not assign any priority to technological and military developments as Virilio otherwise 
does. 
The circulation of ideas, information, sources, and people assumes an openness, absence 
of resistance and an instantaneousness never experienced before because of this three-
directional mutation of the world. Modernity is also a phenomenon of acceleration: the 
invention of print signs a new speed for information exchange that changed every other 
aspect of life, society, and culture. The revolution of transportation at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, when trains and automobiles drastically replaced horses and carts, 
constitutes another step forward in the field of speed, which once again shook every other 
dominion. However, what makes the late modernity of global capitalism so unique is the 
absence of ‘any time delay, without large costs of friction losses' (Ibid., 255), in other 
words, by the realization of an unlimited acceleration. The latter is so revolutionary 
because it signals the crisis of clock time in favour of a timeless time that replaces 
historical duration with post-historical scattered simultaneities, and the crisis of the space 
of place in favour of the space of flows of the rhizome (see above). The consequent 
circulatory and instantaneous movements that end up permeating global capitalism 
support and are supported by the supremacy of financials speculations over labor and of 
services over products: 
"Capital can move […] ‘timelessly' across the entire earth, while the mobility of workers 
and their ability to accelerate and become more flexible remain very limited" (Ibid., 259). 
As a result, the intromission of politics is so debunked that many scholars had diagnosed 
it as having ended: to accelerate the stream of capital and information that both defines 
and is required by our societal norms, deliberations and decisions must be reduced to a 
minimum, or they will constitute a consistence resistance, a limitation for speed. In fact, 
for global powers ‘to be free to flow, the world must be free of fences, barriers, fortified 
borders and checkpoints. Any dense and tight network of social bonds, and particularly a 
territorially rooted tight network, is an obstacle to be cleared out of the way' (Bauman, 
2015,  14). 
 
The result of this continuous acceleration of our society is the reduction of the entire 
planet to a compressed, non-differentiated singularity, a massive ultrasonic vehicle, a 
gigantic dromoscopic simulation, where speed, by means of its aesthetic of 
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disappearance, and through the mechanism of comfort has made the experience of truth 
impossible, unless an incident, a catastrophe occurs. 
Crash becomes the only moment of lucidity, which might free drivers and passengers 
from the hallucinating relaxation of travel, as expressed by Virilio himself. Only then, the 
simulation is immediately interrupted, and all the most determinant aspects of our society 
collide firstly truth, death, and speed; secondarily bodies and machines. In the same 
fashion, the ‘unlimited acceleration’ (Rosa, 2013, 254) of late capitalism requires 
moments of deceleration to avoid incidents that might have disastrous effects on 
individuals, cultures, and environment: ‘the time-horizon set by Wall Street simply 
cannot accommodate to the temporalities of social and ecological reproduction systems 
in a responsive way’. (Harvey, 2000, 59). 
Even though dominated by instantaneity, globalization generates a multitude of 
temporalities each based on different degrees of speed. For example, movement of 
material sources and people need more time than the movement of information and 
capital. Nature and culture, even though invested nowadays by unusual pressures, follow 
a much slower pace than technology does. Due to such fragmentation of our globalized 
reality into several time regimes, duration ceases to exist. It means there is no more 
history, a unique progressive temporal frame following a unique project and a specific 
rhythm (a constant speed without acceleration and deceleration) to which individuals and 
societies must acquiesce. Therefore, there are different instantaneous ‘presents', each one 
with its daily accelerations and decelerations, desynchronized one from another yet 
conflicting. It might occur that a slower dominion is not able to keep the pace of the 
leading one, the fastest dominion(s)/power(s), which generally tries to overwhelm and 
conform the others to itself/themselves (by imposing a resynchronization). As already 
mentioned, politics is one of the spheres that has more difficulties in adapting to the 
unlimited acceleration of ‘the high speed world of financial markets' (Rosa 2013 301): 
‘Toward the end of the twentieth century the role of politics as a social pacesetter that 
was undisputed in classical modernity has been lost because the intrinsic temporality of 
the political is largely resistant to or incapable of acceleration’ (Ibid., 302). 
 
The events of a crash are once again evoked, namely, the resynchronization strongly 
requested by global capitalism with its drawbacks and responses: ‘here democracy is the 
key to the slowdown, because it consciously makes the exercise of power slow’ (Rosa, 
2013, 303). In fact, whether an accident might invest our dromoscopic (to use Virilio’s 
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expression) and ‘turbo-capitalist’ (to us Rosa’s definition) world in its attempt to propel 
itself by accelerating out of any limit, the only way to avoid such catastrophe would come 
from politics, from the ‘democratic side’ of our society. It is not by chance that “today 
‘progressives’ find themselves mostly on the side of deceleration […] because they 
advocate political control of the economy, process of democratic negotiation and 
protection of the environment, and local cultural particularities" (Ibid., 307-308). 
Therefore, politics does not set the pace ‘for social developments' (Ibid., 308) as it used 
to do during classical modernity. On the contrary, it has become a late-modern brake, in 
an age in which the dangers menacing the lives of everyone (concerning unlimited 
acceleration of economics, technology and warfare) have markedly increased in terms of 
power, area, and duration: 
‘The temporal range of our decisions seems to increase to the same extent that the time 
resources we need to make them disappear' (Ibid., 305). Moreover, the menaces of late 
modernity are also irreversible as old threats have never been. ‘Yet irreversible decisions 
require significantly more careful planning and information gathering and are therefore 
unavoidably more time intensive than reversible ones' (Ibid.). Genetics, nuclear plants, 
and arsenals, chemical emissions, environmental crises are just a few examples of 
powerful, long-term and irremediable risks brought about by the ‘compulsion to 
accelerate’ (Ibid., 309) that late capitalism both supports and embodies: 
‘At the beginning of the twentieth-first century, the semantics of progress that 
accompanied all earlier phases of modernization almost completely disappears behind the 
rhetoric of objective forces: technological and social changes are no longer pushed 
through in the name of progress; they are justified by a threatened loss of competitiveness. 
In this context growth and acceleration go completely unquestioned as the prescribed 
goals of societal development’ (Ibid.). 
The once highly political utopian concept of ‘progress’ has been dismissed in favour of 
an apolitical myopic autotomized development that will stop only after an irreparable 
accident. The purely strategic parameters of: economy, technology, and warfare, 
combined with the strict relationship they all have to acceleration, as their propellant, 
makes these three dominions the most valuable and determinant  of self-accelerating 
apparatus that globalization has become. It is on this note that it is possible to return to 




The entire technological apparatus that allows speed to achieve new levels is strictly 
entangled with warfare. In fact, every new enhancement is achieved once a conflict 
requires faster displacement of sources (both human and non-human), means and 
weapons to defeat the opponent. However, until the twentieth-century transport of goods, 
objects, material entities, in other words, the matter on a specific territory was still the 
primary aim of war. As already mentioned, a war was won by occupying territories, by 
penetrating through the enemy lines. Speed was then the means to achieve such a task. It 
is only in the last sixty years that warfare has focused on developing a faster technology; 
all occurring in a race that awards the most dynamic over the broadest nation. War is no 
more fought in the ‘field of space' but on ‘the field of time'. Every new grade of speed 
achieved corresponds to a conquest. As a result, politics completely mutates its status in 
favour of the apparatus overwhelming the individuals.  "The loss of material space brings 
to the government  nothing but time. […] speed would suddenly become a destiny, a form 
of progress, in other words, a ‘civilization' in which each speed would be something of a 
‘region' of time" (Virilio, 2006,  157) The considerable investment in vehicles and 
machine guns at the turn of the twentieth century is one of the first examples of such a 
change in the logic of warfare. World War I was still relying on territorial conquest. 
However, the physical occupation of the enemy's space became less important than  
wearing the enemy down, where coordination, internal transportation of soldiers, 
weapons and other necessary resources played a pivotal role. The faster the replacement 
of one's line went the faster the enemy capitulated. A higher deployment of the air force 
and tanks corresponds to another conquest of time that occurred during World War II. 
The almost instantaneous defeat of the French army, which was still mostly dependent on 
machine guns and trenches, by the Germans whose military Blitzkrieg tactics mostly 
based on a focalized and considerable movement of the faster-mechanized infantry, 
demonstrates further how war, from the nineteenth century on, had speed as its primary 
aim. Moreover, nuclear arsenal constitutes another conquest on the ‘field of time', where 
the actual use is not even needed to show power, only its very possession. As a result, 
space becomes even less relevant to define the strength of a nation. Finally, the 
information revolution started at the end of the last century represents the last speed 
achieved, the last battle won, where the country with the most efficient, and thus pervasive 




Dromocracy is the name coined by Virilio to define a society such as ours, where he who 
optains speed also optains power. In fact, he argues that those who control power are the 
groups that have the most direct relationship with speed, like armies and automotive 
industries, even though the latter has recently surrendered to communication 
technologies, which, in fact, tend toward time zero compared to the much slower vehicles. 
 
Speed has become a fundamental value forging the post-Cold War society, technology, 
entertainment and military industry, tying all them up. In this regard, virtuality is the best 
current embodiment of such dromoscopic apparatus we live in, since: 
- The mechanics of computer and current TV screens have speed as their essential 
feature, without which no images, no light would appear; 
- Hyperconnected virtual realities achieve the time zero, thanks to instantaneous 
communications, in an era that aims to the limit of speed, the highest acceleration 
possible, which is the speed of light, where matter is exterminated in favour of 
pure energy. 
 
According to Virilio, the violence of speed exterminates space, matter and decision-
making skills. It is ‘unsuspected violence produced by the vehicle, this celerity that tears 
us away so abruptly from the places travelled through and in which we abandon ourselves 
in shared transport' (Virilio, 2007, 42). As the last step in the technological enhancement 
of speed, virtuality even intensifies the effects of these three exterminations: 
- It is the result of the compression of territory employing instantaneous movement 
of information from and to every place whatsoever, without any physical 
localization. It is, in fact, accessible everywhere at the same time (time zero). 
It allows the creation of a space that can be inhabited by everyone despite one’s actual 
position on the earth. Virtual space compresses actual space at its limits. 
- The synthetic image that constitutes it “is merely a 'statistical image' that can only 
emerge thanks to rapid calculation of the pixels a computer graphics system can 
display on a screen. To decode each individual pixel, the pixels immediately 
surrounding it must be analysed” (Virilio, 1994, 75). Therefore, the virtual world 
does not feature any real, tangible material entities, but just light on monitors. All 
the discrete elements present have no consistency; they are just visual 
hallucinations, products, ‘emanations’ of algorithms. 
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- Any virtual world, as any video game, reduces the player to a mere executor of 
default tasks, whereby the only liberty he or she has only affects how to proceed. 
In its entertaining version (computer games), the technological apparatus of 
today's society thus tests their ‘consumers' from the capability of better executing 
these pre-set objectives. Therefore, competition does not measure creativity, 
meaning generation, imagination, but only performance. Speed and coordination 
are the only elements to possess a pivotal role in players' victory. As already 
noticed, strength, volumes, masses are illusory characteristics of a video game; 
they are merely architectonic elements that do not affect one's performance, but 
only one's immersion. They only function as both landscape and comfort device 
for the actions of the player on the vehicle/avatar (or playable character). 
 
C. SMARTPHONES 
1. Smartphone as Similar to Mobile Phone 
At their outset - the first Motorola dates to 1979, yet despite cell phones spreading around 
the globe at the turn of the century - smartphones were just mobile phones and not yet 
mobile handheld computers. They performed limited visual elements, as such as texts and 
few images with very low graphics. In fact, mobile phones were initially produced just as 
a more effective and faster way to communicate than a fixed phone: from then on people 
could chat with one another when and where they wanted. Therefore, mobile phones still 
favoured hearing over any other sense, whereas contact was restricted to dialling numbers 
on a tiny keyboard. However, they already affected our conceptual, emotional and 
perceptual spheres in two main ways, which would continue under their successors, i.e. 
smartphones. The focus then being on their shared characteristics: size, having wireless, 
constant connection to the internet and the communicative function. 
 
The first feature of mobile phones - and later smartphones even more effectively – is pure 
nomadism, complete because both virtual and physical. With regard to both mobile 
phones and smartphones, they have ultimately virtualized our notion of proximity and 
distance, whereby ‘proximity no longer requires physical closeness […] [and] physical 
closeness no longer determines proximity’ (Bauman, 2003, 62). For what concerns virtual 
proximity, ‘facility of electronic connection’ (Ibid, 61) has not made travel redundant as 
otherwise predicted at its outset. “If anything, the advent of electronically assured out-of-
placeless makes travel safer, less risky and off-putting, than ever before […]. Cell phones 
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signal, materially and symbolically, the ultimate liberation from place. Being near to a 
socket is no longer a condition of ‘staying connected’” (Ibid., 61). For what concerns 
virtual distance, it corresponds to ‘suspension, perhaps even cancellation, of anything that 
made topographical closeness into proximity’ (Ibid., 62). 
 
Such virtualization of both proximity and distance also affects human relationships. In 
fact, the ‘advent of virtual proximity renders human connection simultaneously more 
frequent and more shallow, more intense and more brief. Connections tend to be too 
shallow and brief to condense into bonds. […] Contacts require less time to be entered 
and less effort to be broken. Distance is no obstacle to getting in touch – but getting in 
touch is no obstacle to staying apart. […] Virtual proximity can be […] finished with 
nothing less than the press of a button’ (Ibid.). 
This increasingly overwhelming presence of virtual proximity in our lives has set the 
pattern for every proximity. In other words, the ‘more human attention and learning effort 
is absorbed by the virtual variety of proximity, the less time is dedicated to the acquisition 
and exercise of skills which the other, non-virtual kind of proximity requires. […] Once 
entered, the passage from non-virtual to virtual proximity acquires its own momentum. It 
looks self-perpetuating; it is also self-accelerating’ (Ibid., 64-65). 
 
Smartphones, by virtue of being mobile handheld computers and not merely phones have 
enhanced the coexistence of virtual and physical nomadism already featured by mobile 
phones - ‘Mobiles are for people on the move' (Ibid., 59) -, which were otherwise more 
like telephones, even though wireless and mobile. Desktop PCs (personal computers) 
embody both virtual nomadism and a hypertrophic form of sedentism. With the 
production and increased distribution of laptops, this initial situation of computers shifted 
to seminomadic hardware. In fact, this kind of PC can be transported everywhere - by 
including already a rechargeable battery, a display, and a keyboard. However, it still 
requires physical support as such as a desk to be used comfortably, and its size makes it 
still too heavy for efficient and fast transportation. As mentioned above, the mobile phone 
and even more the smartphone achieves pure nomadism, both virtually and physically: 
‘Mobiles are for people on the move' (Ibid.). Their weight and size are minimal. No 
external elements (as such as the mouse) are required. The softness of this little hardware 
also increases the level of connectivity at his maximum degree: one can stay intensively 
connected at all time because this tool can follow her or him in every place; it can be used 
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everywhere without any support needed. "You would go nowhere without your mobile 
(‘nowhere' is, indeed, the space without a mobile, with a mobile out of range, or a mobile 
with a flat battery). And once you are with your mobile, you are never out or away. You 
are always in – but never locked up in one place" (Ibid.). 
 
The second feature is what the Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman named in Liquid Love 
(2003) the swarm. He argues that once connected through our mobile phones we all 
become part of a swarm: a ‘crowd of stands-out […]. An aggregate of self-propelled 
individuals who need no commanding officer […] to keep it together. A mobile aggregate 
in which each mobile unit does the same, but nothing is done jointly. Units march in step 
without falling in line. The true-to-form crowd expels the units that stand out, or tramples 
over them – but it is only such units that the swarm tolerates' (Bauman, 2003, 60). What 
Bauman also underlines is that this swarm-like aggregate is not the social product of a 
new generation of non-fixed, wireless telephones; but they were already in development 
in our liquid, post-industrial society since the Nineties. ‘Mobile telephones did not create 
the swarm, though they no doubt help to keep it as it is – as a swarm. The swarm was 
waiting for the [mobiles] […] to serve it. Were there no swarm, of what use would the 
mobiles be?' (Ibid., 60). The social sphere was already developing into an aggregate (the 
swarm) of units (the individuals) before the global production and purchase of mobile 
phones and because of an increasing individualization. As the swarm replaces (even if 
with small changes) the Nineteenth century-screen mass (see above), so the individuals 
forming the swarm replace the modern-lens subjects and the spectators of screens. 
 
As previously mentioned regarding agency in video games (see above), nowadays we do 
not deal with subjectivity anymore, and thus neither with objectivity, controller and 
control, res cogitans and res extensa, in other worlds with substantial and ontological 
notions; but with practical concepts (as such as agency), which thus refers to action. 
Individuality itself is neither a status in which we are born, as on the contrary is 
subjectivity - and the notion of personhood too, with its strong Christian connotation. It 
is a process, whereby one  must become what he/she is: "‘individualization' consists of 
transforming human ‘identity' from a ‘given' into a ‘task' and charging the actors with the 
responsibility for performing that task and for the consequences […] of their performance' 
(Bauman, 2015, 31-32). For instance, at the end of twentieth century, ‘compulsive and 
obligatory self-determination' (Ibid., 32) has replaced ‘the heteronymic determination of 
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social standing' (Ibid.). Similarly, the individual has replaced the citizen, the primary 
reference of all modernity since the creation of the idea of the social contract by 
philosophers as such as Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau. 
 
In the modern age, the weakening of territorial communities caused by the phenomena of 
exploration and colonization required the development of a new form of aggregation 
based on the recently formed ‘unencumbered’ subject (whose definition is universal and 
not relegated to a specific context). Such aggregation corresponds to the modern notion 
of society, and it is to it that is possible to rename the philosophical notion of subject into 
the political one of citizen. "The ‘citizen' is a person inclined to seek her or his own 
welfare through the well-being of the city" (Ibid., 36) or the society. At the turn of the 
last century, ‘the corrosion and slow disintegration of citizenship' (Ibid.) occurred in 
favour of an extended and unlimited individualization. In contrast to the citizen, "the 
individual tends to be lukewarm, sceptical or wary about ‘common cause', ‘common 
good', ‘good society' or ‘just society'" (Ibid.). As stated above, these units aggregate into 
the swarm instead of the society, whereby "‘We' has become ‘nothing more than an 
aggregate of I's, and the aggregate is […] nothing greater than the sum of its parts" (Ibid., 
65). 
 
The etymology of the word ‘individual’ from the Latin individuus - which stands literally 
for ‘not divisible' - explains its association to an indissoluble unit; a unit that is thus 
isolated from the others by virtue of this very monadic connotation of its etymology &  
definition. Under the monitor phase, the unity and consequent isolation that constitutes 
the individual, even by definition, substitutes the unity and consequent isolation of society 
from other spheres (mostly nature). Moreover, individualization does corrode not only 
society - which is already a form of totality - but also any belief in a primordial or final 
totality. In this respect, Bauman argues: ‘Abandon all hope of totality […] you who enter 
the world of fluid modernity’ (Ibid., 22). The swarm also affects another important 
longstanding political institution: the family. ‘Mobiles would not stop mom nursing her 
mocha, nor the kids munching their muffins. But they would make avoiding each other’s 
eyes an unnecessary effort: eyes would by then have turned into blank walls anyway […]. 




As a result, what is left to represent the private realm is not anymore the family but the 
sole individual. Furthermore, the vanishing public realm is just a giant display ‘on which 
private worries are projected without ceasing to be private or acquiring new collective 
qualities in the course of magnification: public space is where public confession of private 
secrets and intimacies is made’ (Bauman, 2015, 39-40). 
 
This continuous display of individuality and individuals is not a sign of a dominating 
narcissism, as frequently stated in newspapers and TV programs. It is how individuality 
and individuals built themselves and their guidelines on a global scale. It is an instrument 
of reinforcement. As already stated above, while subjectivity (as personhood) does not 
need to be reinsured, it is not conceived as construction but as an ontological state, a fact, 
individuality is a process, a work on the self; in order words, it corresponds to self-
building even more than self-realization. There is not a mirror on which to reflect one's 
image, but a blank page on which to write or draw one's characteristics. 
The self-isolation and the solipsism of individualism are also all standard features of the 
monitor phase, the world that it constitutes and its technological instantiation (web, 
computers, video games and not only smartphones). As addressed in a previous 
subsection (see above), even affection and empathy have become solipsistic; they are felt 
no more toward other people but to images consumed on the web and using a PC. It 
follows that not only the social contract but also feeling has stopped being essential to the 
foundation of society. It is as if all the great social project of Rousseau had fallen apart, 
both regarding the social contract and empathy, agape. ‘It is unnecessary to cite Rousseau 
to point out that empathy was once considered a basic element of society’ (Azuma, 2009, 
94). Both the race for self-realization and a solipsist affection directed toward virtual have 
contributed to the formation of the social network, mostly through the mediation of the 
smartphone. 
 
2. Social Networking Sites 
Despite all its recent enhancements and its multifunctionality, - which will be the focus 
of the next subsection - the smartphone keeps being primarily ‘a device for social 
interaction and communication' (Sotamaa &  Karppi, 2010, 123). That is, in fact, its 
original function: texts and calls. This feature has made it the perfect platform for the 
development of social networking sites, or SNS. The production of mobile phones and 
then of smartphones is what effectively brings sociality into the monitor phase even more 
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intensively than the Internet. As previously addressed, through the computer and the web, 
the social (and not society) becomes the platform through which to exchange images and 
information amongst each other without the involvement of any interpersonal emotion. 
Moreover, through the mobile phone, sociality does not correspond anymore with society, 
but otherwise with the swarm, an aggregate of isolated individuals that only experience 
shallow intense and short relationships. Social networks bring the swarm to a further step, 
by combining the social characteristics of the internet and the computer (voracious 
exchange of information and images) with the flat, fast and concentrated sociality of the 
mobile phone. It is not by chance that its central platform of development and use is the 
smartphone, both a miniaturized computer and an enhanced version of a mobile phone. 
 
Online communities were nothing more than an early version of social networking 
already present in the Nineties, due to the then great spread of the Internet. However, it is 
only in 2009, when Facebook (launched in 2004) became the most massive social 
networking site in the world that ‘social media' (a term introduced that same year) 
achieved an impactful worldwide status. At its outset, Facebook was just a Harvard social 
networking site that afterward quickly expanded to others. Other honourable mentions of 
S.N.S are WhatsApp, Pinterest, Twitter, LinkedIn, Skype and Instagram. Since 2009, 
social media have assumed increasing prominence in every sphere, mostly in politics. 
Trump's constant use of Twitter as means of power is just the most visible and transversal 
case. This tendency is also diffused in somewhat local context, as such as Italy, where the 
ex-prime minister Matteo Renzi used, and still uses twitter to influence electors, give his 
perspective on particular events or political situations in a fast and sharp manner. This 
phenomenon highlights once again the increasing invasion of the private into the public. 
Moreover, the new-born Italian political party ‘Cinque Stelle’, mostly composed of 
relatively young members, has assumed the web as a symbol for their idea of virtual direct 
democracy and of their internal organization, in which, as stated by their most abused 
motto, ‘one counts as one'. To apply this conception of politics concretely, Cinque Stelle 
employs extensive use of the web (e.g., blogs, social networks) for political discussion 
and votes of the representatives. 
 
Social media has also spread enhanced modalities for internet dating, fulfilling the 
prediction of Zygmunt Bauman from 2003: ‘As the generation weaned on the net enters 
its prime dating years, internet dating is really taking off. And it’s not a last resort. It’s a 
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recreational activity’ (Bauman, 2003, 65). For instance, only in the last years the usage 
of this kind of SNS has become socially accepted and has stopped being treated with 
shame or as a taboo; mostly due to the ludic and voyeuristic attitude generations having 
grown up with mobile phones in their hands had toward dating applications as such as 
Tinder. 
“Besides, internet dating has advantages which personal encounters do not have: 
In the latter, the ice, once broken, may stay broken or melt once and for all – but 
it is totally different with internet dating. […] You can always press delete. […] 
[Therefore,] users of online dating facilities can date safely, secure in the 
knowledge that they can always return to the marketplace for another bout of 
shopping […] without fear of ‘real world’ repercussions” (Ibid.). 
 
Tinder and many other recent ‘hook up applications' even intensify the treatment of 
relationship as choices on a shopping catalogue and as purely rational contractual 
agreements. Specifically, on Tinder, users can label other users' profile (including their 
pictures and a short bio) as ‘like' by swiping right, or ‘dislike' by swiping left; then, the 
chat can start only if both parties have swiped right on each other. After that, it is up to 
them whether to hang out or not. As a result, individuals have their constitutive isolation 
and unity safeguarded by their trustworthy smartphones. 
However, as it occurs with the swarm (see above), also electronic dating has prospered 
as by being supported by a favourable pre-existing social condition, and not vice versa. 
For instance, "internet dating would hardly have succeeded on its own unless it had been 
aided and abetted by the removal of full-time engagement, commitment and the obligation 
‘of being there for you whenever you need me' from the list of the necessary conditions 
of partnership" (Ibid., 66). 
 
Through social networking sites, smartphones also bring the affective character of 
monitor images to a further step: from the atmosphere of video games (see above), 
passing through the moe-elements of computer database and the Internet (see above), 
ending with the emojis of these handheld mobile computers. The atmosphere is meant to 
immerse the player in the game, the chara-moe to generate solipsistic empathy toward an 
image, while the emoji otherwise epitomizes the grade zero of communication. As chara-
moe, the term ‘emoji' was coined in Japan, but without referring at all to the English 
‘emotion' – as it might otherwise seem. This Japanese word initially means pictograph, 
from e (picture) and Moji (character). For instance, the first diffusion of emojis occurred 
in 1999 on Japanese mobile phones. However, it is only within the last decade – the 2010's 
152 
 
– that emojis have been added worldwide to mobile phones, and after that smartphones, 
and become increasingly popular around the globe. 
Their development was antedated by emoticons, which are text-based symbolical 
representations of facial expressions. Emoticons started being used worldwide on SMS 
(texts on mobile phones) and emails only in the Nineties, along with Internet and mobile 
phones, despite their origin dates to the early Eighties. 
 
Both emoticons earlier and emojis later are meant to communicate emotions 
straightforwardly and quickly, feelings and other affective states. However, such 
immediacy, such a literal absence of mediation that those images manifest, makes them 
what they are supposed to symbolize. To this extent, emojis are nothing more than 
affection-images, which by no chance entirely coincide with facial expressions (see 
above). Besides, the affection that should be conveyed through one of these images is 
finally re-directed toward those same pics. To this extent, emojis are nothing more than 
moe-elements (see above). Finally, the usage of emojis within a virtual context (might it 
be an SNS, a chat or a forum) often implies and requires a comic and ironic undertone or 
at least a light-hearted attitude from the user, although applied to anger, sadness, anxiety 
and any other ‘not joyful' face expression/emotion. Therefore, the use of emojis 
corresponds very often to both distance from one’s own emotion, in order words, the 
tendency toward simulating a certain emotion for the sake of amusement, and a fetishist 
treatment of emotions as primary data. Treating emotions as primary data means that they 
are losing their original ‘function’, their raison d'être, which is ‘to move' us, to make us 
act or at least reflect on what troubles us. Through their reduction to meaningless and 
self-referential images (in other words simulacra), emotions neither link people anymore 
nor help define a possible interiority (an attribute more proper to personhood than 
individuality). They instead become consumer goods at the disposal of unsatisfied, 
voracious and monadic individuals or an ephemeral reason for a short moment of 
aggregation, a momentary objective for the swarm. 
 
Photos are also affected by this reduction of images to ‘pollen for the swarm’, digital 
material that virtually circulates through social media from one smartphone to another, 
from one individual to another. This massive presence of pictures on our smartphones 
and then on social networks is the result of the extreme versatility of mobile handheld 
computers (even wider if compared with PCs’ multifunctionality), which include, in fact, 
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photo cameras too. Instagram is the most fitting example of how this implementation of 
the smartphone can be applied to social media: this web application is nothing more than 
a virtual social platform where to share pictures. Pinterest is another social network where 
users share pictures, but also any other kind of images, including videos, GIF (Graphics 
Interchange Format) images, and drawings; but herein are images catalogued and labelled 
after topics and ideas and not concerning who has shared them. All these social networks 
explicitly revolving around images demonstrate that social media do not concern 
socialization or the creation of a society, or sharing experiences, but only gathering and 
consuming data and images on a common platform. This hypertrophic circulation of 
images does not only affect the swarm and its movements, but also the units that form it. 
In other words, also the individuals tend to reduce themselves to images and share those 
same images on the social media. These images are the selfies. 
 
Selfies are the most peculiar and representative typology of smartphones pictures 
circulating through social networks because they were born on these very platforms. 
Besides, they are the tools most commonly used by individualism to show off their 
presence in the swarm of social media. This kind of pictures have utterly replaced mirrors 
for what concerns the way one physically interrelates with him/herself; by doing so, they 
have also utterly changed the meaning of ‘reflection'. In fact, once selfies replace the 
mirror as the concrete and original model for the construction of the self-image (see 
above), so the concept of selfhood is also utterly reframed. 
 
 
As illustrated in the Part I, the myth of Narcissus implies only the relation between 
Narcissus and his reflection. In Ovid's version, ‘Narcissus […] is Narcissus and not the 
archetypal narcissist. His story is more revealing in terms of Ovid's literary intent […] 
than it is in terms of psychological generalizations and theory' (Galinsky, 1975, 49) A 
‘one-sided psychological extrapolation would result in only a partial recognition of Ovid's 
intentions. […] Ovid's interest in this story is not the psychopathology of Narcissus, but 
the paradox of Narcissus' (Ibid, 52). In other words, narcissism does not directly refer to 
Narcissus, but it instead deforms this mythical character to fit him into the denotation of 
a personality disorder, as is the Oedipus complex a Freudian extrapolation from the myth 
of Oedipus to a psychoanalytical diagnosis. For instance, narcissism is a term introduced 
by Sigmund Freud himself in his essay On Narcissism of 1914. 
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As mentioned in Part I, the myth of Narcissus was also a philosophical warning against 
the attachment to material reality and an ethical warning against the detachment from 
one's community, without any psychological attribution. Therefore, narcissism is an 
inappropriate reference to his homonymous tale and then to the whole mirror phase. 
Moreover, once this term is applied to contemporary phenomena, such as selfies and 
social networks, the risk is to define them incorrectly as new forms of self-reflection and 
to reduce them as mere forms of excessive self-love. 
 
Selfies are not just self-reflection because, firstly, they do not follow all our movements 
while we also look at them. Secondly, we do not get lost in ourselves by looking at the 
smartphone camera; we just want to take a picture of ourselves, and not to keep it as a 
memory, or to look later at our own image in a particular context, but to share them 
eventually on Facebook or some other social network. Thirdly, the mirror implies a purely 
intimate relation with our image, a relation developed in private. On the contrary, by 
taking and then posting a selfie one seeks a public reaction (be it of approval or 
disapproval), despite the reason behind that gesture. Moreover, selfies are currently also 
group selfies, while the first selfies dating back to the early 2000's (even before the rise 
of social media) were much less in number and just of single individuals. Nowadays, even 
famous actors and politicians take selfies. An example of it is the highly criticized selfie 
taken by the former British Prime Minister James Cameron and former U.S President 
Barack Obama as a tribute to Nelson Mandela in 2013. Finally, every smartphone supplies 
the user with the availability of actively modifying his/her pictures between sharing on 
social networks, in contrast to the mere reproductive or at the most distortive capacity of 
mirrors' surfaces. In other words, smartphones modify exclusively and directly the image 
(produced by pictures or selfies), whereas mirrors (at least the mirrors with polished 
surfaces) are instruments for mere cosmetics, whereby the image (reflected) is only a 
support for one's exterior modifications of face/body. As a result, there is no double as 
with the mirror, a constant reciprocal reference between body and image, but just a 
reduction of everything, including oneself, to massively circulating images. 
 
The whole monitor phase and its interactive features do not just replace the self-reflection 
of mirrors with shared images. It also hinders the spectacle, core and central scopic regime 
of the screen phase. The smartphone contributes precisely to the decline of spectacle by 
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abolishing the strict division between audience and actors, passive and active, periphery 
and centre, due to its hyper-connectivity and its transversal virtual space. 
 
3. Smartphone as Different from Mobile Phone 
The swarm made from separate and isolated individuals, and ‘pure nomadism', with its 
switchable virtual proximity and virtual distance, are features developed by mobile 
phones and then transferred to smartphones by virtue of their standard physical (small 
size) and communicational properties. 
However, by moving from ‘traditional' mobile phones to smartphones during the last 
decade, we have passed from exclusively linguistic (both audio and textual) devices 
submitted to the sole communicational function to their implemented version including 
more prominently haptic and visual elements. It is as if the telephone had a drastic 
substantial change, becoming all of a sudden, a cutting-edge version of digital technology, 
and what this research defines as a monitor. Therefore, through smartphones (e.g., iPhone 
and Samsung), the monitor phase has not only reduced its size (already addressed 
concerning ‘complete nomadism') but also enhanced its multifunctionality, adding 
utilities even absent in PCs. Cameras constitute one of these new utilities, as already 
illustrated in the previous subsection (see above), along with implemented mobile games 
(which will be one of the main topics of the next subsection) and blood pressure 
applications to track regularly one's own pulse (as such as ‘Instant Heart Rate'). 
 
It is with the implementation of touch screens into smartphones that both phones and 
computer industry undergo a revolutionary change, and that the ‘glassy technology’ 
reappears in a new form. The haptic relationship that characterizes the monitor phase and 
distinguishes it from any other ‘vitreous kind’ of devices finds in the so-called Touch 
Screen its current most advance enhacement16. It also finds its, more representative and 
comfortable application in smartphones, despite its extension to different forms of 
portable computers as such as iPads (in other words a hybrid between an iPhone and a 
                                                            
16 In this subsection, the term ‘touch screen’ has been left unchanged from its original 
nomenclature despite the very different and specific meaning herein given for explanatory 
reasons to the words ‘screen’ and ‘monitor’. In fact, within this context the term ‘touch monitor’ 
would have been more accurate. However, for sake of understanding the term touch screen will 
be kept in its original form. In fact, a widespread definition recurring in every language would 





computer) and last generations of laptops. The touchscreen reduces, even further the 
distance between vitreous devices and ourselves. In fact, while computer and console 
games need a controller, an external element, to create a first active interaction, with the 
touch screen the relationship with the monitor, and more generally with technology 
reaches an even closer degree of proximity. In this context, the haptic relationship 
happens on a new direct level; sight and touch (and even sound, if activated) achieve full 
coordination. Finally, to make this possible the monitor assumes new technological 
features. Swiping applications, as such as the already mentioned dating app Tinder, and 
mobile games for what concerns some of their features, are just an example of the 
potentials of touch screens and the series of activities they allow. 
 
Digitality transforms images and transfers vision to an extended vision-optical function 
to a haptic space. Eyes move to a just visual-representative nature to a tactile one.  Once 
again, the instrument changes our perception and so the meaning itself of perception. Art 
partially becomes the model of whatever we do through ‘participative technology'. From 
the spectatorial nature of television and cinema, we pass toward a more nomadic one, 
signing the end of mass society and the beginning of a transversal society. The haptic 
experience is integrated with the visual one in such a way that the eyes disclose their 
haptic facet. 
 
Cinema and television still find common ground on the distinction between the passive 
watcher and the active performer of the spectacle, but not anymore on a control level, 
whereas video games, computer and touch screen devices ground on a digital level. Long 
distance vision has been substituted by close vision, which is typical of artists' work and 
more generally artisans' way of producing. Herein comes not only consumerism but also 
an active assemblage of elements from the perspective of web-users. If the hegemony of 
television during the Cold War corresponded to the passage from the capitalism of 
production to neoliberalism, from service to consumerism, then the full enhancement of 
video games and the full development of the internet might be giving a new shape to 
society. 
 
Reading a monitor full of information is quite a different thing from looking. It is a digital 
form of exploration in which the eye moves along an endless broken line. The relationship 
to the interlocutor in communication, like the relationship to knowledge in data-handling, 
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is similar: tactile and exploratory. A computer-generated voice […] is a tactile voice, 
neutral and functional. It is no longer in fact exactly a voice, any more than looking at a 
[monitor] is exactly looking. The whole paradigm of the sensory has changed. The 
tactility here is not the organic sense of touch: it implies merely an epidermal contiguity 
of eye and image, the collapse of the aesthetic distance involved in looking. […] We no 
longer have the spectator’s distance from the stage’ (Baudrillard, 1993, 61). 
 
In conclusion, the multifunctionality of smartphones is also related to the possibility of 
downloading several applications, each corresponding not only to a different function but 
also to a different service, with a constant connection to the web, in case of requiring 
support. Such characteristics represent a further enhancement for the entire capitalism of 
services we are already living in since the end of the last century. 
 
4. Smartphones, Services and Mobile Games 
As the functioning of our monitors (and screens) is increasingly based less on purely 
visible, discrete and vitreous elements as lenses and mirrors were, so our world has been 
assuming (mostly after the late Seventies,) increasingly more immaterial and intangible 
features. As already mentioned, it is in the Nineties that the world indeed becomes a 
monitor world, even if on an initially softer version than nowadays. After its incubation 
during the Eighties, circulation of information fully established itself as the primary 
element of both society and technology. Economy itself achieves its current state of 
fluidity (as every other sphere). It entirely replaces its old mechanical features with the 
new electronic features by submitting labour and production (‘hard’ Twentieth century's 
capitalism) to communication and services (soft turn of the century capitalism). Such an 
exchange of products and possession of services and knowledge has been incremented at 
an exponential level by smartphones and the effect that they had on the other two monitor 
instantiations - computers and mostly video games. In this specific case, the social sphere 
prepared the ground for the development of specific kind of technologies and not vice 
versa. During the Nineties (at least in developed countries), the tertiary sector - not by 
chance also named service sector - had already a far higher rate of employment than the 
secondary sector – the industrial sector, whose function is manufacturing products. It 
follows that the offer of services was already overtaking the production of goods. Such 
an 'environment' allowed the development of a technology of services (alongside 
information), embodied by the internet and even on a higher scale by smartphones. 
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Without such tertiary-focused economical direction, technology would probably not even 
have emerged. 
 
Service is defined as 
“‘a helpful act’ (‘the act of serving’) or ‘useful labour that does not produce a 
tangible commodity’. In economic jargon, services are activities that are neither 
products nor construction. Services are often characterized as intangible and 
insubstantial, as they cannot be handled, heard, tasted or smelled. They cannot be 
stored or transported, and they are inseparable and perishable. One of the 
consequences of the recent emphasis on services is that "instead of thinking of 
products as fixed items with set features and a one-time sales value, companies 
now think of them as ‘platforms’ for all sorts of upgrades and value-added 
services’” (Sotamaa &  Karppi, 2010, 13). 
 
This very mutation of capitalism affects also politics, reducing politicians from leaders 
into counsellors. The first ‘crucial difference between leaders and counsellors is that the 
first are to be followed while the latter need to be hired and can be fired. Leaders demand 
and expect discipline; counsellors may at best count on the willingness to listen and pay 
heed’ (Bauman, 2015,  64). Secondly, leaders ‘act as two-way translators between […] 
private worries and public issues’ (Ibid., 64-65), whereas counsellors ‘are wary of ever 
stepping beyond the closed area of the private’ (Ibid., 65). As a result, the social is reduced 
by counselling to a mere service to the private; the public sphere is submitted to the swarm 
of single individuals, emptied of any sense of community. Once again, an aggregate of 
individuals, a swarm, replaces society (see above). 
 
As mentioned above, the pervasiveness and intrusiveness of the internet has 
hyperbolically increased in parallel with the developments and diffusion of smartphones 
in less than ten years. In this same period of time, the web has become a constant presence 
in our lives, due to the perpetual connection allowed by these small, light devices that 
was not possible with the bulkier PCs and even laptops. While during the Nineties and 
the early 2000’s using a computer did not necessarily correspond to being online, the 
diffusion of the internet has found in the mobile industry its real means of diffusion. Such 
uninterrupted connection to the World Wide Web has brought the capitalism of service 
and the entire tertiary sector to an even further level, so much so that it has even affected 




Within the last five years, mobile games and the enhancement of web connections through 
smartphones are even affecting a solid sector of the games industry, which includes both 
computer gaming and console gaming. As already mentioned (see above), amidst their 
multiple functions smartphones also include games, which were featuring even in first 
mobile phones since Nokia’s Snake (1998). Henceforth, mobile games became a 
synonym for casual games, in other words ‘games for everyone’ (Sotamaa & Karppi, 
2010, 125), ‘a rapidly growing industry’ (Ibid., 126) thanks to smartphones. “With the 
development of mobile phone technology, the game designs have started to resemble the 
traditional console and handheld console games, some of them appealing to the more 
hard-core players. However, the mobile games’ role as quick time killers is still holding 
fast. Easy accessibility, short play sessions and simple gameplay are among the key 
design features that seem to be associated with mobile gaming and are becoming more 
and more popular on other platforms with the ‘casual revolution’ […] or ‘normalization 
of digital play’” (Ibid., 123). 
 
In parallel with the approach of mobile games to traditional computer and console games, 
internet has been implemented into the game consoles of the two last generations (like 
the previous PS3 released in 2006 and the last PS4 released in 2013), along with the 
creation of platforms as such as Steam. Steam is a website founded in 2003 that become 
famous only in the last five years, and is only accessible on computers. Through it, players 
can buy old and new games, console games adapted to PCs, and video games for consoles 
produced by both big names and small independent houses, all exclusively in digital 
format. In this regard, the introduction of internet into console games is facilitating the 
downloading of games in digital copies, which are decisively replacing game hard copies 
as a result. Moreover, producers have now developed the tendency to patch and update 
their games after their release, following the suggestions and needs directly given by 
players on the internet. This new approach has made automatic updates a typical 
characteristic of the last few years’, along with DLC (downloadable content, or rather 
additional content), ‘subscription, digital game download […], virtual commodities and 
value-added services’ (Ibid., 3). All these virtual services constituting a steadily 
expanding online market of games (absent since a decade ago), ‘have changed the 
experience of playing with video game console’ (Ibid., 5). The videogame is steadily 




A first reason for these new developments is to be found in the new audiences introduced 
to digital games by the recent diffusion of casual and social games originally featuring on 
smartphones: 
“Players are not so much asked to structure their lives to fit the demands of a game […]. 
Instead, the games are increasingly designed to serve the players and to fit into their lives. 
In the age of ‘contextual gaming’, play is increasingly tied to the practices and rhythms 
of everyday life and playful behaviours are often rooted in social relations and exchanges 
of information that are used to maintain and expand the networks of relationships […]. 
Many signs indicate that the days of digital games packaged as ‘fire and forget’ 
commodities are numbered. The global game industry is actively moving from providing 
discrete offerings towards establishing ongoing relationships with players” (Ibid., 3-4). 
 
The second reason for the development of virtual services and the consequent reduction 
of games to services lies within the ultra-competitive nature of the current ‘global game 
industry, characterized by spiralling production times and development costs’ (Ibid., 3). 
This condition “has forced the developers to search for alternative approaches. Therefore, 
digital distribution systems, subscription-based models and micro-transactions have 
challenged the traditional circuits of game development, play and distribution. A common 
theme across the transformations ranging from persistent game worlds and casual games 
to automatic content updates and player-created content is that they make games, more 
or less, available ‘as services’” (Ibid.).Finally, the model of service applied to games 
today is just the current manifestation in in a long relationship between financial earnings 
and game industry. 
 
The first step corresponds to early arcade games: they ‘did not have an end, as the 
economic model was based on players inserting quarter after quarter’ (Ibid., 13). As the 
second step, ‘console games had to introduce a narrative closure to make consumers 
purchase a new game. The third step corresponds to the introduction of online games as 
such as MMORPG, or Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game in the late 
nineties. Herein the ‘closure of a story ‒ the finite nature of fiction, if you will ‒ […] gave 
birth to the sequel and the expansion. The expansions can both extend the existing 
narrative and reveal new parts of the game world’ (Ibid.). Finally, selling ‘games through 
a particular service relationship and charging monthly fees for the opportunity to play 
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seems like the logical conclusion of the serialization of games that started when the fiction 
was married with the system to create sales’ (Ibid.). 
 
D. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MONITOR PHASE 
1. Electronic Automata 
With both its screens and monitors, televisions and computers, the whole twentieth 
century marked the advancement of electromagnetic physics and electronics over 
mechanical physics and mechanics, from a technological and scientific standpoint. It 
follows that the screen and the monitor phases constitute two consecutive phases of a new 
mode of fabricating and conceiving machines, which are even integrated with the old 
mechanical one in specific instances (as with mass transportation like cars, airplanes, 
etc.). Society and concepts are once again strictly intertwined with these material 
transformations. Regarding the first point, as society changes due to electronics and 
electricity completely altering the nature of industrialization and of its constitutive 
automation, so new social changes allow the development and distribution of the new 
technology. Regarding the latter point, more fitted concepts replace less fitted, in order to 
echo, anticipate, or code the new advancements. 
 
In his ‘Bergson: the Software Philosopher’ (2005) the Italian literary critic Renato Barilli 
demonstrates the anticipatory character of Bergson’s philosophy over any other of his 
contemporaries, in relation to the twentieth century’s origin and advancement of 
electronics over mechanics. ‘Bergson is not the vague, ephemeral and poetical exponent 
of a philosophy voided of any pragmatism, of any relation to the material forces of 
progress, but he rather applies the most fitted and convenient conceptual frames for our 
time, as far as our time is acknowledged to be grounded on electricity and electronics’ 
(Barilli, 2005, xv). In this regard, the French philosopher is defined as ‘Software 
Philosopher’. At the beginning of the twentieth century, in parallel with the first steps 
taken by electronics, Bergson in fact develops a philosophy of the soft, or rather the first 
philosophy of the process, whose innovative concepts are meant to overcome the old and 
already inadequate philosophy of the hard. 
 
Firstly, the ‘soft philosophy' of Bergson entails a somewhat new conception of the brain. 
The philosophy of the hard (as such as idealism or even historical materialism) has always 
treated the brain as a solid, undisputed and self-grounded subject. However, Bergson 
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specifically redefines the brain as ‘an interval [écart], a void […] between a stimulation 
and a response’ (Deleuze, 2014, 217), something no thinker or scientist has never before 
attempted to do. A conception that would nevertheless pass unnoticed until the 
Sixties/Seventies, as noted by Deleuze (see above). In other words, to Henri Bergson the 
brain does not have any substantial characteristics; it is ‘no more than a kind of central 
telephonic exchange: its office is to allow communication or to delay it’ (Bergson, 2005, 
30). As a result, his conception of the brain has it resemble an electric circuit, or rather a 
transmitter that receives and then radiates waves. The brain as microscopic electronic 
system generating connections within itself, with the world and the rest of the body 
replaces the brain as a ghost controlling the body as a giant clockwork mechanism 
detached from it. 
 
Secondly, ‘Conscience and world, images and things constitute a single system, as 
juxtaposed levels, hindering any attempt of resection. In other words, Bergson upholds a 
convincing and radical form of monism, which nonetheless avoids reducing one 
component to another, by fully supporting one of the two’ (Barilli, 2005, 37). It follows 
that Bergson’s position is neither dualistic as is the Cartesian view, nor reductionist or 
eliminative as is positivism, Marxism or any general physicalist perspective; it is ‘a 
monism of the relation’ (Ibid., 37), without any ‘triumph’ achieved by either the subject 
or the object. 
 
Thirdly, Bergson (along with Nietzsche) is one of the first philosophers to discredit 
representation in favour of an integrative and more tactile relationship with the world, 
whereby we pragmatically grasp and apply the conceptual configuration contextually 
needed to interact with a mutable reality. 
Representation is a purely optical relationship with reality that had been firstly developed 
during antiquity, with the mirror as its technical booster. With the modern age, 
representation became the only possible way to achieve irrefutable and accurate 
knowledge. As already explored in the second chapter, the reason for such a phenomenon 
included the further advancement in the fabrication and employment of lenses (making 
vision more accurate and effective on long distance); the increasingly larger production 
of clockworks and other mechanical devices; and lastly the consequent reduction of the 
universe to an automatic machinery easy to master. However, the advancement of 
electronics and thus of an integrative kind of technology will endanger this old conception 
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of truth as correspondence and demand a replacement for it, as firstly attempted by 
Bergson and later by large part of twentieth century’s philosophy (Deleuze included, as 
already demonstrated in detail). 
 
Fourthly, evolution (and then time) is for Bergson a process, or rather a ‘flux of fleeting 
shades merging into each other’ (Bergson, 1998, 3) as electromagnetic waves or current 
running through a wire. This conception grounded on a soft geometry of fields and 
vectors, and on probability, contrasts the modern finalism (Leibniz) and mechanism 
(Descartes and Hobbes), both conceptions based on the hard mechanical geometry of 
points, and on certainty. ‘Whether nature be conceived as an immense machine regulated 
by mechanical laws’ (Ibid., 45) by mechanists, or ‘as the realization of a plan’ (Ibid.) by 
finalists, both share the same image of the world. They see reality as predictable, like 
clockwork and dominated by a strict predetermined relationships (either of causal of 
teleological kind) between discrete identifiable static elements that coexist on an 
objective plan despite time (i.e. the Cartesian plan). Finalism (or teleology) is itself 
defined by Bergson as ‘inverted mechanism’ (Ibid., 39), because it ‘substitutes the 
attraction of the future for the impulsion of the past’ (Ibid.). Finalism and mechanism 
subsequently echo the social and technical advancements of the modern age, whose 
models are first clockwork and later, the assembly line, and thus the hegemony of the lens 
(see above). 
 
Finally, in his late The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, Bergson (1932) contributes 
to social analysis by distinguishing between open society and closed society, aware of 
how parallel technological, economic and social changes move. He specifically defines 
open society as decentralized; it is developed as a net, made from the contribution of 
different elements, which always renew themselves through their reciprocal relationships. 
In this regard, Bergson has always demonstrated throughout his work his favour of the 
League of Nations (the early version of the current United Nations) and disregard for 
closed communities and States. He was in fact a Chair of the International Committee on 
Intellectual Cooperation established in Genève in 1922 and formally dissolved in 1946. 
Bergson’s idea of open society partially corresponds with that weakening of the nation-
state model occurring since the outset of globalization and influenced once again by the 
advancements of electronics. Deleuze argues that after World War II the nation state 
inverts, “the configuration of power […], and, instead of converging on a single 
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mysterious leader, inspirer of dreams, commander of actions, power was diluted in an 
information network where ‘decision-makers’ managed control” (Deleuze, 2014, 272). 
 
Technical/technological enhancement has machines as its most iconic symbol. 
Obviously, manufacturing is not just limited to the sole use of machinery and has been a 
constant presence even before the invention of automata. However, machines represent 
such development in technology due to an autonomy of tools and devices never seen 
before. First machines were built in the modern age along with Cartesian philosophical 
use of the world automata, entities characterised by a certain degree of self-sufficiency, 
but without any relationship with conscience. Electronic machines have otherwise 
become a model for a more physical interpretation of the brain; the brain as a circuit of 
wires that transmit both a soft electrical charge and information along the entire body, as 
noted by Bergson and later by Deleuze.  While Bergson’s philosophy echoes the first 
steps of electromagnetism and thus electronics, the analyses of Deleuze and Baudrillard 
already belong to a time of full electronic development, spanning approximately three 
decades since the seventies. By furthering the intuitions of their older compatriot, they 
both explicitly address the passage from the mechanical automata, of the lens phase, to 
the electronic automata, of screen phase and monitor phase. 
 
Despite the advancements of electronics, the imaginary of the first half of the twentieth 
century was still dominated by the mechanical automata, as shown by the cinema of the 
time. In this regard, Deleuze argues that the French School of these first five decades 
‘never lost its taste for clockwork automata and clock-making characters, but also 
confronted machines with moving parts, like the American or Soviet schools […] with 
the intention of posing the question of the future. […] The moving machine becomes one 
with the psychological automaton pure and simple, at the service of a frightening new 
order: this is the procession of […] hypnotizers-hypnotized in expressionism, from The 
Cabinet of Dr Caligari to Testament of Dr Mabuse via Metropolis and its robot’ (Ibid., 
270-271). The reference of the expressionist cinema to mechanical automata and their 
inner dualistic partition into a subject who controls (or the ghost in the machine) ‘reflected 
the rise of the Hitlerian automation in the German soul’ (Ibid., 271). National Socialist 
Germany epitomised both the peak and the limit of the state as political mechanical 
automaton, developed firstly by Hobbes (who was a mechanist, not by chance) on a pure 
conceptual level with the Leviathan. In fact, the Leviathan is nothing more than a 
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kingdom-automaton, whose engines and discrete components correspond to the subjects 
and the king to the ‘puppeteer’. 
 
The imaginary would change after World War II along with the transformation of cinema 
and the new relationship with the brain. In this regard, both Baudrillard and Deleuze 
explore how, mostly after the sixties, our society has changed its way of conceiving and 
building machines. Since the first machines built during the seventeenth century, the 
modern world had been based on a reality and an imaginary made of (mechanic) 
automata. Descartes' thought is the first conceptualisation of machinery, where res 
cogitans is the philosophical version of the concrete person who controls the automata, 
which corresponds to the person’s body. The new electronic machines jam this old 
relationship between man and machine, exemplified conceptually by the mechanical 
automata of the modern age and more concretely by the second industrialization, when 
the worker was ‘always […] a stranger to the machine he operates, and alienated by it’ 
(Baudrillard, 1993, 65). ‘Mechanical automata […] played on the difference between man 
and machine, and on the charm of this difference’ (Ibid., 143). By contrast, ‘today’s 
interactive and simulated automata are no longer concerned’ (Ibid.) with it, because ‘Man 
and machine have become isomorphic and indifferent to each other: neither is other to the 
other (Ibid.). As a result, the ‘new technologies, with their new machines, new images 
and interactive [monitors], do not alienate me. Rather, they form an integrated circuit with 
me’ (Ibid., 65) so much to resemble ‘contact lenses in that they are so many transparent 
prostheses, integrated into the body to the point of being almost part of its genetic make-
up: they are like pacemakers […]. All our relationships with networks and [monitors], 
whether willed or not, are of this order’ (Ibid.). It follows that the structure of these 
electronic machines is ‘one of subordination not of alienation.’ (Ibid.). 
 
By furthering the soft philosophical elaboration initiated by Bergson, Deleuze addresses, 
in the conclusions of his Cinema II (published in 1985), ‘the technological and social 
evolution of automata. Clockwork automata, but also motor automata, in short automata 
of movement, made way for a new computer and cybernetic race, automata of 
computation and thought, automata with controls and feedback’ (Deleuze, 2014, 272). To 
him such new ‘configuration of the automaton is the correlate of an electronic 
automatism’ (Ibid.). Not by chance, Cinema II has been published at the threshold of an 
era subjected to information technology (the Post-Cold War era) and thus to the monitor 
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phase. In the epilogue of this text, the author even foresees a transformation of cinema by 
the new advances in electronics, leaving free room for future possibilities: ‘The electronic 
image, that is, the tele and video image, the numerical image coming into being, had either 
to transform cinema or to replace it, to mark its death’. These electronic images are only 
hinted at but not explained by Deleuze, who does not ‘claim to be producing an analysis 
of’ (Ibid., 272) them, ‘but only to indicate certain effects whose relationship to the 
cinematographic image remains to be determined’ (Ibid.). 
 
Electronic machines appeal also to invisibility to the extent that micro-processing units 
compose them. As already demonstrated (see above), computers tend to make an invisible 
and unreachable textual plan of information and data the base for the constitutions of the 
visible sphere represented by images on the monitor. Even what is technically defined as 
hardware is soft in its structure and its composition. On the contrary, mechanical automata 
were massively extensive, as already mentioned, composed of extremely visible engines, 
gears and other mechanical components, 
 
In conclusion, the modern mechanical automata are perfectly matched with lenses as they 
require distance between controller and controlled, subject and object, while TV screens 
and all kinds of monitors (screen phase and monitor phase) are themselves electronic 
automata, glasses connected and integrated into electronic circuits, even though by 
different degrees. According to Deleuze, with the enhancement of electronics “the screen 
itself, even if it keeps a vertical position by convention, no longer seems to refer to the 
human posture, like a window or a painting, but rather constitutes a table of information, 
an opaque surface on which are inscribed ‘data’, information replacing nature, and the 
brain-city, the third eye, replacing the eyes of nature” (Ibid., 272-273). 
 
2. Simulacra 
Moe-elements and emojis belong to the same class of images, the simulacra, which have 
in fact become the very model for every image in our time of monitor phase. In other 
words, simulacra have become the ‘monitor images’ par excellence born along with 
‘modern thought […] of the failure of representation, of the loss of identities, and the 
discovery of all the forces that act under the representation of the identical. The modern 
world is one of simulacra’ [author, year, XV]. This passage has been extracted from the 
preface of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (1968); it corresponds to changes already 
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occurring with the screen phase (cinema and television) and furthered by the monitor 
phase and our ‘monitor age’. The expression ‘modern world’ refers herein to the time this 
book was written, the Seventies - and the decades to come -, and not to the Modern age 
(from late fifteenth century until the very end of the nineteenth century). In addition, the 
expression ‘modern thought’ refers herein to the tradition of post-representational 
philosophies of being  developed during the entire twentieth century, to which Deleuze 
also belongs. 
 
The best manner to explore the different implications of the simulacrum extensively is by 
dissecting it through three main perspectives, differentiated into: temporal, cultural and 
disciplinary contexts and approaches, with the three perspectives corresponding to three 
authors repeatedly mentioned: Deleuze, Baudrillard, and Azuma. Their points of view are 
so relevant because all of them have profoundly addressed the simulacrum and shared its 
definition as a self-referential image and thus as an aesthetical notion. 
During the late sixties, Deleuze developed his conception of simulacra in his doctoral 
thesis Difference and Repetition (1968), concretely referring to pop art creations and to 
their concept of artistic creation as continuous reproduction. He embodies an early phase 
of simulacra, the simulacra of the screen phase, optimistically foreseeing their further 
advancement. During the early eighties, Baudrillard developed his conception of 
simulacra in his most determining work Simulacra and Simulation (1981), where he 
pessimistically reframed the hopeful considerations of Deleuze on both the two terms of 
this title. He embodies a second phase of simulacra, when computers and videogames 
were already becoming a striking reality. He also assisted to the passage from the screen 
phase to the monitor phase. Azuma addresses simulacra in his Otaku; Japan’s Database 
Animals (2001), featuring a neutral and purely descriptive attitude toward simulacra. He 
embodies a reality in which simulacra have settled in, to be a constant presence in our 
lives, because of the pervasiveness of information technology through the Internet and 
computers. In other words, his perspective fully echoes the monitor hegemony at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. 
 
Deleuze has always aimed at overturning Platonic philosophy - the best expression of the 
metaphysics of representation – by abolishing the very Platonic distinction between the 
hyperuranion, the perfect and true realm of the Ideas, and our mutable and false concrete 
world. As a result, Deleuze says, there is no more difference between things and 
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simulacra, originals and copies, things and reflections (see above), but ‘things are 
simulacra themselves’ (Ibid., 84). 
In this regard, he states that: ‘Overturning Platonism […] means denying the primacy of 
original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections’ 
(Ibid., 83). Once fulfilled this philosophical goal ‘each thing exists only in returning, copy 
of an infinity of copies which allows neither original nor origin to exist’ (Ibid.). Deleuze 
thus defines simulacra as ‘function by themselves, passing and repassing the decentred 
centres of the eternal return. […] In the infinite movement of degraded likeness from copy 
to copy, we reach a point at which everything changes nature, at which copies flip over 
into simulacra’ (Ibid., 163). 
 
Deleuzian simulacra need to be pictured within the replacement of the reality-possibility 
distinction with Bergson's notion of virtual and actual (see above). Only within this 
conceptual frame, simulacra become, as argued by Deleuze ‘conditions of real 
experience, and not only of possible experience' (Ibid., 372). Therefore, experimentation 
replaces representation (which is based on the double copy-original), fantastical notions 
carrying ‘nomadic distributions' (Ibid.), replace categories carrying ‘sedentary 
distributions' (Ibid.). Phantastical notions ‘are not universals like the categories, nor are 
they the hic et nunc or now here' (Ibid.), but impose moment by moment a different 
spatiotemporal field, ‘their own scenery' (Ibid.). In resonance with the late sixties' 
emancipatory leitmotif, Deleuze inevitably gives a positive connotation to simulacra, and 
thus to the corresponding social, aesthetic, and technological changes. Herein the 
elimination of originals in favour of the sole existence of simulacra is firstly a conceptual 
shift, which will subsequently affect the other just mentioned spheres. 
 
Despite his conceptual understanding of the simulacrum, Deleuze retains it primarily as 
an aesthetic and thus artistic notion (see above). In this regard, Deleuze defines Pop Art 
as an art of simulacra: ‘Pop Art pushed the copy, copy of the copy, etc., to that extreme 
point at which it reverses and becomes a simulacrum (such as Warhol’s remarkable 
“serial” series, in which all the repetitions of habit, memory and death are conjugated)’ 
(Ibid., 383). Although Deleuze’s simulacra might be associated with his concept of ‘pure 
images’, mentioned in the chapter on the screen phase (see above), simulacra otherwise 
are both images and objects . Deleuze extends these typical characteristics of pop art to 
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the entire artistic sphere: ‘Art is simulation, it reverses copies into simulacra’17 (Ibid., 
382). He even extends it to the hermeneutics of art developed during the late sixties by 
Umberto Eco: “Eco shows clearly that the ‘classical’ work of art may be seen from several 
perspectives and is susceptible to several interpretations, but that there is no autonomous 
work corresponding to each point of view or interpretation, all included in the chaos of 
the work as a whole. The characteristic of the ‘modern’ work of art appears to be precisely 
the absence of any such centre or convergence” (Ibid., 91). This treatment of art as 
simulation and as producer of simulacra anticipates what could be defined as the trend of 
every genre nowadays (as it will be predicted by Azuma). 
 
A decade later, Baudrillard published his most determining work Simulacra and 
Simulation (1981), which also revolves around simulacra, as indicated by the title. To 
him, simulacra constitute firstly a social phenomenon rather than 
conceptual/philosophical one. This social phenomenon corresponds to the rise of 
consumerism, the commodification of reality and, above all, social life, as already 
mentioned in the previous chapter in reference to televised images and commercials (see 
above). Baudrillard’s attitude toward these non-representing images and the society that 
produces them is often pessimistic. 
 
Baudrillard echoes Deleuze by claiming: ‘The era of simulation is inaugurated by a 
liquidation of all referentials’ (Baudrillard, 1994, 2), where signs of the real substitute the 
real. Similarly, Baudrillard defines the hyperreal in terms of ‘the generation by models of 
a real without origin or reality’ (Ibid., 1). It is an artificial and simulated reality, where 
representation becomes self-referential, simulacra. Videogames and, more  generally, all 
virtual worlds are such hyperrealities. In fact, since their images are interactive and not 
mere passive representations, electronic games and synthetic worlds do not refer to any 
external world but simulate it, build their own independent realities but emptied of the 
concreteness, extraneousness and danger that characterizes ‘nature’. In other words, we 
do not observe, reflect and judge a video ludic representation as we do with movies and 
paintings, but we passively buy into it and uncritically interact with and as if it were real. 
                                                            
17 In these two quotations, it is possible to notice that Deleuze distinguishes copies from simulacra. 
Copies are always copies of an original, while a simulacrum does not refer to anything else than itself 
even if working as a repetition of something else. Somehow, the fact that Azuma is otherwise using these 
two words indistinctly is probably involuntarily. 
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Before the rise of neoliberalism and information technology since the late Seventies 
common perception, philosophical theory, the structuralization of society, and more 
generally everyday life followed unquestionably the distinction between reality and 
imaginary. However, the continuously revolutionizing way in which modern society has 
developed itself, the explosive expansions of monarchies and afterward nations, the entire 
capitalist model up to the Cold War, had in such distinctions the basis of their conceptual 
frame and reason d’etre. Henceforth, common sense continues presuming the truth of this 
old separation even nowadays. 
 
Reality corresponds to the absurd and the scandalous that affects our lives against and 
outside of our expectations. Reality is thus all-encompassing, external to our 
intentionality and overwhelming from the perspective of subjectivity and social entities. 
On the contrary, the imaginary acts as a differential in relation to reality. It includes all 
those symbolic tools necessary to construct meaning, to generate models that can never 
be concrete, but that nonetheless have always the real as referent. Therefore, the 
relationship between these two realms is one of exchange, reciprocity and distance. 
Reality always presents itself as an irreducible and infinite Otherness; the line of the 
horizon that does not let our gaze comprehend it. Conversely, the imaginary corresponds 
to the desires, wishes, projections, utopian visions belonging to and constituting 
individuals and communities. 
 
The formation of a global society, already occurring during the Cold War and fully 
achieved after the capitulation of the eastern bloc, epitomized by the ‘Fall of the Wall’ in 
1989, has brought to a continuous and technologically renewed meddling of reality and 
imaginary. Once the Western viewpoint has become hegemonic and self-referential by 
physically reaching the maximum degree of expansion possible, whose result is an 
implosive attitude based on deterrence and not anymore on conquering, models stop being 
ideal representations of the world and conceptual guidelines for specific individuals and 
communities. ‘The models no longer constitute either transcendence or projection, they 
no longer constitute the imaginary in relation to the real, they are themselves an 
anticipation of the real […] they are immanent, and thus leave no room for any kind of 
imaginary transcendence’ (Ibid., 122). For instance, narration instead of being the 
representation and construction of meaning in reaction to a certain reality has become 
what proceeds and determines reality. Maps (as partially suggested by Deleuze and 
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Guattari’s when describing the characteristics of the Rhizome) tend to replace the territory 
in which we live: ‘The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is 
nevertheless the map that precedes the territory […] But it is no longer a question of either 
maps or territories. Something has disappeared: the sovereign difference, between one 
and the other, that constituted the charm of abstraction’ (Ibid., 2). 
 
Therefore, hyperreality comes into being when imaginary, the conceptual realm, does not 
try anymore to change a posteriori reality but precedes and generates it; when imaginary 
loses its referent, thus when it does not signify anything. As a result, the symbolic 
character of imaginary is replaced by the hyperreal figure of the simulacra, an empty and 
meaningless image in virtue of ‘substituting the signs of the real for the real' (Ibid.). Once 
again, the Platonic difference between real and reflection exemplified by the mirror and 
the Cartesian difference between subject and objective world exemplified by the lens are 
softly overturned by screens first and then monitors. 
Finally, Baudrillard's simulacra feature a lack of reference that makes every definition 
interchangeable with one another. They thus come to constitute altogether a homogenous 
and indiscriminate blur (as the next paragraph on ‘virality' will illustrate profoundly). 
 
By applying Azuma's perspective, Deleuze belongs to an extended period of transition, 
‘between 1914 and 1989' (Azuma, 2009, 72), from modernity to the so-called 
postmodernity (see above). Baudrillard is otherwise placed in between the end of the 
transitory period and the beginning of what Azuma defines as complete postmodernism. 
Therefore, although pop art, cinematic pure images and televised images already 
constitute iterations of simulacra under the screen phase of the twentieth century, it is 
with the hegemony of the monitor  during the post-Cold War era (the complete 
postmodernism of Azuma) that simulacra (as such as moe-elements and emojis) will 
achieve their complete and stable form. 
 
Azuma still interprets simulacra as aesthetic products, but insofar as they originate from 
new technological innovations and not as a social or conceptual phenomenon, pointing 
specifically at the information technology and the World Wide Web. This strictly 
technological interpretation causes Azuma to apply the Database model to the 
simulacrum, whereby the latter dwell within the users’ facet of the double layer structure 
(see above) of the Internet, while within the other facet dwells the database, the archive 
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of encoded information. The simulacra, as images on the monitor, are consequently 
grounded, specifically on the settings provided by the deep inner layer of the Database. 
This conception makes simulacra a mere assembly of pre-existing data, a mere procedure 
without emancipatory connotation. As a result, Azuma’s simulacra are mere 
‘technological images’ on a monitor, grounded on a purely textual database, and not 
Deleuze’s ‘rebellious images which lack resemblance’ (Deleuze, 2014, 35) and thus 
ground: ‘The surface outer layer […] is covered with simulacra, or derivative works. But 
in the deep layer lies the database of settings and character, and further down, the database 
of moe-elements’ (Azuma,  2009, 58). 
 
As noted by Azuma himself, his own conception slightly changes the definition of 
simulacra, compared to earlier theories as such as Baudrillard’s view, which has 
considered the increase in simulacra merely as ‘a chaotic phenomenon emerging after the 
demise of the distinction between the original and the copy’ (Ibid., 58). For instance, 
Baudrillard has only talked about an undifferentiated ‘hyperreality’, never distinguishing 
‘the level of the simulacra and the level of the database […], nor has the whole been 
grasped as a double-layer structure’ (Ibid., 60). 
Azuma specifically applies his conception of simulacra as surface outer layer, in 
opposition to the database as deep inner layer, to the otaku culture as the epitome of social 
aggregates modelled after information technology: 
“Otaku culture is filled with derivative works; original and derivative works are 
produced and consumed as if they were of ‘equal value’. However, not all such 
derivative works actually have the same value; otherwise the market would not 
grow. In fact, underneath the simulacra exists a database, a device that sorts good 
simulacra from bad ones regulating the flow of derivative works’ (Ibid.). 
 
It follows that, in Azuma’s view, the opposition between simulacra and database has 
nowadays replaced the classical one between original and copy. 
 
Through a multimedia approach, otaku treat contemporary products as such as comics, 
animations, video games, etc., as database, from which they can generate derivative 
works: ‘The 773rd Bikkuriman sticker must adequately share a common database with the 
previous 772 stickers, or it would not be regarded as a derivative work to begin with. 
Ayanami Nurturing Project must adequately share a worldview with Evangelion, and the 
design of Di Gi Charat must adequately sample moe-elements from the late 1990’s. 
Simulacra created without recognition of these processes will be weeded out by the 
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market and disappear’ (Ibid., 60-61).  According to this new consumerist behavior, a copy 
stops being ‘judged by its distance from an original but by its distance from the database' 
(Ibid., 61). As a result, after the Nineties, otaku culture has replaced its interest in 
authorship with the character settings and basic moe-elements (see above), which 
constitute the database. 
In conclusion, the multimediality of Internet has shaped, for Azuma, a consumerist 
behavior that subsumes both original and derivative under the shared label of simulacra, 
while it treats ‘the database of settings' (Ibid., 63) as the core of a work. For the otaku, 
‘even if derivate works violate original works (at the level of simulacra), the originality 




The second chapter (see above) addressed the implosive character of information and 
communication through satellite system, television and nuclear arsenal during the Cold 
War period. In post-Cold War this implosive character socially embodied by the 
production and circulation of human masses (a direct consequence of the 
spectacularization of society due to the diffusion of Cinema and afterwards TV screens 
on a global scale) has mutated into a viral form, where a transversal, horizontal society 
has completely replaced the mass society. This transformation is due to the next step in 
the development of the exchange of images and information (the visible and the invisible), 
which has become active, interactive and bidirectional (a reversal of spectacularization), 
even more fluid, pervasive and quicker. Such a new step is embodied by the diffusion of 
internet, computers and smartphones along with the full accomplishment of globalization 
after the capitulation of the Communist bloc (perhaps caused by the inner incapability of 
the latter to face the new technologies and their incessant ubiquity). 
 
All these changes visibly occurring after the fall of the Wall find their seed in the late 
Sixties/Seventies. In fact, it is during this period that information technology started to be 
concretely developed, the financial/consumerist capitalism (neoliberalism) started 
replacing productive capitalism along with liquid society taking over solid society; ideas 
of self-managed systems were diffusing and were applied to ecology (ecosystem) and 
even to hippie communes. Finally, the most influential aspect of the late Sixties on our 
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post-Cold War Monitor age is ‘the moment of liberation in every sphere’ (Baudrillard, 
1993, 3). 
 
Deleuze was a major supporter of this emancipatory leitmotiv, its philosophy being 
entirely based on the practice (and not just on the theorization) of concepts as such as 
differentiation, multiplicity, experimentation, etc. Moreover, his positive attitude toward 
the massive and extended changes occurring during the late twentieth century is 
confirmed by his perspective on networks (in the form of rhizomes) and by his ‘defence' 
of repetition (and thus simulacra), an inevitable consequence his critique of the Platonic 
dichotomy between original and copy. Finally, his philosophy features a general dismissal 
of dominating models and a tendency toward an eclectic contamination of fields that will 
become the most representing element of a world based on information technology. 
By contrast, Baudrillard developed a harsh pessimistic reflection on the aftermath of this 
social (and not only) revolution, which he sarcastically calls the orgy. He addressed in 
depth the negative backlash and uncovered the illusions behind this so celebrated 
liberation. ‘We have pursued every avenue in the production and effective overproduction 
of objects, signs, messages, ideologies and satisfactions. Now everything has been 
liberated […] all we can do is simulate […] liberation’ (Ibid., 3). Once achieved this 
liberation in every sphere, including sex, politics, art, economics, women, children and 
unconscious, ‘every individual category [becomes] subject to contamination, substitution 
is possible between any sphere and any other: there is a total confusion of types’ (Ibid., 
9). The result is ‘a fractal mode of dispersal’ (Ibid., 5), whereby a haphazard propagation 
makes every evaluation impossible. 
 
The use of the term ‘orgy’ by Baudrillard underlines how the movements of liberation of 
the Sixties were embodied, above all by the sexual revolution, which dreamed ‘of 
sexuality as an assumption of desire beyond the difference between the sexes. In point of 
fact sexual liberation has succeeded only in helping sexuality achieve autonomy as an 
undifferentiated circulation of the signs of sex’ (Ibid., 13). As a result, ‘On all sides we 
witness a kind of fading away of sexuality, of sexual beings, in favour to the earlier stage 
of immortal and asexual beings reproducing, like protozoa, by simple division of the One 
in to two and the transmission of a code. Today’s technological beings […] all tend 
towards this kind of reproduction, and little by little they are imparting the same process 
to those beings that are supposedly human, and sexed’ (Ibid., 7). 
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As stated by Deleuze and Guattari in their A Thousand Plateaus contagion is the way 
rhizomes expand themselves, while tree-model systems (like family, state, etc.) do it by 
filiation: 
‘We oppose: epidemic to filiation, contagion to heredity, peopling by contagion to sexual 
reproduction, sexual production’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2014, 282). ‘Contagion, epidemic, 
involves terms that are entirely heterogeneous: for example, a human being, an animal, 
and a bacterium, a virus, a molecule, a microorganism. These combinations are […] 
interkingdoms, unnatural participations’ (Ibid.).This epidemic conformation of networks 
is compared by the two co-authors to social systems external to the state, purely nomadic 
and without territory which he addresses as animal packs and war machines: 
‘The war machine is always exterior to the State, even when the State uses is, 
appropriates it. The man of war has an entire becoming that implies multiplicity, 
celerity, ubiquity, metamorphosis and treason, the power of affect. Wolf-men, 
bear-men, wildcat-men, men of every animality, secret brotherhoods, animate the 
battlefields. But so do the animal packs used by men in battle, or which trail the 
battles and take advantage of them. And together they spread contagion’ (Ibid., 
283). 
 
What is interesting to note, in our time dominated by of networks, virtual, hardware and 
software all made visible by monitors, is the coexistence of hyper-immunity and hyper-
virality. In other worlds, closed circuits, procedurals machines following a specific and 
pre-programmed code are altogether with ever-expanding networks. In fact, these two 
phenomena are two facets of the same coin: the logic of transgression, of contamination 
of fields, of will to power alongside with that of insurances for every possible risk, 
vaccination, hypochondria, hyper-sanitation expressed by modern architecture, etc. On 
one side, there is the dynamic of contagion of open systems embraced and anticipated by 
Deleuze and Guattari, whereby identity is replaced by difference. On the other side, there 
is the metastasis of closed circuits, which has been employed by Baudrillard to explain 
terrorism, cancer, AIDS, financial crises - he mostly refers to the Wall Street crash of 
1987, but it can be extend to the crisis of 2007-2008. 
 
These phenomena have, in fact, become increasingly more common since the late 
Eighties/early Nineties, when the French sociologist wrote extensively about them. All of 
them are “‘superconductive’ events” (Baudrillard, 1993, 41), breakdowns of redundant 
systems (networks) without any relation whatsoever with external elements, with 
otherness: ‘the absence of otherness secretes another, intangible otherness: the absolute 
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other of the virus’ (Ibid., 72). They are afflictions originated by an immunodeficiency 
spread on every field and by the excess of promiscuity of spheres. For instance, AIDS or 
cancer are ‘non-conventional illnesses generated by the very success of prophylaxis and 
medicine, illnesses bred of the […] elimination of pathogenic forms’ (Ibid., 71); 
‘computer viruses explore possibilities of networks that are never anticipated by those 
network’s designers’ (Ibid., 43). ‘As for terrorism, does not its secondary, reactive 
violence shield us from an epidemic of consensus, from an ever-increasing political 
leukaemia and degeneration […]?’ (Ibid., 75). To sum up, ‘terrorism, transvestitism, and 
cancer, all reflect excesses – on the political, sexual and genetic level respectively; they 
also reflect deficiencies in - and the consequent collapse of - the codes of the political, 
sexual and genetic realms. All these forms are viral […] and their virulence is reinforced 
by their images, for the modern media have a viral form of their own, and their virulence 
is contagious’ (Ibid., 40-41). Finally, a ‘decentredeness of all systems, an internal 
metastasis or fevered endogenic virulence […] creates tendency for systems to explode 
beyond their own limits, to override their own logic’ (Ibid., 5). 
 
In our time of advanced information technology, this cancerous/metastatic aspect 
(closeness) addressed by Baudrillard and the contagious aspect (openness) addressed by 
Deleuze correspond to the two poles of the virality of the monitor phase - here both 
authors pointed out how this virality operates on a plan of immanency by lacking 
transcendent references. In other words, these two are tendencies and aspects of all 
networks, in an age when every sphere is represented as porous hyper-connected systems, 
mostly thanks to the widespread diffusion of electronics, software, internet, computers, 
and smartphones. With both the cancerous and the contagious aspects a virus is definable 
as a destabilizing spreading force without possible containment. In this concern, networks 
(therefore ANTs, rhizomes, cybernetics and complex systems) are all viral; they are not 
confined within boundaries, always proliferating. One of the main reason for that is their 
being purely positive affirmative force, non-bound by any dialectical relation with a 
negative of opposite sign. They in fact integrate every discrete element that might enter 
in contact with it, by reconfiguring the entire network-system. Therefore, Marxism cannot 
apply anymore to society developing after these non-hierarchical and decentralized 
systems. This also explains why mirrors and lenses have lost their symbolic relevance –
having the double replaced by multitudes and sameness– along with their current minor 
relevance as concrete tools. “Virulence takes hold of a body, a network or other system 
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when that system rejects all its negative components and resolves itself into a 
combinatorial system of simple elements. It is because a circuit or a network has thus 
become a virtual being, a non-body, that viruses can run riot within it; hence too the much 
greater vulnerability of ‘immaterial’ machines as compared with mechanical devices. 
Virtual and viral go hand in hand” (Ibid., 71). 
 
Such dematerialization of bodies is just the last step of a long-term techno-
anthropological operation on bodies by vitreous technologies, started by the first men 
looking at themselves on a mirror. In fact, this mirror-stage was necessary for the 
development of the first form of physical manipulation of bodies: cosmetics. It is also in 
this very moment that humankind differentiated between the self and the ego, soul and 
bodies, which was for the first time represented and then modelled into ideal proportions. 
This reduction of the body to an image and its ‘culturalization’/socialization through 
cosmetics ended up sacralising it. During the modern age, the great diffusion and 
application of the lens in different forms and shapes, from telescopes to microscopes, and 
the consequent predominance of the scopic regimes of observation and gaze, made 
distance the paradigm of every relationship, always an asymmetric link between a subject 
and object. Distance also affected the human body, which was reduced to an object of 
observation, to res extensa, whose only characteristic is having an extension within spatial 
coordinates. This reification of the body is the prerequisite and the legitimation of modern 
human anatomy and of its foundation during the sixteenth century. Until then, dissection 
on human bodies had been almost forbidden and largely condemned, which had made 
anatomy mostly hypothetical and very slow in its development. Body was not yet 
completely detached from soul and still had a sacred aura. 
The most important consequence of theoretical reification and actual dissection of bodies 
is not exclusively their reduction to mechanical automata (see above), but also their 
‘analytical decomposition’ (Baudrillard, 1994, 98) into discrete parts called organs, each 
one assigned to a different function. 
 
During the entire twentieth century, molecular genetics replaced the previous mechanist 
perspective of anatomy, along with the development of information technology, network 
theory and lastly the computer. The DNA molecule itself is modelled on the database, as 
storage of ‘all information relative to a given body' (Baudrillard, 1993, 134). “From a 
functional and mechanistic point of view, each organ is still only a partial and 
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differentiated prosthesis […]. From the point of view of cybernetics and computer 
science, it is the smallest undifferentiated element, each cell of a body becomes an 
‘embryonic’ prosthesis of this body” (Baudrillard, 1994, 98). As a result, the individual 
is reduced to his/her ‘abstract and genetic formula’ (Baudrillard, 1993, 135) and his/her 
body to ‘a message, nothing more than computer fodder.[…] Thus reproduction precedes 
production […] [as] the genetic model of the body precedes all possible bodies’ (Ibid.). 
 
The technology of the industrial era, which was based on a model of production, was still 
following the modern idea of body, whereby mechanical extensions were always external 
to beings and only affecting objects and images. In fact, prostheses ‘of the traditional 
kind, designed to replace defective organs, change nothing so far as the general model of 
the body is concerned. The same applies to organ grafts’ (Ibid., 137). Otherwise, the soft 
technologies of our era, which are  based on a model of reproduction – as stated above – 
follow the contemporary idea of body, whereby ‘genetic and mental software' (Ibid., 136) 
are ‘ramified and internalized' (Ibid.) by beings. It is also the case with ‘psychotropic 
agents and drugs' (Ibid., 137), which model the body ‘from within' (Ibid., 138) in 
molecular terms. The body becomes immanent to itself. The context and the situation no 
more determine it. It is determined only by its internal and microscopic relations. It stops 
being an object of representation and perception and a sensitive Lieben, a living body, the 
centre of our grasp of the external world. 
 
The compact materiality of bodies bears a process of disappearance under the effect of 
information technology, which reduces it to a ‘genetic formula’ (Ibid.), a message, and of 
‘biochemical influences’ (Ibid.). The body thus becomes a soft machine permeable by 
several means: 
- Firstly, our culture bodies ‘are irradiated by signals' (Ibid., 41), images, formula, 
and networks; bodies as media. 
- Secondly, genetics, as already mentioned, allows for conceiving and treating 
bodies as self-replicating systems transmitting information to one another. Bodies 
as messages. 
- Thirdly, the impact of cognitivism on philosophy of mind, psychology and, not 
last, common sense, along with its application to neurosciences and to the 
development of artificial intelligence, has contributed to extend the computer 
metaphor also to the brain – and indirectly to the body. In fact, this theory reduces 
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the nervous system to a hardware and the mind to its software - in other words to 
its functioning – and mental functions to sole computational processes (like with 
a computer). As a result, brains are firstly compared to computers and computers 
to potential brains, because of their common computational function (even if on 
different levels). Both brains and computer are secondly compared to machines 
and functional objects, as such as clocks and pumps, which are all defined by 
their purpose, their raison d’etre, and not by their composition (including 
materials and mechanism). This explains why research on artificial intelligences 
is based on cognitivist theory. 
The primary computational function of the brain (commonly called mind) is calculating 
the most efficient physical reaction to a specific sensory stimulus and then do the rest of 
the body act accordingly to it. All this happens through the passage of information through 
the nerves. 
If Descartes still spared the mind from his mechanization of the body, with the 
‘information psychology’ of cognitivism the mind too becomes an instrumental notion 
strictly related to a physical component (the brain). Moreover, the brain/mind becomes a 
mere piece of the body and thus a replaceable and reproducible mechanical component 
only meant to operate on an informative level. Finally, the other non-neural systems of 
the body become only the physical executor of the brain/processor. Brain as a computer 
and Body as an executive machine. 
- Fourthly and lastly, the digital advancements of information technology, mostly 
after the development and diffusion of ‘touch-screen’ devices (see above), are 
increasingly meddling bodies and monitors, actual and virtual, on perceptive and 
physical levels. Cyborg bodies, bodies fused with computers, but where it is the 
biological part to be integrated into the artificial whole and not vice-versa. 
 
Deleuze positively conceives the body as an expansive force, as done with sexuality and 
rhizomes. Even in this matter (the body), his position remains complementary to 
Baudrillard’s ‘metastatic imaginary’. In contrast with the above analysis of the body 
under the negative metastatic tendency of monitors, it is necessary to briefly take into 
account Deleuze’s notion of body without organs (BwO), which can be interpreted as a 




The ‘BwO is not at all the opposite of the organs. […] [It] is opposed not to the organs 
but to that organization of the organs called the organism’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2014, 
184). Like subjectivity, signification and the State, the organism is a stratum, ‘a 
phenomenon of accumulation, coagulation, and sedimentation’ (Ibid.) from which a 
centralized power benefits. The medical doctors and hence the political power they 
embody (the State on a general level) specifically benefit from the organism (a stratum 
on the body without organs); organism ‘that, in order to extract useful labour from the 
body without organs, imposes upon it forms, functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchized 
organizations, organized transcendences’ (Ibid.). To unbind itself and thus us from the 
three most oppressing strata - the organism, significance (either interpretation), and 
subjectification – the body without organs respectively ‘opposes disarticulation, 
experimentation and nomadism […] (keep moving, even in place […])’ (Ibid., 185). 
 
As already addressed by this chapter, all the three main technologies of the monitor along 
with their entwinement with the Web (video games nowadays either already include an 
online multiplayer modality, or some of them revolve around solely online virtual worlds) 
hinder the three processes of stratification and centralization. For instance, ‘monitor 
technologies’ are all digital even if by different means (as mentioned several times); they 
thus tend to favour the use of specific and limited part of the bodies (hands’ movement 
and touch, eyes through sight, and only optionally ears through hearing) over others (the 
rest of the body). Video games replace interpretation with configuration (see above), 
whereby players adapt to a simulated environment through repeated trials and by 
developing specific required skill instead of building a personal meaning through 
catharsis. The superflat images (see above) and simulacra (see above) diffused by our 
media through an incessant circulation and an aimless communication, and dominating 
our culture, also reflect an increased absence of signification. The Internet has shaped and 
still shapes our globalized world as a relentless nomadic world on both the virtual sphere 
and the ‘physical’ one, thanks to the small shape of smartphones and their consequent 
easy transportability (see above); it has also decreased the power of the State, whose inner 
centralized and territorial organization makes it the political version of organism. 
 
However, Deleuze and Guattari warn everyone against de-stratifying too wildly: ‘if you 
blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then […] you will be killed, plunged into 
a black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe’ (Ibid., 187). The main risk is that a too-
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violent destratification might bring to a degenerated body without organs, either under 
the form of empty body without organs (drug addict, paranoiac, or hypochondriac) or 
under the form of cancerous body without organs (fascism in a general sense and even 
terrorism). The empty body without organs corresponds to ‘the void of too-sudden 
destratification’ (Ibid., 192) driven by a self-destructive desire. The cancerous body 
without organs corresponds to ‘the proliferation of a cancerous stratum’ (Ibid.) driven by 
the desire of ‘the power to annihilate’ (Ibid.), an over growing organized element that 
spreads and attacks everything else. Both these two degenerations of disorganized bodies 
(extendable beyond the individual body to the social, political body), foreseen by Deleuze 
and Guattari, echo the metastatic body of Baudrillard, so to underline once again the 
complementarity of the contagious tendency and the metastatic tendency, the positive and 


























A. SPECIFICALLY ON VITREOUS TECHNOLOGY 
Ocularcentrism is a term first applied by Martin Jay to define “certain cultures or ages 
[…] ‘dominated’ by vision” (Jay, 1994, 3). As widely demonstrated by the previous four 
parts of this work and as he points out, visual ‘prostheses’, such as the ‘telescope, 
microscope, camera or cinema’ (Ibid., 3) have intensively contributed to the enhancement 
of human sight and its central role in history, but they have also altered it. The several 
visual properties and potentials of glass, such as reflection, refraction, and transparency, 
have made it the fittest and most proper material to apply to these kinds of instruments. 
Despite having various components made of materials other than glass (e.g., the support 
of mirrors, the metal rod of telescopes), the latter embodies, in fact, the most relevant and 
central part of these tools, because glass allows and corresponds to their prominently 
visual function. 
However, this visual character of glass and the predominantly visual function given to 
tools with a central vitreous component, caused and still causes the proliferation of a wide 
variety of visual regimes, each one constituting specific ‘cultural categories’ (Ibid., 390). 
This proliferation is not the product of a conscious, rational plan, but it echoes an 
unpredictability inner to intelligence itself, materials, things and their reciprocal 
entanglement. As a result, each vitreous phase (from the phase to the monitor phase) 
works in both ‘metaphorical’ and concrete terms, through visual regimes with 
corresponding cultural categories and specific technological instantiations. For example, 
the lens phase operates through the scopic regimes of surveillance, observation, and gaze, 
on a virtual level, and through microscopes, telescopes and camera obscura on an actual 
level; the screen phase otherwise operates through the scopic regime of spectacle and 
cinema projectors and televisions. 
 
The cultural categories and the concepts ‘produced’ within each phase work also as 
‘anthropotechnics’: a form of instrumental reason not operating exclusively through 
physical tools on the ‘inert matter’, but also as techniques, practices affecting and 
‘manipulating’ humankind itself, and mostly the body. The various parts have illustrated 
how each phase generates a different relationship with the body and frames it into a 
different image. For example, the mirror phase corresponds to duplication, whereby the 
physical body is just the weak reflection of our intellectual, cultural, emotional aspects, 
which are then distinguished from them. The lens phase even increases such detachment, 
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by entailing the reification of the body, its reduction to a property, an inert mechanical 
automaton, which needs to be activated and possessed by a soul, a subject. The monitor 
phase generates a variety of relationships with the bodies, as exposed at the end of the 
homonymous part IV. 
 
Moreover, there is a part of the body that is apparently more affected by all these vitreous 
phases and thus by the hegemony of glass: the eyes. As widely shown throughout this 
study, the eyes have undergone a peculiar alteration, very different from the one vitreous 
technology has had on the rest of the body. Firstly, vitreous optics have hindered visual 
immediacy, by virtue of both its concrete instantiations through things and tools, and its 
abstract, social and cultural instantiations through concepts, cultural categories, visual 
regimes and social dynamics; the very idea of visual immediacy. In fact, the entire history 
of the technical use and symbolic use of glass throughout the ages has demonstrated how 
sight is never immediate and that it does not follow exclusively one kind of regime, but 
several. Secondly, the natural vision of the two eyes has been, with the mirror phase, 
juxtaposed to the eye of the mind, the mirror of nature, and perfected by it. Afterward, 
the lens phase has even made vision more monocular, more dependent on lenses, 
approaching macroscopic and microscopic reality otherwise impossible to reach. 
Therefore, these two ‘far lands’ are made visible by an altered and monocular vision, but 
also by a new ideology, a new conception of the world as purely extensive and objective, 
a conception that allowed the employment of lenses for observation. Furthermore, our 
environment of reference is modified alongside our sight. The world experienced by our 
two eyes overlaps with the flat and monocular worlds (from microscopic to macroscopic) 
which lenses disclose. Similarly, mirrors engendered the Greek’s doubt about reality 
itself, forcing them to split reality into two sides, two realms. 
The screen phase further affected our eyes, our vision, and our environmental orientation 
through a hyperbolic multiplication of images, related to the invention of devices such as 
the photo camera, the cinema and the stereoscope. The latter specifically ‘called into 
question the assumed congruence between the geometry of the world and the natural 
geometry of the mind's eye' (Ibid., 152), while the camera’s eye corresponded to the 
development of a new eye of a frozen kind, overlapping with our two ‘natural' eyes'. 
Furthermore, with the diffusion of the medium of TV and, the indistinctiveness between 
images and things, already hinted at by cinema, increased, until they assumed  increased 
traction with information technology. The increased linking of images and things 
184 
 
corresponded with  the development of hyperreality and expanded reality, whereby our 
relationship with the ‘world' was  once again modified as an entanglement of virtual and 
actual, software and hardware. Consequently, the relationship between ‘man' and 
machine is overcome, as the glass is integrated with electronic components which alter it. 
No longer simply external elements (as the metal support was for mirrors and lenses) but 
also central. Finally, eyes and monitors become prosthesis of one another, reciprocal 
extensions, in an assimilation that also involved other parts of the body and other senses. 
On this note, the last two phases (screen and monitor) have specifically involved other 
senses, despite the centrality of sight which vitreous objects still create. The mirror and 
the lens phases were still purely visual because both are vitreous tools not yet merged 
with other materials. Since the twentieth century, the screen phase has included sound in 
their images and, later, the monitor phase has generated even haptic characteristics to its 
images. Furthermore, these two phases have also partially tackled the previous model of 
knowledge as ‘dispassionate cognition’ (Ibid., 146). 
 
Since the construction, and hence use of mirror, and the corresponding development of 
the mirror phase, vitreous tools (although constituted at their very beginning by metals 
rather than glass) have always favoured a cognitive conception of knowledge. In other 
words, knowledge has been favourably declined in visual terms, as a correspondence 
between a ‘mental' image and a world made static by our sight. Since the turn of the 
Nineteenth Century, the critique of representation were of different kinds, such as social, 
philosophical, and artistic, and yet, counterpoised by cognitivist theory. In the finale of 
the fourth part: the cognitivist theory -a specific approach in psychology and 
neurosciences which interpret the brain as a computer and, in turn, computers as 
computational machines, and not as integrated electronic machines. In other words, the 
process of these computational machines follows the sensory-motor schemata of 
stimulus, hence computation and final adequate response. – 
Therefore, this ‘brain-monitor’ is finalized to recognize a distant external reality made of 
discrete objects and to translate them through internal information and data. This 
cognitivist conception instead of rejecting knowledge as cognition reinstated it, proving 
how the integrating side of monitors, with their electronic components, lives alongside 
the glassy cognitive knowledge, as a computer monitor relies in equal measure on 




Other possible common characteristics of glass, and thus of the vitreous optic are: its 
versatility, its tastelessness, its apparent impartiality, and its tendency toward flatness and 
extension on bidimensional surfaces. All vitreous phases share in fact an illusionary 
displacement of the third dimension. Regarding the impact of glass on contemporary 
design and architecture (and thus not just concerning screens and monitors), Baudrillard 
states: 
“One material sums up the idea of atmosphere and may be thought of as 
embodying a universal function in the modern environment. That material is 
GLASS. Advertising calls it ‘the material of the future’ – a future which, as we 
all know, will itself be ‘transparent’. Glass is thus both the material used and the 
ideal to be achieved, both end and means. So much for metaphysics. […] It is the 
ideal recipient: it does not ‘pick up the taste’, it does not change over time as a 
function of its content, as do wood and metal, nor does it shroud that content in 
mystery” (Baudrillard, 1998, 41). 
 
In conclusion, Glass is the material that most effectively and in the longer term, has 
affected, and followed us. Somehow accompanied by metal, both materials display on a 
more general level, the strict and unbreakable relationship between intelligence, things, 
material, and technology. As a result, there are vast possibilities for ‘human' development. 
To address the potentials of such development, such relationship will be the focus of the 
next and last paragraph of this final part. 
 
B. GENERALLY ON TECHNE 
1. Redefining Intelligence 
The entanglement of glass craft and human development throughout approximately 2500 
years is only the most visible exemplification of how entwined intelligence, humanity, 
technology, material, and things are. The intertwinement of these five terms entails the 
redefinition of each of them. To redefine intelligence according to this new asset, it is 
necessary to refer to the advanced definition of Henri Bergson and hence deem to which 
extent it is still valid or not. 
 
Although the specific history of vitreous optics and its various phases has developed into 
a cognitive model of knowledge, intelligence is at its core, beyond its epiphenomenal 
manifestations, a faculty not meant to achieve knowledge and even less a knowledge 
based on recognition (representation); but it instead it aims to fabricate instruments, to 
achieve craftsmanship. This is the extent to which it is necessary to support the view of 
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Henri Bergson, insofar as he considers intelligence a tendency of action and not a 
substantial entity: 
‘If we could rid ourselves of all pride, if, to define our species, we kept strictly to 
what the historic and the prehistoric periods show us to be the constant 
characteristic of man and of intelligence, we should say not Homo sapiens, but 
Homo faber. In short, intelligence, considered in what seems to be its original 
feature, is the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools to make 
tools, and of indefinitely varying the manufacture’ (Bergson, 1998, 139). 
 
The strict relationship between intelligent and instrumentality is also confirmed by a 
closer look at language and concepts (thus thought). Firstly, by focusing on the 
relationship between glass, society  (in terms of human relationships, their specific forms 
and their development) and thought it is already possible to acknowledge how every 
invention coincides with a linguistic shift, with the need for a definition which will 
probably work in the future as a new metaphor for new thoughts. As argued by Bergson, 
‘Without language, intelligence would probably have remained riveted to the material 
object which it was interested in considering’ (Ibid., 159). In fact, words are mobile and 
not adherent signs that, in virtue of these characteristics, allow free passing from an object 
to another: ‘The word, made to pass from one thing to another, is, in fact, by nature 
transferable and free’ (Ibid.). Therefore, language neither coincides with sociality nor is 
it a cognitive tool; otherwise, it primarily enables the construction of relationships 
between objects and thus facilitates their combination and designing. 
 
Secondly, concepts are not mere mental representations, mental copies of real objects, 
and therefore do not reflect nature. They otherwise work as virtual utensils, they have a 
duration within which they mutate whether we realize it, or not. They are poietic, 
productive forces, forms to apply concretely to reality rather than elements, particles of 
knowledge. They determine the coordinates we use to orientate ourselves in the world. 
As demonstrated by the specific case of the different phases developed over human 
history and the history of glass craft, concepts have the same development as objects but 
on a virtual plan. They indicate how to make objects, instead of merely represent. As once 
again intuited by Bergson ‘concepts […] are outside each other, like objects in space; and 
they have the same stability as such objects, on which they have been modelled. Taken 




However, it is from this point that it is possible to take a departure from Bergson’s 
conception of intelligence. This intelligible world is, in fact, not entirely under human 
control: It is neither wholly predictable in its effects, or its virtual, conceptual features, 
nor its actual production such as computers, automata, and utensils. In other words, as 
shown explicitly by the evolution of vitreous optic, (which includes both the various 
vitreous technologies and the various phases/steps analysed), the instrumentality of 
intellect is being reversed, whereby rationality follows a specific material and takes a 
specific shape in relation to the manipulated material, and hence the produced objects. As 
intellect is meant to manipulate things, so materials have a degree of influence on 
intellect. The specific instance of the success of glass (and of metal too) is just a 
contingent process, one of the many directions intelligence can take concerning every 
possible material. Moreover, the different phases, the different specific things produced 
out of a specific material, do not follow any deterministic path. To summarize, all the 
different phenomena and phases developed throughout human history and related strictly 
to vitreous optics only constitute one direction out of many, taken by intelligence. In other 
words, it is only a result of the symbiotic relationship between intelligence and materials, 
and intelligence and things: As we frame things, they reframe us. As a result, Francis 
Bacon's notion that we know what we fabricate is incorrect. We do not have complete 
control over our technology, either as products or extensions of ourselves. 
 
The relationship between utensils throughout the course of history assumes the dimension 
of a chain made of different levels of fabrication, where utensils are used to make other 
utensils, and where particular kinds of tools tend to have a priority over others. In this 
regard, both glass, metal, and vitreous and metallic objects were primarily employed to 
forge other objects and materials, thereby influencing our modality of manipulation and 
crafting for centuries, as illustrated widely by this study. Bergson reductively limits the 
processing of intelligence to the characteristics they have historically assumed, by 
prioritizing these two materials. For instance, he states: 
-Firstly, ‘to modify an object, we have to perceive it as divisible and discontinuous’ (Ibid., 
162). 
-Secondly, ‘Of the discontinuous alone does the intellect form a clear idea’ (Ibid., 154); 
-Lastly, ‘The intellect is characterized by the unlimited power of decomposing according 




As a final note, despite the gloss on the above-mentioned considerations, Bergson makes 
an agreeable statement regarding how fabrication is not just limited to practical aims such 
as surviving: 
‘The first business [of intelligence] was indeed to make instruments, but this fabrication 
is possible only by the employment of certain means which are not cut to the exact 
measure of their object, but go beyond it, and thus allow intelligence a supplementary – 
that is to say disinterested work’ (Ibid., 159). 
Thanks to this final note, it is possible to move forward and to redefine things in a new 
way, not as mere predictable, devitalized and unambiguous possessions in our hands. 
 
2. Redefining ‘Thing’ 
Reification is not only a phenomenon affecting human beings but also many other things. 
Reification should be appropriately defined as a phenomenon of Cartesian reduction to 
res extensa, to pure extension, whereby the original meaning of the word thing is replaced 
by the Cartesian appropriation of Latin word res. It is interesting to note that the latter 
stems from the Sanskrit ray, which stands for property. In this regard, Part II has 
illustrated how the distinction between subject and object has developed due to the 
development of private property, which was conceptually framed by John Locke and 
strictly intertwined with Cartesian separation between thinking entities and extensive 
entities. In fact, the discussion of Lens Phase has also illustrated how defining certain 
entities as merely extensive, unqualified and inertly uninfluential allows for the institution 
of a sense of property toward them, whereas Locke also reduces the body to a property. 
Part II has also illustrated how the constitution and expansion of this construct (the object) 
were massively favoured by the development, enhancement and extensive use of 
observatory tools which employ lenses, such as the dark room, the telescope, and the 
microscope. In fact, through lenses, our sight tends to look for ‘the cadaverization of life' 
(Jay, 1994, 395). Therefore, during modernity, things were reduced socially (through 
private property) and conceptually to objects; they had been reified. 
 
The redefinition of intelligence, thanks also to Bergson’s perspective on the matter, 
partially requalifies ‘things’, but without fully achieving the goal of the present section. 
Heidegger attempted a redefinition of things according to the original etymology of this 
term, whereby a thing is a gathering, a product of particular care: an assembly. However, 
Heidegger partially kept the term object (Gegenstand, which stands for ‘what stands 
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against’) and used it to define technological products, insofar as technology herein refers 
to its modern and scientific connotation. As a result, he traced a dichotomy between things 
‘in there’ and objects ‘out there’, as reported by the French sociologist and philosopher 
of technology Bruno Latour (1947-): 
‘The handmade jug can be a thing, while the industrially made can of Coke remains an 
object. While the latter is abandoned to the empty mastery of science and technology, 
only the former, cradled in the respectful idiom of art, craftsmanship, and poetry, could 
deploy and gather its rich set of connections’ (Latour, 2001, 233). Therefore, there are 
still ‘reified’ objects even within the ontology of Martin Heidegger. 
 
By contrast, every product is never just an object, but primarily a thing; it is never 
designed to solve practical matters at hand, but its manufacturing exceeds such problem-
solving schemata. 
Gilles Deleuze and Bruno Latour have nonetheless adequately requalified things. Firstly, 
Deleuze has reintroduced objects within our point of view, whereby we do not have points 
of view about things (as with phenomenology), but ‘Each point of view must itself be the 
object, or the object must belong to the point of view. The object must therefore be in no 
way identical, but torn asunder in a difference in which the identity of the object as seen 
by a seeing subject vanishes’ (Deleuze, 2014, 71). 
 
Secondly, Latour has correctly removed Heidegger’s dichotomy between things and 
objects, by replacing matters of fact with matter of concern and hence overcome the 
traditional distinction between nature and society. The epistemological notion of matters 
of fact has reinforced the metaphysical separation between the two classes of material 
entities and social entities. Matters of fact are what defines reality, then nature: “‘Nature’ 
conceived as the gathering of all non-social matters of fact’ (Latour, 2007, 109). It means 
that only certain entities, like things and animals, can be invested by factuality and 
‘ascend’ to the natural realm. 
 
Latour thinks that the utility of this concept is limited to its initial use by the 
Enlightenment: ‘the Enlightenment profited largely from the disposition of a very 
powerful descriptive tool, that of matters of fact, which were excellent for debunking 
quite a lot of beliefs, powers, and illusions’ (Latour, 2001, 232). Afterward, it developed 
into a central concept for the entire positivist manifesto and still characterizes the 
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language of many scientists by designating all that is uncontrovertibly given in 
experience. However, the previous four parts have concretely proven how the term 
‘matter of fact’ is too narrow for expressing the complexity of those entities wrongly 
labelled as natural and thus reduced to ‘silent’ objects deprived of any history and trace, 
or of any relationship whatsoever with who manufactures, utilises or does research on 
them. Therefore, it is necessary to bring back objects to their original status of being 
things and in reverse to also reconnect social non-facts (like society and human beings) 
to things. According to the etymology of the term thing, Latour defines it: ‘in one sense, 
an object out there and, in another sense, an issue very much in there, at any rate, a 
gathering’ (Ibid., 233). 
In order to achieve his aim, the French sociologist replaces matters of fact with matters 
of concern, since ‘Matters of fact are a poor proxy of experience and of experimentation 
and […] a confusing bundle of polemics, of epistemology, of modernist politics that can 
in no way claim to represent what is requested by a realist attitude’ (Ibid., 245). Only 
matters of concern are adequate to describe the plethora of entities (or things) that 
circulate in our ordinary world and "to renew from top to bottom the very scene of 
empiricism—and hence the divide between ‘natural' and ‘social'. A natural world made 
up of matters of fact does not look quite the same as a world consisting of matters of 
concern and thus cannot be used so easily as a foil for the ‘symbolic-human-intentional' 
social order" (Latour, 2007, 114-115). In fact, the expression 'matters of concern' 
implicates an empirical and tangible relation and entanglement with objectivity, or rather 
‘thingness’. It requires an active and continued gathering of information, data, materials 
to achieve an understanding, while the notion of matters of fact only hides the difficulty 
that every inquiry on any subject requires. Thanks to the two interconnected notions of 
thing and matters of concern Latour has found the means for redistributing objects and 
subjects, which means breaking the two frameworks into those where they both have been 
aprioristically confined, in other words, nature and society. As shown through the 
exceptional example of glass, both materials/things and human beings are non-
hierarchically associated; they are involved into the same process, so that none of them is 
deterministically determined by the other or strictly distinguished from it.  
 
3. Replacing Matter with Materials 
There are two main ways to relate to non-organic beings: as materials and as matter. Most 
pre-Socratic Greek philosophers first developed both these two 'approaches' as 
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alternatives to the purely mathematical, spiritual and abstract conception of Pythagoreans, 
before philosophy also moved into the study of ethics and politics with Socrates and Plato. 
In fact, Pythagoras, and Parmenides too, introduced philosophy and more generally 
thought to that detachment from reality that would take   root even deeper with Plato’s 
Two Worlds Theory, defining the contemplative characteristic of philosophy. On the 
contrary, the majority of pre-Socratic philosophers were philosophers of nature, 
exclusively interested in fully comprehending physis (nature in Greek) and its main 
features, a nature always conceived as an encompassing reality and as something distant 
from us. Sophists are inevitably excluded from this category of naturalist thinkers due to 
their disregard for any possible understanding of the real. 
 
As mentioned above, amongst the naturalist pre-Socratics, there were two main modes to 
understand physis: either as archè (meaning ‘principle’) or constituted of atoms. The 
former approach was by far the most common, while only Democritus developed the 
latter following the path of his master Leucippus, at least before the Hellenistic 
philosophy and specifically Epicurus’ rehearsal of atomism. Understanding nature as 
archè meant relating physis to a specific principle of the world; a specific underlying 
material constituting reality. Chronologically, this approach was the first to have based 
itself on materials. It is monistic insofar as it views ‘nature’ as an undivided, indistinct 
and always mutating form,  nonetheless keeping its strict substantial and noumenal 
references to a certain element, which both constitutes and includes everything within it. 
Socratic thinkers who understood nature as archè and generated different schools of 
thought and a different view on the properties of the world. In fact, a material was 
identified  as archè because its features were deemed to be   the features of the whole of 
‘nature’ itself or because of certain evaluation of pseudo-empirical character. For 
Instance, to Thales physis was made of water and then liquid; to Heraclitus it was fire, as 
it was characterized as unstable, and thus in constant turmoil; to Anaximenes it was air 
because he deemed every natural phenomena in terms of rarefaction and condensation of 
air. 
 
This approach to nature as not being composed of fragmented and fluid materials 
characterized, to a greater extent, the Italian Renaissance, through two parallel 
phenomena: the alchemic philosophy and the guilds.  Alchemy differed profoundly from 
the pre-Socratic philosophy of material as archè, because it referred to a pluralism of 
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materials (without any original element that might work as principle for any other 
entities), each one mutating into another, but with no reference to any atomistic theory 
(as with Chemistry). It also favoured manipulation, artificiality over natural formation. 
Moreover, alchemy added symbolic qualification to materials over the mere descriptive 
properties of the pre-Socratics. In other words, humans actively manipulated materials in 
order to produce something, while the Greek approach had been a merely descriptive one. 
In fact, the materials identified as archè could have been only natural elements, such as 
air, fire (as accidental fire) and water, whereby human beings were just a form assumed 
by them without any real influence on the process, indeed a process of pure mutation of 
forms. For Instance, Greeks distinguished between the accidental fire, which is designated 
by the world ignis and the artificial fire, which is designated by the world piros, not only 
on an actual but also on a virtual level. 
For the alchemic thought of the Renaissance, there is not just a mutation of forms, but 
also a transformation of a material into another material, also affecting its own properties. 
Human beings are actively involved in this process: they act as the manipulator of such 
materials, like artisans, but operating and manipulating themselves. It is a process of both 
the actual plan of materials, and the virtual plan of concept, affection, behaviour, sociality, 
and perception. Therefore, actual materials are invested by a symbolic attribution, 
whereby their transformation of one into another corresponds to a change from certain 
properties to others, and thus to an inner transformation of characteristics within the 
artisan/alchemist. In other words, ‘human souls’ mutate too and assume the property of 
the materials which  are forged time and again. 
 
The development of alchemy as an ‘operating philosophy’ that generates relationships 
and conceptually assembles with materials, contrasts with the merely descriptive and 
passively involved character of pre-Socratic philosophy. The development and diffusion 
of alchemy during the Renaissance is parallel with the more concrete advance of guilds 
primarily in the centre and north of Italy. A guild was a corporation of artisans which had 
a great deal of political power within the Italian communal systems even since the late 
twelfth century. By the Fourteenth and Fifteenth century, the guild was a determinant of 
the economy of Europe. Each corporation was specialized in a specific art, where art 
referred to technique, to a practical discipline with a productive goal, such as weaving. 
For instance, amongst the major guilds in Florence, there were the Art of the Wool and 
the Art of the Silk. This practical declension of art left nonetheless, great room for 
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refinement in the final products, a refinement that transcended the mere instrumentality 
and showed its effectiveness through the architecture, sculpture, and painting (the three 
Fine Arts) of the Italian Renaissance. In fact, Leonardo da Vinci, Donatello, 
Michelangelo, Brunelleschi, Piero della Francesca have all been apprentices of so-called 
botteghe (workshops). 
 
Democritus otherwise initiated the other line of thought that became hegemonic from 
modernity onward, when the modern industrials replaced the artisans of the Renaissance. 
Democritus indeed introduced the concept of matter as we conceive it nowadays: as an 
aggregate of atoms, which makes him the first materialist in history. In this regard, Karl 
Marx wrote his doctoral thesis on Democritus’ atomist view and contributed, along with 
positivism, to the definite ‘triumph’ of materialism in the twentieth century, whereby the 
whole reality (including social phenomena and concepts) are interpreted only as matter. 
Already Modern philosophy tended toward a conception of this kind, mostly due to the 
mechanist reduction of physical entities to merely extensive and unqualified entities 
operated firstly by Renè Descartes. 
 
The atomism of Democritus applies to all beings, by hyper-fragmenting them through a 
purely analytical process. The result of this conceptual elaboration is an immense 
multitude of discrete and strictly separated elements, each of them nonetheless without 
specific properties, unqualified, replaceable and equal to any other: the atom as an 
infinitely replicable model. On the contrary, the concept of material expressed through 
the pre-Socratic archè and even better by the alchemic philosophy of Renaissance 
generates qualities such as: differentiation, continuity, contiguity, and hybridization 
within nature. 
 
As argued by Bruno Latour, ‘If there is one thing that materialism has never known how 
to celebrate it is the multiplicity of materials, that indefinite alteration of the hidden forces 
that enhance the shrewdness of those who explore them’. (Latour, 2013, 220) Such 








4. Redefining Technology 
Six principles help to redefine technology: 
 
1. Technology refers to any possible utensil used in history and pre-history due to the 
specific characteristics of intelligence. As far as it is artificially induced, even fire is a 
technology. Therefore, technology refers to every utensil and to the practices executed by 
tools. 
 
2. Technology appears as a submitted and predictable instrument only at its outset. In this 
regard, the following sentence of Bruno Latour is enlightening: “Nothing is less proper to 
technologies than the relation between the end and the means, since ends and means are 
invented simultaneously. It is a grievous misunderstanding to claim to see technologies 
as mere ‘applications of Science’ and mere ‘domination of Nature’—we now know how 
to counter the weight of the mistakes borne by those two proper nouns.” (Ibid.). Liberating 
technology from mere functionality means also liberating it from neutrality: ‘When 
people say of technologies that they are neither good nor bad, they forget to add: nor 
neutral’ (Ibid., 219). On this matter, Jean Baudrillard gives another important insight: ‘A 
utensil is never possessed, because a utensil refers one to the world; what is possessed is 
always an object abstracted from its function and thus brought into relationship with the 
subject. In this context all owned objects partake the same abstractness, and refer to one 
another only inasmuch as they refer solely to the subject. Such objects together make up 
the system through which the subject strives to construct a world, a private totality’ 
(Baudrillard 1988, 86). For instance, vitreous tools were primarily crafted to enhance our 
visual capacities, allowing at the beginning the seeing of our own body (mirror phase), 
later seeing further (lens phase) and finally seeing the imaginary as if it were real (screen 
and monitor phases). The choice of focusing on the implementation of sight over other 
abilities is mostly the result of pressure from society and culture (in the form of 
philosophy, religion, art, etc.), rather than the expression of a primary necessity. However, 
this study has explored the several ways vitreous tools exceeded their function, 
unpredictably retro-affecting the social, perceptive and conceptual ‘spheres’ (never to be 




3. Technology, every utensil, works as an extension of our body, insofar as each specific 
tool extends a specific part of it. On this note, glass specifically allowed the 
manufacturing of a wide range of extensions for our eyes. This means the on a general 
level technology, and on a specific level vitreous tools, are media. In this regard, the 
distinction made mostly by Marxists and all the Frankfurt School between primary and 
secondary needs is not sufficient, since it does not consider how our needs are filtered by 
the utensil we use to satisfy them, and not only by language. Things also work as an 
extension of ourselves, as compensation for a perceived limitation, as exemplified by the 
craving for flying: the airplane somehow satisfies it but also works as an extension for us. 
It is the realization of the myth of Icarus: humans equipped with artificial wings. On one 
level, the wings satisfy a desire, but on another, the wings work as an extension. Extension 
means that there is no organic unity, that our sensitivity is reduced to give place to 
something that works as if. While a bird feels its wings, its wings are part of it, it feels 
them, Icarus does not feel his artificial wings as part of him but uses them, as were they. 
There is a fictional element within ‘tools', mostly when we use them. 
 
4. It follows from this last note that technology is also a filter. Everything we observe, we 
analyse, is always filtered through our tools. As our study has illustrated with glass, our 
perception, sight especially, is always reframed by the tools we use, and not just extended 
through them. 
 
5.Technology alters what it is supposed to enhance. For instance, this work has addressed 
how glassy technology has, since antiquity altered our primary visual perception. 
 
6. Technology also stands for practice and not only for utensil and all ‘artificial’ things. 
To this extent, culture itself is a technique that tends to train us, a self-manipulation of 
humankind not so different from the crafting or industrial production of objects and 
materials. This manipulation is should be understood, not in hierarchical terms, but as a 
circular  relationship wherein all terms are equally affected, as occurs in surveillance, 
along with the spectacle, theatre and many other ‘technologies of the self' developed by 
the various vitreous phases. 
Such practices, technologies, and forms of ‘domestication’ (including education too) are 
always possible and parallel to actual technologies, tools, utensils, things, referring one 
level to the other and reciprocally allowing their effectiveness. This phenomenon 
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illustrates how intelligence can apply its instrumental attitude toward the organic and 
toward itself too, despite its predisposition towards the inorganic, with particular attention 
to the unorganized solid. Culture, including religion, art, and philosophy which are all 
technologies of the self, practice with a broad social element that applied nonetheless an 
instrumental (thus intelligent) approach. 
 
As anticipated by Bergson, philosophy, speculative thought is not separated from the 
‘instrumentality’ of intelligence, but belongs to it, affecting, as already shown throughout 
this study, society and concrete technical development despite its self-portrayal and 
intentions. Its categories and concepts are themselves techniques with a manipulative 
effect on what they are applied to, and not a representative scope. However, concepts are 
also reversely affected by the ‘attachment’ intelligence has toward the things it designs. 
In this regard, the first part has established the concrete embedment of the word and 
concept of theoria within the actual reflective property of mirrors. Therefore, theoria is 
not a genuine and disinterested approach to reality distinguished from praxis, and 
philosophy is itself a form of poiesis, a constructive technique, whereby description is 
never adherent to an object, but somehow it creates it, and/or  unwarily modifies it. 
However, theoria is also a great scale form of organization, a project, a plan, that echoes 
the extension and flatness of the mirror (and every other glass pane). It is a particular 
instrumental way of organizing the world, an organization that takes the solid as the model 
and has dominated for centuries the way we act, as both social and public praxis, political 
action (following the definition of Aristotle) and strictly manufacturing poiesis. 
 
Art is another practice, a techne, which has its genealogy mostly in handcraft, while it is 
only after romanticism that our understanding of this activity became strictly bound to 
the figure of genius, to expression, to feeling and less on technique. Art from pure poiesis 
changed into a form of expression of ourselves, of some inner states. Later, Heidegger’s 
contribution  generated even more distance from the technical notion of art. For him, art 
reveals the thingness of things, or, in other words, it reveals the function of specific things, 
it makes us aware of objects that we will otherwise forget about in the moment we use 
them. He considers by defining the goal of art as the reveal of the thingness of things, or 
better the thingness of a specific thing. As already argued by Nietzsche in his On the 
Genealogy of Morals (1887) morality is a last notable example of practice, which affects 
concretely our body through the definition, institution and application of specific social 
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relationships. It uses, in fact, the flexibility and relocating characteristic of language, 
along with its reference to a specific set of value, words, and grammar shared by a specific 
group, community, and nation, to manipulate, afflict, direct and train the singular bodies. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to follow Latour’s definition of technology as a mode of existence, 
whereby “‘Technology’ does not designate an object but rather a difference, a new 
declension of alterity” (Latour, 2013, 223). Where technology stops being conceived as 
a stable substance, or an object with an identity. Instead, it is conceived in terms of 
possibility, of force, of power, of what original transformations it might bring. 
Technology is viewed as a mode, more specifically as ‘a mixed mode: proteiform speed 
on one side, persistence on the other’ (Ibid., 225). “As we can see, the adjective 
‘technological’ does not designate in the first place an object, but a movement that is 
going to take from inert entities and from living ones […] what is needed to hold together 
in a lasting way […] one of the moments of metamorphosis” (Ibid.). Latour tries to 
liberate technology also from the common prejudices and presumptions that surround it; 
to see it a different way than as a field of action, and as a specific method for assembling 
a multitude of entities rather than an object. One of the most recurrent views is the 
reduction of technology to the limited pattern of inert ‘objects'. On that note, Latour 
considers it impossible to do "justice to technologies with the two patterns of ‘Objects' 
and ‘Subjects'" (Ibid., 211). He accuses this characterization of technology as ‘object' for 
dismissing naively and too arbitrarily the agency that such ‘mode of existence' possesses. 
Arguing against such misunderstanding, he states that ‘all humans are the children of 
what they have worked on' (Ibid., 231). Latour has, in such a way, inverted the entirety 
of modern metaphysics, dismantling the very modern assumption that technology has to 
be understood only under the regime of instrumentality. In other words, Latour is 
‘relocating' the technological: tools are not just tools, means made for a specific end. 
“Technology is [wrongly] believed to be an action stemming from a human being – most 
often male, moreover – that would then bear ‘on’ matter itself conceived through 
confusion between geometry and persistence” (Ibid., 219-220). It follows that tools, and 
technologies transcend their function due to the many connections they can develop with 










- Alberti, L. B. (2004), On Painting, translated by Grayson, C. London: Penguin 
Books. 
- Alpers, S. 1983, The Art of Describing : Dutch art in the Seventeenth Century, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
- Alexander J. C., Giesen B and Mast J.L. 2006, Social Performance, Cambridge 
(UK): Cambridge University Press. 
- Apuleius (2017), Apologia. Florida. De Deo Socratis., edited and translated by 
Jones, C. P. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.. 
- Aquinas, T. (2008), Truth, translated by Mulligan, R. W. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf 
& Stock. 
- Aristotle (1952), Meteorologica, translated by Lee, H. D. P. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
- Aristotle (1957), On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On Breath., translated by Hett, 
W. S. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
- Aristotle (1996), Poetics, translated by Heath M. London: Penguin Books 
- Aristotle (1893), The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Peters, F. H. London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 
- Assmann, J. 2002, The Mind of Egypt: History and Meaning in the Time of the 
Pharaohs, New York: Metropolitan. 
- Azuma, H 2009, Otaku: Japan’s Database Animals, Minneapolis: University                                                                                                                            
of Minnesota Press. 
- Bacon, F. (2017), Novum Organum, translated by Spedding J., Ellis R. L., and 
Heath D. D. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press. 
- Bacon, F. (2012), The Great Instauration, Jersey City (USA): Start Publishing. 
- Barilli R. 2005, Bergson. Il Filosofo del Software, translated by the PhD candidate 
Andrea Bergamini, Milan: Raffaello Cortina Editore. 
- Barthes, R. (1977), Image, Music, Text, essays selected and translated by Heat, S. 
London: Fontana Press. 
- Baudrillard, J. (1989), America, translated by Turner, C. London: Verso. 
199 
 
- Baudrillard, J. (1994), Simulacra and Simulation, translated by Glaser, F. S. Ann 
Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 
- Baudrillard J. (1995), The Gulf War did not take place, translated by Patton, P. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
- Baudrillard, J. (1996), The Perfect Crime, translated by Turner, C. London: Verso. 
- Baudrillard J. (1988), The System of Objects, translated by Benedict, J. London-
New York: Verso. 
- Baudrillard, J. (1993), The Transparency of Evil, translated by Benedict, J. 
London: Verso. 
- Bauman, Z. 2003, Liquid Love, Cambridge (UK): Polity Press. 
- Bauman, Z. 2015, Liquid Modernity, Cambridge (UK): Polity Press. 
- Benjamin, W. (1999), Selected Writings Volume 2 1927-1934, Translated by 
Livingstone R. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University. 
- Bentham, J. 1843, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 4, London: Simpkin, 
Marshall, & Co. 
- Berger, J. 1972, Ways of Seing, London: Penguin Books. 
- Bergson H. (1998), Creative Evolution, translated by Mitchell A. Mineola, N.Y.: 
Dover Publication. 
- Berkeley, G. 2005, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, 
New York: Cosimo. 
- Berman, M. 1988, All That is Solid Melts into Air, London: Penguin Books. 
- Bonnet, S. M. (2014), The Mirror: A History, translated by Jewett, K. H. New 
York: Routledge. 
- Burn A. and Gareth S., Heavy Hero or Digital Dummy? Multimodal Player–
Avatar Relations in Final Fantasy 7, Journal of Visual Communication, Vol 3, 
Issue 2. 
- Burch, N. Spring 1981, “Charles Baudelaire versus Doctor Frankenstein”, 
Afterimage, 8/9. 
- Cavell, S. 1979, The World Viewed: Reflections and the Ontology of Film, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
- Chee L. & Lim, E. 2015, Asian Cinema and the Use of Space: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives, New York and London: Routledge. 
200 
 
- Clark, T.J. 1984, The Painting of Modern Life: Paris in the Art of Manet and his 
Followers, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Press University. 
- Clarke J, 2014, the cinema of James Cameron: bodies in heroic motion, New 
York: Wallflower Press. 
- Cole C. May 2017, Interview of former RAF Reaper pilot ‘Justin Thompson’ (a 
pseudonym), Drone Wars UK. 
- 1 Corinthians 13:12, Holy Bible: King James Version. 
- Crary, J. 1990, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the 
Nineteenth Century, M.I.T, Boston. 
- Cutting, J.E. 1986, Perception with an Eye for Motion, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
- Dante Alighieri (1867), The Divine Comedy: Paradiso, translated by Longfellow, 
H. W. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Welch, Bigelow, & Co. 
- Debord, G. (2006) The Society of the Spectacle, translated by Nicholson-Smith D. 
New York: Zonebooks. 
- Der Derian J. 2001, Virtuous War/Virtual Theory, International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 76, No. 4. (Oct., 2000). 
- Descartes, R. (2001), Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry and Meteorology, 
Translated by Olscamp P.J. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 
- De Duve, T. 1978, Time Exposure and Snapshot: The Photography as Paradox, 
Photography, Vol. 5 (Oct., 1978) pp. 113-125. 
- Deleuze G. 1998, Bergsonism, translated by Tomlinson, H. & Habberjam, B. New 
York: Urzone Inc. 
- Deleuze, G. (2015), Cinema 1: The movement image, translated by Tomlinson, H. 
& Habberjam, B. London: Bloomsbury. 
- Deleuze, G. (2014), Cinema 2: The Time-Image, translated by Tomlinson, H. & 
Galeta, R. London: Bloomsbury. 
- Deleuze, G. (2014), Difference and repetition, translated by Patton P. London: 
Bloomsbury. 
- Deleuze, G. & Guattari F. 2014, A Thousand Plateau, translated by Massumi, B. 
London: Bloomsbury. 
- Diogenes Laertius (1925), Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Volume I: Books 1-5., 
translated by Hicks, R. D. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
- Drohojowska-Philp H. 2001, Superflat, Artnet. 
201 
 
- Foucault, M. (1991), Discipline and Punish: The Birth of The Prison, translated 
by Sheridan, A. London: Penguin Books. 
- Foucault, M. 2002, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, 
New York: Routledge. 
- Gaboury, J. 2015, “Hidden Surface Problems: On the Digital Image as Material 
Object”, Journal of Visual Culture pp. 40-60. 
- Gadamer, H. G. (1989), Truth and Method, translated by Weinsheimer J. & 
Marshall D. G. London: Sheed & Ward. 
- Galinsky, G.C. 1975, Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Bath, UK: The Pitman Press Ltd. 
- Gasché R. 1986, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of 
Reflection, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
- James 1:23-24, Holy Bible: King James Version. 
- Jay, M. 1994, Downcast Eyes, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University 
of California Press. 
- Hadot, P. (1998), Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision, Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
- Rosa, H. 2013, Social Acceleration, A New Theory of Modernity, New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
- Harvey, D. 2000, Spaces of Hope, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press. 
- Heidegger, M. (1977), The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays; 
Science and Reflection, translated by Lovitt, W. New York: Harper Torchbooks. 
- Henry M. (2012), Barbarism, London: Continuum. 
- Huntemann N. B. 2010, Joystick Soldiers: The Politics of Play in Military Video 
Games, New York: Routledge. 
- Huizinga, J. 2014, Homo Ludens: a Study of the Play-Element in Culture, 
Mansfield Centre, Connecticut (USA): Martino Publishing. 
- Latour, B. (2013), An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, translated by Porter, C. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
- Latour B. 2007, Reassembling the Social, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
- Latour B. 2001, Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to 
Matters of Concern, Critical Inquiry (The University of Chicago Press Journal 
1974-), Vol. 30, No. 2. (Winter 2003). 
- Leibniz, G.W. (1991), Monadology, Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Press. 
202 
 
- Leibniz, G. W. (1988) Political Writings, translated and edited by Riley, P. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
- Locke, J. 1846, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, translated by Kay, C. 
H. Philadelphia: Kay & Troutman ed. 
- Lucretius (1924), On the Nature of Things, translated by W. H. D. Rouse, W. H. 
D. revised by Martin Smith F. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press. 
- Martin, J. C. 2000, The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of 
Cinema, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
- McIntyre, A. 2007, After Virtue, Notre Dame, Indiana USA: University of Notre 
Dame Press. 
- Miller J. L. The Mirrors of Dante’s Paradiso, University of Toronto Quarterly, 
Vol. 46, No. 3. (Spring 1977). 
- Murray, J. H. 1997, Hamlet on the Holodeck: The future of Narrative in 
Cyberspace, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
- Nonnus (2014), Dionysiaca Books 1-15, translated by Rouse W.H.D. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
- Ovid (1876), Metamorphoses, translated by Riley H.T. London: George Bell and 
Sons p. 103. 
- Power, H. 1966, Experimental Philosophy, New York and London: Johnson 
Reprint Corporation. 
- Plato (1964), Alcibiades I, translated by Lamb, W. R. M. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
- Plato (1990), Theaetetus, translated by Levett M. J. Indianapolis/Cambridge: 
Hackett Publishing Company. 
- Plato (1968), The Republic of Plato, translated by Bloom A. Library of Congress, 
Washington, DC: BasicBooks. 
- Plautus (2011), Casina. The Casket Comedy. Curculio. Epidicus. The Two 
Menaechmuses., edited and translated by de Melo, W. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press. 
- Plotinus (1984), Enneads IV, translated by Amstrong A. H. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 




- Sartre, J. P. (1993), Being and Nothingness, translated by Barnes, H. E. New York: 
Washington Square Press. 
- Seneca (1971), Natural Questions, Volume I: Books 1-3, translated by Corcoran, 
T. H. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
- Snyder J. Spring 1980, “Picturing Vision”, Critical Inquiry, 5, 3. 
- Sotamaa, O. &  Karppi, T. (2010), Games as Services: Final Report, [online] 
available at: http://www.trim.fi 
- Virilio P. 2007, Negative Horizon: An Essay in Dromoscopy, London: 
Continuum. 
- Virilio P. 2006, Speed and Politics, Los Angeles: Semiotext(E). 
- Virilio P. 1994, The Vision Machine, Bloomington Indiana: University Press. 
- Wardrip-Fruin N. and Harrington P. 2004, First Person: New Media as Story, 
Performance, and Game, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT press. 
- Williams R. 1974, Television, New York: Routledge. 
- Willson, C. January-March 1988, “Visual Surface and Visual Symbols: The 
Microscope and Early Modern Science”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 49, 1. 
